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Hastings School of Law
Law Room
198 McAlister
San Francisco, Californ
November 18, 1981

CHAIRMAN ELIHU M. HARRIS: The subject of
hearing is AB 1820 which provides for State Fund
courts. AB 1820, which was introduced on behalf of
Council of California, merely states that "notwiths
provision of law, funding of the Trial Courts
provided by the State in accordance with the provis

"
Obviously, there are many different forms that State
Funding could take. For example, the Post Commission
if
five options, ranging from full assumption of judicial sa
(which would cost approximately $40 million) to a total
of the "Justice System" which would include District
Public Defenders and presentence probation functions and
would cost approximately $920 million.
We will hear today from a wide range of witnesses who
will comment on the desirability and feasibility of State fund
as well as on the fiscal, administrative, personnel
and local control implications of various methods of
State Financing of the Trial Courts.
We will hear first from Assemblyman Howard Berman
author of AB 1820.
ASSEMBLYMAN HOWARD BERMAN: Mr. Chairman, I i
this legislation at the request of the Judicial Council.
seems to me that all the different arguments,
conceptual ones with respect to the Courts as a
desire for some uniformity in terms of f
and the whole role of the judicial system argues for
State financed.
In the wake of Proposition 13, the
among local jurisdictions as far as their will
to provide adequate support are not helpful to the
of justice and any sense of equity. The real prob
is to devise some formula that allows the State to assume a
fairly significant additional financial burden at this
we are so strapped.
Is there a way to deal wi
the
ions that we provide in the wake of Proposit
AB 8 formulas to readiust those monies where
could pick up the cost of the Judicial Branch, most
absorbed by Counties? We could also somehow lessen,
Slthventions to the county use and provide this level of
uniformity based on legislatively determined polic
seems like it makes very good sense. Hopefully we ca
s today as to whether my basic view that it does
sense is confirmed and if so are there any innovat
s of how to do this at a t
where we

just augment our state budget by that amount without finding a
source of revenue somewhere.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: May I ask a question? Do you have any
position as to whether state financing should include a total
buy-out or should simply be a total assumption of judge's
salaries?
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: My view is that it should be a
total buy-out of all of the support aspects of the Judicial
System. There is a logic to having some uniformity or at least
differences determined by a rational state policy and not simply
a particular county's ability to pay. These are creations of the
State and the State Legislature and the Constitution so we should
them that way.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Our first witness is Mr. Ralph
11, Administrative Director of the California Courts.
MR. RALPH GAMPELL: Mr. Chairman, Members. Good
morning. My name is Ralph Gampell.
I am the Administrative
Director of the California Courts, and Mr. Assemblyman Berman was
enough to say that this legislation was introduced at the
request of the Judicial Council.
State funding of the trial
courts is not a new concept for the Judicial Council.
It's been
the Council's position for a considerable number of years, and it
came to the fore again immediately after the passage of
Proposition 13. You may recall the Committee of both houses that
received various suggestions. At that time, the Judicial Council
reiterated its prior position and its essential policy position
is that it is in favor of state funding of the Trial Courts with
1 control.
I recognize that that has within it a built-in
anachronism. But, equally well, in discussing with you, as I
you will remember as the various models which are available
go forward, you'll see that each one of them has their own set of
advantages and disadvantages.
On the general proposition of
state funding, it seems to me there can be little to say to the
What we have in each of
count s at all levels is
courts that are resolving disputes e
between the State and a
zen in the criminal law or
citizens on the civil
But the laws which are
and the rules
are being applied are s
You enact the law,
courts have to deal with it.
I can give you example after
le of what has been ooino on in mv own time. For very good
reasons, the penalties were increased for drunk driving. We know
that that will mean that there will be more jury trials.
I am
expressing any opinion of the merits of the drunk driving
bills, except to say that you enacted a statute which will haue
impact on the courts. Now, as you see from those pie chartf
of John Davies, whom many of you know as a senior legislative
sentative, if vou look at those pie charts, on the bottom
we have estimated trial conrt costs at $512 to $668 million
To get those fiaures, \Je took the 1978 numbers of the Post
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ssion and we applied two multipliers, the
of
cost of living and the actual CPI. The
and the second is actual. And if you
you'll see that of the total amount the local
$457 and $612 million, and the State has
on the other side.
If you look at the revenue s
fines, penalties, forfeitures, assessments and
rest,
see a figure of close to $400 million that is
it
ties, the counties, and the State. Now, you
outgoinq is entirely a county cost. Nothing is
ties and the cities do get a substantial port
incoming revenues. However, the cities will point out to you
it's their resources, their police, their meter maids,
enforcement which produces the criminal bulk of the business
which comes revenues into the system. The state's portion,
which goes into the earmarked funds and is not earmarked for the
courts, all kinds of people have a piece of that, University of
California, Fish and Game, drunk driving. Our proposition I
is simple. Somebody has to pick up this tab. The somebody
is the taxpayer. Are we going to require that wi
each county
amount of resource which is available to the courts that are
doing the state's business depends on the fis~al success of that
county? A Municipal Court in Beverly Hills is going to b8
served financially than a Municipal court in East Los Angeles.
There is more money around.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you Mr.
Tell me this, what is meant by local control and how
control exercised?
MR. GAMPELL: Well, let me answer that
what
think it isn't.
I don't think that the Judicial Council, and I
that the present Chief Justice certainly does not vjsualize
the New York Model. The New York Model is a
th centra
irection and power flowing down to each level to
st
1. That at the one end, clearly, is not with
f any body that I know. What we visualized, I
of the Post Commission was that money would
count s for judicial salaries and, I could on
own contemplation, because I know that the Counci
felt that the determination of how the money would
was
essentially a legislative decision and not one for
Council to make. Rut, to the extent of the State was
le, i
pick up the tab for the nonjudicial personnel, the
liffs, the clerks, all the persons who are
to make the
apparatus move, but again speaking for myself
Council does not take a position, it was not that these pPrsons
be incorporated into a state civil service but that
1 would stay with the localities, because judges and
and the local Boards of Supervisors are best
to
those elements. Maybe there should be some overall
principles that a judge has X amount for a clerk, and
in, the Council has never gotten into that. And one
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le way that was
scus
the State would contract
authority to provide these ancil
should pick up the sa
s
judicial branches.

Post Commiss
was
ies for the
services. But the
benef s of all

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I
why the state
't
pick up all the costs
not also exercising
re
ibility for determin
s. You want us to have a
statewide justice system at the
court level that is
sistent throughout the state. But you don't have one brand of
in Alameda County and
one in Los Angeles County.
And, I don't know how you do
ss there are so~e controls
at the state level.
I am not even sure what localit s, for
, should be able to do or
as relates to the
court system.
I'm not sure
particularly well
equipped to make so-called
on the court system.
MR. GAMPELL:
I think
answer to that is, what is a
decision? You could lay down broad guidelines for count
return for your subvention, but by the same token, let me g
I talked one time at a meet
a simple example if I might.
my opposite number in tJew
Thev quite recently have
ized their own court system.
took over twenty-eight,
it was, separate pension plans for employees throughout
State of New York. Let me put
into context. Supposing that
State were to take over all nonjudicial personnel into a
tate system. By the very nature of things that would mean that
a court clerk in Mendocino, who
get a very low rate of pay
have to come up to the
level,
may be what a court
gets in Los Angeles. The
fferentials that go with an
lernent of local control, would obviously have to disappear.
clerk one would have to get the same salary. And I think
would be a very heavy burden on us.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Wel that s al
of the state emp
s. That s
we adopt an administrat
MR. GAMPELL:

Yes,

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
local decisions are not on
ssary and well advised, as
at state level.
HR. GAMPELL:

the case
al
burden we have to

Nell, aga

CHAIPJ.'l..AN HARRIS:

Let 1 s

sed to

l contra
also
that might

, I could use a New

mode

California

MR.GAMPELL: Yes, are
go
to sav, for example, tha
judge would take the bench ~t 9 and f
ish at 5, which is
kind of state control
s
ss le but I
most

at 8:30 and
sirable. Or, that every clerk will come to
fini
at 5.
Those would seem to me element
knowledge of the judges and the court
there
on the ground.
Now, maybe, this pos
enunciated by Judge Eagleson who is
son participating in those discussions
are
Commission.
I certainly am not reluctant to
I
we going to be setting up a juggernaut?
recognize that I have absolutely no monopo
area.
In fact I am here to learn, as I
as to how this matter can be handled.
But
As the fiscal constraints become
to get money out of the local
sors.
You're going to decide, are we going to
a clerk to the
court or are we going to employ another nurse
ICU.
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: Mr. Gampell,
that this
should be done because of the service levels
are now subject to competing appropriation and
answer
the Board of Supervisors, I would not like to let
go
unquestioned.
Do you have some specif
s - some
horrendous that has happened to some citizen or to some
cons tuent because of the present format?
MR. GM1PELL:

Certainly not.

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: Certainly not?
all those hearings and discuss all this
reason to depart therefrom.

So we re going to
having some

MR. GAMPELL: No, but I think, any j
Los
les will tell you when they go in with
is competing in these days against what weJfare ...
ASSEMBLYMAN BERJvlAN:
MR. GAMPELL:

Isn't that

No.

ASSEMBLYMAN BERJv1AN: Why? Every
agency, the police, the sheriff, the
everybody else who also performs legit
1
, even lifesaving functions for the
their belt, reform and operate and
you saying that somehow the jud
HR. GAMPELL:
No, no, nothing of
that they should be in exactly that compet
r agency that requires money.
But that
Why should county X which is fai
be able to provide a higher level of service
, than a county which is not?
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no.

do
every
should be
1.vi th money
is a state

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN:
ational development
lized control, the
s of influence in the
lized system much more
ithic state system or
heard judge after judge,
s because they cannot
the wall to take up the cases,
computerize, they cannot
and that sort of
1 if they were
the Judie
MR. GAMPELL:

Well,

1 as I visualize it, wou

tically from an
wou
that, under a
lligence of various
about reforms in a
could through a
state system. And
said, berate other
codgers off the
duff to
cannot automate, they
tead of other
less do you think they
funded system that
they try to carry out

control from the Judicial
be of the most general

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN:
control. But, still, the
to
to assistant clerks or
to automate, the decis
judges as opposed to more judges, to change rules and
s, that sort of th
,
be dampened by the fact
larger the agency, the
go to the lowest common
to satisfy the nay-sayers
, because you always
MR. GAMPELL:

I am not sure of that.

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN
to that.
MR. GAMPELL:
siding judge would f
rule, he might be ab
colleague than he
the reca itrant col
can do

me

that does not

opposite side of that. But
, if he had some ove
1
have more
fluence on a
's a kind of one
now where
who has a
on
to hear,
or other
to compete statewide
s $600
llion
on a
1 level
of supervisors

MR. GM1.PELL:
If a court
lationship with
board
smelling like a rose, and
reason, the court and the
along too well, li
that out but the 1

whatever reason, has a
it's going to
in which
sors are not
The judges can

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: So,
level where a judge or judie
that
stead for any number of reasons
rather have them travel to Sacramento

up

MR. GAMPELL: No, it seems to me
generalized guidelines and the state
,
who are not going to suffer from
s result
local upset there is, the litigants are going
1 because the level of service is going to
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me
I
this is really a good point.
should be addressed on a continuing
sses
I would like to know, Mr. Gampell, is
Judicial
Council has a number of specific recommendations, or do they
simply have observations. Have you reached
conclusions as to
you would see the state assuming financ l respons
lity
the courts and also what kinds of auxiliary controls would you
see the state having if in fact they assume
1
responsibility on one or another level.
MR. GAMPELL: Yes, the Judicial Council has not
addressed at any time either in this administrat
or prior ones
the nuts and bolts of it, believing that is a
slative
function.
It seems to me that translating
of the
pos ion transmitted to the Post Commiss
general guidelines, state funding through
seems to me where the council essentially was,
the number 4 option listed by the Post Commiss
council favors having nothing at all to do
and public defenders who are within the
I think, the best translation.
But
should be effective, that seems to me a
ion.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, certa
think we are really getting the
that we should be getting on
For example as to the appellate proce
courts are financed, you ought to have a posi
agree or disagree, at least it gives us a po
own experience and practicality. At least
MR. GAMPELL: Speaking froJll rrty mm
lf of the Judicial Council, I helieve that a
like New York is not feasible in Californ
pure
my own experience.

on
ic
's

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: Do you see state fund
or state
as an implicit monolithic system, shi
the power
the purse strings to Sacramento as opposed to the
of
sors?
-7-

MR. GAMPELL:
It's
to have some state influence.
it should set
1
lines, but other than
believe that the local courts and the local boards of
particularly
to the day to day
levels of service which
there must
a court
state's business.
ASSEMBLY~.AN BERMAN:
We 1, I
yet to hear, and I
be interested if the future
sses have some testimony
indicate that somebody is
deprived of adequate court
s because of the present
stem. Other than, "Gee, if we
a hundred new judges and
state deep pocket we cou
or work harder or
of us would have to get up earl
turnover more cases." If that's the so
rationale, it's a
le mistake.

MR. GAMPELL:
It isn't. We know that, whatever the cost
the court system, somebody is going to have to bear it, and
going to come out of the taxpayer's pocket.
Is it going to
out of the taxpayer via taxation locally or is it going to
of the taxpayer via state taxation central? The money
to be spent and it seems to me that ...
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: The question is which way is
more efficiently and more f
ly?
MR. GAMPELL: Right,
ssed in these hearings
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr.
vou would like to add?
MR. GAMPELL:

No, I

I

hope that that can be
11, do you have any other

't think so, thank you.
you have anything you

CHAIR11AN HARRIS: Mr.
ike to add? Thank you
Senator Ra
is Counse
trative D
Legislat
s morninq?

is not
Law
to
Counse .

MR. RALPH
ity to be here.
before legislative
s the first time I

Mr

Our

,

ss is Ralph
; former
Courts; former
Welcome. How are
I
appreciate
perhaps hundreds of
not recently.
In fact,
as a private citj7en.

It might help if I aave
a 1
le bit of background
then wound up with some o-1= !'1'' own present judgments on it.
questions actually posed here
not have been asked for
st hundred and twenty
s of California's existence. We
the trial court system that grew out of the needs of peopJe

own localities both by
that trial courts shou
is deeply ingrained in
It is true of course that you
announcements that we have a state court
a
been apparent that both the structure
and their operating procedures come
titution describes the fundamentals
ted the procedure to a greater extent
lse in the United States.
In fact, all
at the Probate Code, the
Code
Procedure and Title 8 of the Government Code
the State law is determinative as to
tructured and operate. But that is the
a state court system. And after you get
and the generalities, it looks much dif
Let's take judges as a starting
are state officers, but upon occasion
ssified as local officials for part
1
, as they depend upon the local e
, their local concerns are going to
s. And beyond the judges, as we
on which they depend and the facilities
extent have always been the respons
In their daily operations
the budget mostly as
So, if you come to this
stigating the state's financial
1 courts, you've a pretty clear p
's share has been rising modest
a minor element in the trial court
Commission Report in '75
in the financing of the
50 states and that's been
many years. Historically, the
1 support to the provis
1 salaries,to financing a
all judges, and thereafter to
of special state interest
For example, in 1975, when it was
lling circuit judge program at the
eked up the cost for it. And
1 program for the state's j
was created, the state picked
stances there was the state
it was recognized as such. Similarly,
ion of the cost of establishing new
for reimbursing local governmPnt

9-

fs

0

This morning's San
comments upon one of
sors filing a
State to point out that
State isn't meeting
s to pick up state
costs. And this,
is one of the ways in
the State could do a
r
aid of local
and in aid of courts
real
did need
mandated costs, this
s
1 costs. To the
that the State sharing
j
1 salar s and
the increases have
place almost entirely within
years. But it can't
that
made any
change in the level of state funding and the
And that's why I
the kind of question
dealing with would not
asked in the first 120
California's history,
lly, isn't so different
that of other states. But, a new approach was conceived
Alaska and Hawaii became states. As part of their statehood
determined in both instances that the entire
should be funded and administered by state
, and both systems were set up that way. Now that
had real impact on some of the older states, such as
s, Colorado and Idaho. And they have taken major steps
direction. But it's important to remember that the new
s started with a clean slate. They came out of a background
the federal government provided the entire judicial
A state-administered judicial system in that context was
picking up what alrea
sted and continuing to
ster it in new and improved form.
But during the 1970s
was a nationwide momentum toward the "Unification of State
Systems," and in that movement the state funding of trial
was a major element. The Cobey Commission, for example,
that virtually every recommendation for improvement of
court systems during the
years preceding that '75
recommended a "Unif
stem." And their excellent
of that movement po
s out that state funding is near
luded and it's usual
state supervis
stration. And,
Colorado and
the relief to the local
So you
s kind of
funding
surprised if
courts will lead
a cons
of how
better adninistration of
increase can be
these issued
the
courts
Now, California
unab
to come up
ten years, but it ce
Committees of both Houses
acceptable answers. The
d this issue before them
972.
Inc
1
, in
three alternat
the Legislature was
all of which were
study.
I would like to
that background a 1
b
ause it indicates the
nature of this problem.
It
intractable, incidentally, when we
d a substantial surplus

state level and it will
seal experts are proj
budget.
In '69, I was
the Federal Highway
operation of Municipal and
sted, obviously, in the
nicely into priority
We wanted to pursue and obta
hundred lower court districts
attack on the 767 that exi
to 300, the question is, can
court study done by Booz, Allen
came with a recommendation
, county-based lower court
of lower court costs is
a state pick-up of salary costs for
istrators. The Judicial Counci
recommenda.tion, the Chairman of the
ttee, Senator Grunsky, a member of
it, and it was a big issue
the same time, Assemblyman
sembly Judiciary Committee and a
had previously commit
fully state financed.
He
we opposed his bill on the
and they were in the
best step was to work on
le) he put his bill in his
ttees got the bills out of the
committees, both were kil
study. But that wasn't all.
ted to the then Chief Justice
in the trial courts. That
members appointed by the
and three by the State Bar.
f
court system and came
created not what the Council
a unified trial court and
ial salary costs. That, of
to further study.
That complicated background
still continuing interest goe
considered it further in '73
proposal in '74.
In '76 the State
agreed to present another propo
course, Senator Song created,
ssion, which as you know,
proposal in 1975. The Counci
r one in '76. None of this,
support, either in the Legislature
s, or among the iudges or lawyer
il decided in one of its
st

11-

that it was going to
upon which to
a
s with whom it was then
have all been
session, this was
got perhaps 1
House. And I
1 pending, and as
getting by way of
over that period
continuing debate on the
servers will agree that
the concept of trial court
in California.
I might
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: I am not sure
's a val
ion, but let me say
s. We're
ly aware of the
, we are aware of the confl
we're obviously seeing
it. What I am interested
is, what makes sense
your standpoint. The
and I understand
certainly appreciate being
to date. What
s
? We want to know what

MR. KLEPS: I
and unification.
I do
in the Bench or Bar
1 level and ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
s
and unification toqethe
ipal and the super
and maybe, while
s attached, the real
re a logic to
what were the
funding have

of state
course, that
the problem is a

Cl

The proper way, I
principles that have
should put its money
a program that will
istration as the reason
s are concerned, and I d
the Judicial Council never
udicial salaries up to 1978.
and Proposition 13 prob
take the whole cost." But
thing that has been
tate which fixes the
rest of the judicial sa
improvement in the system? The reason
, judges would be taken off
s are concerned, whether t i
ccounting that is going to shift j
s.
They are so concerned
costs us back from the county that
s a real tangle in the use of
Fiscal considerations have
wants to accept help, for
would increase flexibility
se the judges' sense of respons
tern as a whole, and on the ju
ve got jurisdiction equal to tha
would create the possibility of
do with the municipal court j
administration of judie
sa
the Controller's office,
istrative problems created.
a long time, and I think
step forward if it wou
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
s of that?

What wou

MR. KLEPS The Cobey
twenty million dollars.
11, at the forty
1
tern, and it will be what
for a visible result
is to have the state
form salaries through the
a day when the superior court
of salary and then the State
zing them statewide. And I th
t works and I think it wou
ASSEMBLYMAN BEEMAN:

And

MR. KLEPS: To get a judicial corps that is not only
made up of state officers with
state fixing their salary,
creating any admini
problems of central
stration.
ASSEMBLYMAN LARRY STIRLING:
... and the way the state i
going to pay for that is out of the general fund or by
transferring revenues from the courts that the counties presently
to the state and paying it directly?
MR. KLEPS:
I hardly need to say that revenue shift at
local level is one of the reasons that all of these programs
I just described haven't gone anywhere.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That's the reason I am trying to
understand the basis for your premise.
It is somehow again the
pocket factor, that the State has 20 million bucks to come
up with.
MR. KLEPS:

Yes it is, that is right.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

It is ...

That's a lousy approach.

MR. KLEPS:
It's an obligation of the State to pay the
of State officers and that's a minor amount of money to
in getting a corps of judges to feel that they are state
and have some response to state level policies.
ASSEMBLY~~N STIRLING:
If we follow that logic, then
lice officers are all state officers.

MR. KLEPS: No, no.
I think, you do it one issue at a
and you figure out what the benefits are, and if you see
more benefits than the 20, 30 million dollar cost, it's worth
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well I was only trying to find
of is. You cited one that is
the evil being compla
somehow there is a tangle of
, if it's factual
getting judges between count s to cover ...
MR. KLEPS:

It's a major issue.

And there is no need

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I have never heard that, havinc:
involved in local government for 10 years, and some little
experience with the criminal justice system.
MR. KLEPS:

Well, this all takes place at the accounting

1.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
to please here?

So, it's the accountants we're

MR. KLEPS:
No, I am
ications in the flexible use of
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Do
because Orange County wou
s County, or vice versa?

f

not

MR. KLEPS:
I think you could
statement from the Judicial Council on
s was a serious problem during the t
sible. And as I say, it has
recommendation right from 1972 by
that the one thing the State cou
, is to pick up judicial salaries.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

I am

11

MR. KLEPS: Well, I have stated my
's the best I can do.
CHAIP~N

HARRIS:

Thank you

much

MR. ALEXANDER AIKMAN:
Good
, Members of the Committee, I am
Senior Staff Attorney with the National
Courts in its Western Office here
San Franc
you don't know what the National Center for
just say briefly that we are a
zation that works with and
country.
In the Western office we
tates, althouqh occasionally we do work
I am yet another witness who is not
lly what would be most appropriate
we are not in a position to make that
the facts, it's not our
you for a few minutes
, what states are picking
are some of the prob
as
financing or ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Is Cali
terns are currently administered?

a

MR. AIKMAN: Well, the organiz
are similar.
Obviously, Cali
else.
But I think, if you look
lar, and perhaps for some of the
about, they are newer, they are
of the political problems as exist
basis, you find the Western State
the costs of the courts, then Cali
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, years ago it used to be
st, and
is still among the
st in the country. And the trend across the country in the
last few years has been for more and more state assumption of the
costs of operation of the courts
just voted on it two
ago, and they are going to state funding.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Can you tell us also whether or not
controls accompany increased state funding?
HR. AIKMAN: Almost all of the states that have gone to
state financing do have a line item at the state level with
administrative control coming down from the state, at least with
respect to personnel. Depending on the size of the jurisdiction
speed with which the State assumes that responsibility may
But ultimately most states,
are few, Pennsylvania
may be the biggest that does not do
that way. Pennsylvania
has X dollars that they just pay to the counties, increased from
t
to time. But almost every other state, large and small,
says, "this is our system and we are going to run it at the state
level."
What I'd like to do is to get three issues that were
sed in Hr. LeBov's letter announcing this hearing, what costs
shoulrt be included, how do you spl
up the revenue, and then,
how much authority should the state assume. This last question
is the same one the Chairman asked. With respect to included
costs, I think Mr. LeBov may have shared my full remarks, which I
I have a table in there,
am not going to give you this morning.
following page 2 of the full remarks which indicates the elements
o expense that are associated with the judicial system and how
many of twenty states that nov7 large
assume state financing,
how many of those twenty states picked up those particular items
costs.
In general, most of the states assumed all of the
sonnel costs and all the
costs of the system except
ilities. Facilities in
state have rema
the most
fficult issues to be resolved. And, in
seven of the
states have attempted to p
up the
facil
s.
But when you look at personnel and
costs, most of them
picked up all of those co
only ten of those
states for which we have
fund iuvenile
probation services and only seven
adult probation. Because
of the historical placement of
in California in the
Executive Branch that's probably not going to be a significant
ssue in California.
I assume
would not be regarded as part
the judicial system, for the
se of picking up costs.
Personnel within the judicial
normally is assumed to
the clerks, although
Vermont and West Virginia,
small states, for political reasons, the clerk's offices
were not picked up as part of state funding. But even if the
c
is constitutionally an independent officer, the State has
assumed the costs of the clerks themselves if not the clerk, at
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of the staff
been a problem
only fifteen of
s.
In part, because
even though they are
In states where the
ttle bit more than
they assume financ
to let the count
and witness fees.
lt to resolve in a few
offices.
I forget
Kleps who referred to
f the public defender is
a lot of counties are
counsel to handle con
defender's office is
So private counsel gets
almost always are assumed
system.
If you look for models
The states have done
costs. They have carved
large areas. With re
is even greater.
approaches that the state
s the maximum relief to
revenue down there. The
ck up none of the revenue.
all of the revenues as
tates do that.
If you look
page 4 which shows the
in fifteen of the state
tate is to assume all
fees with the
revenue down there.
s this assumption of
New York, for
they assume financ
years.
of expenses that
then you'll also
some of the counties and
on what is essential
cal problem that's worked
going through.
s and cities take Y, and
that," and the bill
rationale for that,

If you looked at
of control over personnel,
the one the Chairman was
cannot
at that issue
independent of how you are
system. For
instance, if you were to
of
'11 give them so
many dollars and let
way they want,"
s obvious implications
run
personnel
system the way you want and we
If you are going to
make your system a line
where
pick up certain
identified costs, then
you'll say, "all right,
we are going to make you
at the same time," that has
an obvious impact on how
to control them. There
seem to be three methods
, obvious line item
budgets, we have just mentioned
of a cost
reimbursement where the
s say we spent X on our costs, on
our courts, and then the State
s a
for X, and then the
third is the one that Mr. Gampell was
sting, where you make
s. As I indicated, most of
a lump sum available to the
the states that have gone to state f
ing have gone to line
item budgeting, for the same reason that the Chairman indicated.
That is, the states now feel
a responsibility for this
stem and they are not will
the operation of the
tern over, or leave it with the
s or cities. Well, they
all the checks, regardless of
counties or cities
So, normally, when the states assume the financing, they do
also go to a line item budget
state control follows. Cost
reimbursement takes you away
an effective state personnel
system and therefore is
the context of California,
which is so big and so comp
But there are problems
with the cost reimbursement
scuss all of them.
(SPEAKER UNKNOWN)
the costs? When do the
s
If it's at the end of the fiscal
reimbursing them the costs,
twelve or more months after
than they're getting
the relief they
lly, what costs are
a, I guess Mr. Berman,
to do when they
11, they suddenly
don't do that, you have
who may be getting $15,000 and
pretty much the same work
same work in a bigger
stem
Los Angeles or Orange counties
20,000. Are you just
think, we just write the
to try to set up some
$15 in one county and $35
't care that one county is
11 give us the same service
maximum salary, you are not re

When do you get
ify their costs?
, then you're never really
write will be
That's
not an ongoing, is not
1 system. What
to re
se? You referred
about
Mendocino is
state is paying the
Even if
in Mendocino
clerk
is doing
pretty much the
same work in
getting $18,000 or
care what you
is? Or are you
cornputer programmer
r, are you going say, we
us $35 and another county
an
? If you set a
all of the costs, and if

't, then you are at the
lities for reimbursement.
zation of salaries or accounting
when Los Angeles bills you for a certain cost,
same cost that Alpine is billing you, then
to set up a separate accounting
jus
system to comply with this new process
MR. AIKMAN: The admini
simplicity of cost reimbursement.
with respect to (inaudible) also
as simple as they would appear to be.
shed a study for the State of Arizona
,
slative session, considered financing. And we
figuring out what their costs and revenues
,
the administrative consequences of state
tern are
One of the things we examined was what kind of a block system
cou
you create for Arizona to make it work there. We said,
's take their costs on a per judge basis, or per
lat
sis, or per filing basis. There was no way we could come
a single block grant that is fair to all of
count
zona. The range of expenses in those counties
the
spent the least to the county that spent
, that it really was not possible to come
grant figure, that would have been fair to
you were trying to get some uniformity to the system at all.
thing the block grant does do, I think, is
provides a
The state is saying, within any county, no matter
or how small, we think at least X per j
or X
ten
people for filing should be spent.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
... can
a way that you deal with that for and
floor almost ... or geared to some deal,
do you understand what I am saying?
mean,
might deal with the allocation of state
, not a full buy-out but a part 1
strative costs and then
... its spends by revenue ...
MR. AIKMAN: Sure, and
sylvania is doing, because their s
not cover the costs of Pittshurqh or
stance, but it may cover the costs of one
s.
(SPEAKER UNKNOWN): So what you say is,
a floor for you, we are going to give
so much relief, X dollars,
it is.
s, or you, San Francisco, or you, Santa Rosa, want
money than X on your judges and on your judicial
to have a better system then, that is
th us.
to help you out to that extent, and

1

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
you get into with
double or triple

just wondering what kind of
stem. Does that, in fact, add
?

HR. AIKMAN: You
today because of what you
study from California we
lowest to the highest is
t
s on a per population basis
was spending one seventh per
spending the most. You would
formity on this effort to
you would be doing is, simply
saying our pockets are a litt
you so much to help you out.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. AIKMAN:

same problems you have
if we did the similar
range from the
Well, it was seven
spending the least
what the county that was
not be achieving any
stem more uniform. What
to the deep pocket,
than yours and we'll give

Do we have those figures?

Which ones?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
the counties.

, the differentiations among

MR. AIKMAN: For Arizona? I have provided the
zona ..• I don't know for Cali
We have not studied
here. This little book has the Arizona study.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do we
ifornia? The differences among
here the possible Arizona range
seven for ...
HR. AIKMAN: For ten
thousand on a per j
that the costs elements
be that county A is
not including.

lar figures on
s? There seems to be
one to a multiplier of
It was seven
those f
are not simi
costs that county

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. AIKMAN:

But

f magn

bit too obvious,
t.1R. AIKMAN:
services. County A
might well be,
use it makes.
charge the court
that
as
a
general
county
B may not.
It may just assume
wants
to
have
a
computer.
court as having the cost if the
individual units with
So
's not going to charge
The
absence of that for
usage fee.
Some count

B would not be a true ref
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
salaries?

Do

MR. AIKMAN: Yes, the j
s
1
Those are picked up by the state
an issue. There are other issues, if I
Chairman? I think that if
ttee
is worth a serious look, a
trying to make it sound 1
that's our business, but I
studying. You don't seem to have,
, I don't think anyone
Cali
that's needed, not only with
respect to the administrative consequence
tern that would be created and how it could
really is needed to make an effect
whether this is a worthwhile effort.
take a year or two to get that kind
be time well spent if it is believed
consideration in the State of
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Not just
is going to be a necessity at some
rather than later. And we certa
and any advice that your of
perimeters to questions that we are
, are not going to get any answers
s and we are going to need your
stions.
MR. AIKMAN: Well, I have
we have already developed for
basis available to Mr. LeBov
that need to be addres
In
have been out here as well.
checklist.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Can
Who are you? Are you a
HR. AIKMAN: The National Center is
on that does research and consult
s. That's all we do, in fact.
They
They created this ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So, genera
just a pool of experts and if a court
of studying something, then you're
Is that the way it works out?
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MR. AIKMAN:
they want to.

They can also go and hire Arthur Young if

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
California?

Have you done any work in

MR. AIKMAN:
in years past and on

, both at the state level
1.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Such as what?

MR. AIKMAN: Well, just looking at the last two years,
we've done a management study
Orange County Superior Court,
which was prompted by the Board of Supervisors concerned about
costs. We also gave Orange County our estimate of what the cost
of adding a judge was as a result of the first study. We did a
management audit of the Municipal Court in Monterey County.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Have you ever done anything that
shows the implications of various legislation? For example, how
would prejudgment interest affect the several state court
processes?
MR. AIKMAN:

Not for California.

MR. RUBIN R. LOPEZ:

Is that do-able?

MR. AIKMAN:
It's do-able. You're going to get a lot of
people giving you impressions, because it's very hard to measure
anything.
But we could go out and ask people what they think,
and we can look at other states. The advantage we have is that
we work very closely with j
iaries of every state in the
country.
MR. LOPEZ:

Is your address and phone number on this

document?
MR. AIKMAN:

Not on that document, Mr. Lopez.
give me some indication as to
of municipal and superior
?
Is that kind of unique?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
how many states have the same
court systems we have in Cali

MR. AIKMAN: No, most states still have a split trial
court with limited jurisdiction. The three levels is not unheard
of, but it's falling by the wayside. What we are finding is the
limited jurisdiction courts being consolidated single, in
California, the municipal court (inaudible) and the superior
court, the general jurisdiction courts begin to form.
Most
states still split one of there ...
In fact, Washington, D. C. is
the only pure kind of jurisdiction in the countrv. And those
judges are talking about the special ...
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MR. GAMPELL: The
county costs is the document
's office relative to
counties in California.
almost eight months at
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Clerks Association
of those costs and we
future time. Okay, I
Judge Schauer, Judge
Officer of the Superior
, would you come up
as you so desire.

?

JUDGE RICHARD SCHAUER: Mr.
, my name is Richard Schauer,
the Los Angeles Superior Court.
is on my extreme right and also
, Frank Zolin.
I came here today really
sion, either in support or
minds about that.
It
,
details of the state funding,
It is, of course, going to
expens
s, there is no question about
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Is
to the taxpayers if
to the counties in
that money on the
on other programs.
a question of which
JUDGE SCHAUER:
really the county
, so they may be
people.
I think
and the property tax.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Good

JUDGE SCHAUER:
, there would be
a year.
Some estimates
million dollars a year
ion dollars a year.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Why
represent? Hhat would
represent?

2

JUDGE SCHAUER: Well, a number of things. One thing, of
course, could be the uniform personnel system, the change from an
accounting system in different smaller units to one statewide
uniform system for court personnel which would mean that the
salaries and wages would increase, rather than come down to any
lower denominator. And then there would be a whole litany of
additional costs of unification.
I don't know that you really
want to get into that.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No I real
don't, but I was
interested in what the cost would be, because sometimes we only
think of the costs being the differences in the salaries of ...
JUDGE SCHAUER: There would also be the costs of
changing the forms and retraining the personnel. Municipal
courts don't do what superior courts do. There have to be
some .•.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Wouldn't some of that be one-time

costs?
JUDGE SCHAUER: Some would be one-time, but the annual
ongoing cost would be certainly in excess of forty million
dollars a year.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Are there no offsetting savings that
you can possibly perceive?
JUDGE SCHAUER: That plugs into savings, we've run an
analysis on that which we furnished, I think, to some other
legislative committees.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Can you give us a copy if we don't
have it? Do we have one, Mr. LeBov? I don't need it right now,
thank you.
JUDGE SCHAUER: Do you have a copy of the letter from
Judge Eagleson and Frank Zolin? I believe of August of this
year.
In any event, we do believe that there is no compensating
sufficient benefit for unification if that's poured into st0te
funding for unification, even separate from state funding. We
do •••

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN:
disagree with that?

do municipal court judges all

MR. FRANK ZOLIN:
I don 1 t think they can shovl you any
kind of analysis financially.
I don't think even the
strongest ...
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN:

The personal financial ...
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JUDGE SCHAUER: I don't think
has been able to
any
ion, indicating there won't
Maybe, if you project ten
savings. But that's kind of
in the present.
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: I could
be •.. from saving that wou
courts are underutiliz
have the whole pool of judges,
ions .•.
(inaudible) to make use
1 of the particular county
JUDGE SCHAUER: Well, that's
that has been made. But I
and no municipal court judge yet
unused capacity in his court. And
year before, every presiding judge
in Los Angeles County for assistance
they did not have the available
of Los Angeles County, but I was
ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN: One thing
seem like a very relative question,
terms of the judicial system and what
simply changing from certain funding system
, you ... Well, I might be attracted
the
state funding, I think in the face of
ing and the fights to get over
funded unless there is some, more
fferences that are happening in ...
s to the judicial system, basic things (
JUDGE SCHAUER: Do I think that there
s from state funding in that sense? Not
to Mr. Stirling's idea of covert
deeper and there is
, I suppose there could
s.
BERMAN: Let's
pockets now funding the court system
on there that is just so intolerable
for a deeper pocket?
ASSEMBLY~ffiN

JUDGE SCHAUER: Well,
's
that it's really a question that you
son.
I did not find
so during
judge. But I think it may be deve
perhaps in our county and
other
event, I would express our concerns a
suggested with regard to covert
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regard to some huge monoli
state system, so big and so
distant that may be more ineffic
and more expensive. There
are advantages, certainly, I think, to state funding of the
judiciary but there are also
1
If it is decided that
there should be state funding, I
, that the
judiciary would prefer some subvention or block grant kind of
provision, local responsibil
than a line-item budget
with inevitable state control. But I'd have very little to say
other than to tell you that we don't have a final position, a
really thought out position for or against the state funding as a
principle. It's going to depend on
details.
I do ask you,
however, to proceed with great caution in this area.
It's not
only going to be terribly expens
for some taxpayers if there
is a shift, but additionally I agree with Mr. Aikman, that we
probably in this state don't have all the information that we
need to make intelligent projections about the administrative
results of this. It could be an administrative nightmare if we
get into state funding, or it could be somewhat advantageous
administratively. But I do ask you to proceed with caution. I
believe I can speak for my other two colleagues here and we stand
ready to be of any assistance we can in connection with the
actual analysis. Thank you.
I'll take any questions I can. You
may want to hear both Mr. Zolin and Judge Eagleson.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you, Judge.

Mr. Zolin.

MR. ZOLIN: Well, good morning, Mr. Chairman. It's a
pleasure to be here.
I hope you all have copies of my letter of
November 17, in which I make specific proposals regarding state
financing.
I would like to summarize the major points and the
highlights of this letter.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Zolin, will you please introduce
yourself just for the purpose of the transcription?
MR. ZOLIN:
I am Frank Z
the Los Angeles Superior Court.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

, the Executive Officer of

Thank you.

MR. ZOLIN: First of all to clari
your problem,
current state accounting budgets is making t extremely difficult
for counties to continue to f
current level of court
operations. Inflation and revenue problems are anticipated in
the future, making it extreme
fficult for the county to
continue to maintain the current level of financial support
mandatory court services. As we
ject into the future, as
stated on the second page of my letter, I project that increased
need for Los Angeles Superior Court of about 39 judicial officers
by 1990. That's a very modest 15 percent growth rate and I ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
as opposed to judges?

Are you talking about court personnel
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MR. ZOLIN:
Judges
se of 39 judges.
I assume
the State of Cali
pattern.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Mr.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Once
ionary assertion. We bl
ly
that there is going to be
problems and that sort
I also want to know what the
stration to reform itself and
11 for example, our multiple
present court rule,
or the judges' part to
)?
MR. ZOLIN:
I can answer on that
s Superior Court has authored and
streamline operations.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
that ...
Let me ask you
firms are going to
research capability
MR. ZOLIN:
There is a ...
arrangements (inaudible).

No

we'

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
Do you see
You know, we're, me and all
that are deteriorating, wel
sort of thing. And when I see a
1-dressed, very important men come
do something about more money,
stions and they
not
selves more e
I am
MR. ZOLIN: Well,
sent any major reform
ooking at roughly 14 or
now and 1990, that certa
to streamline the
ASSEMBLY~~N

STIRLING:

MR. ZOLIN:

I believe

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
reforms?

Well,
is an

You'd we
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reform

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
into them that you do fighting
bill on court unification.

Would you put the zeal and sweat
s' bill and maybe Stirling's

MR. ZOLIN: We have advocated large reforms and I've got
a few on my desk, and I'll be happy to bring them to you at the
next session.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, that's fine, as long as you
put the energy in them. But I'd like to see an equal amount of
energy be expended on reform as with pleading the case of poverty
on behalf of the judicial system.
MR. ZOLIN: I don't believe I am pleading the case of
poverty. I might be advocating the short pocket proposal rather
than the deep pocket. And that is, if we do accept the fact that
the court system requires some expansion in the next few years,
we have to address the issue of how that expansion is funded.
At the present time the State of California funds less
than 9 percent of the operating costs of trial costs of the
Superior and Municipal Courts and Justice Courts in the State of
California. County general funds bear 91 percent of the
operating costs. Now, that does not seem to be a full
partnership and California is lacking a little in the level of
financial support of most states in the United States.
I think the most effective way to provide additional
state funding for profitable operations is to expand current
block grant programs or subvention. And I'm trying to get into
some details here in regards to the administration of such a
subvention program. First of all, I think it's more appropriate
to look at net operating costs rather than gross operating costs
to determine what level of additional financial assistance the
state should provide. And, I think, when you analyze the revenue
pictures you reach the conclusion that you will require a
two-tier level of subvention.
As you know, superior court judges authorized since the
passage of SB 90 now receive a subvention of $60,000. There is
no state subvention provided for mun
1 courts. \·Je are
proposing that a $200,000 subvention be provided for every
superior court judicial officer and a $100,000 subvention be
provided for every municipal court judicial officer. The total
cost of that to the State will be approximately 211 million
dollars. That represents about two-thirds of the net county
costs to operate a court system. That would not include county
costs incurred for defense services, police services and
prosecution services and other such related services.
Why do I recommend the use of a subvention or block
grant program over a complete state buy-out? I think that are
several advantages and I list them all on paqe 5. First of all,
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Ye

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN:
MR. ZOLIN:

S

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN:
grant on population,
words, you real
you provide
MR. ZOLIN:

That's

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN:
system is committed

r.m. ZOLIN:

No,
(inaudible) .
The calculat.ions
between the
would

ASSEMBLYMAN BERMAN:
find the same kind of
lock grants
tho
ifferences, or are

MR. ZOLIN:
accept the
differences. Let me
of the specific
questions your Committee
s are on page 6. But
one question you posed is,
be included in trial
court budgets if and when
Well, I think you will
have to look at
on an
remental
is
we will start with
the production of unit
courtroom itself. So, I
think, a logical beginning
is courtroom staff, the costs
directly related to
court
And Mr. Kleps testified
very persuasively earl
s morning that perhaps the state
should pay all judges salaries.
ly makes sense, but
as you can see in my letter, I
not only all of the
salaries of all of the judicia
but the courtroom
clerks, court reporters, bailiffs
s and the supplies and
the materials necessary to
court. Now if you wish
to limit state support at that
could probably stop at
that increment, but suppose you move on and finance the direct
support activities.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Well, I understand that. I don't know
why anybody wouldn't go for that. But it seems to me that there
is also some need to at least
ss the concept if not the
specifics of someone who is
control. In other words, you
don't just turn over the
All block grants have some
restraints. I am saying, are we just to turn over the money, or
are we just going to say "here is $100,000 for each of your
judges and that's that."
MR. ZOLIN: I
1
I believe you now exercise
on a number of judie 1 off

that's a legitimate concern. And
own control. You achieve control
zed
the area ...

CHAIRHAN HARRIS: \'Jell
not now. Basically what we
do is getting a letter from
Board of Supervisors
indicating that they would
resolution the creation of
the judges, and we as a perfunc
matter simply pass that on.
Those are consent items. Have you ever had any problems with L.
A. County wanting more j
not get ...
MR. ZOLIN:
justifies the needs ...
CHAIRf\1AN HARRIS:
need is demonstrated, I
able to get any addit
MR. ZOLIN:
must recognize thRt
and support costs.

ls analysis that

z

But as soon as the
that's not been

You

s on that basis. You
additional operating

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: We 1 re not
the County Board of Supervisors
approve and want these
t
that it is a consent
costs.
0

ing anything, because
s that they in fact
That is the reason
pays most of the

MR. ZOLIN: That's been true for the last few years.
guess, it's a popular thing.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I

Let me ask you if I may.

Mr. Stirling.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: For example, if the state did go
into this block grant, would the judges support the concept
wherein the state said, you don't need money for a bailiff in a
civil suit when there is no potential fisticuffs?
MR. ZOLIN: Well, under the block grant program those
decisions will be made on the local level. As you know, in Los
Angeles County we are not staffed (inaudible) bailiffs and we are
experimenting a court attending program, and we have been
(inaudible) the savings of our hundred thousand dollars a year
for any license •..
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: The question would still be,
should the state have authority to say that the court does not
need an armed guard in a civil suit, unless it's a dissolution?
MR. ZOLIN: Well, perhaps the state should have this
authority and would flow with the block grant proposal.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

Would not or would?

MR. ZOLIN: Would not. The block grant is the available
money, the current little block distributed on the ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: So, the answer is that we like
the money to stay 1n but no subsequent controls to it. Even •.•
MR. ZOLIN:
to the action.

Only those controls established as applies

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I mean, this Committee
makes a statute. Mr. Chairman is trying to ask, to get the feel
for, what kind of controls you would subject •••
MR. ZOLIN: You're right, that's specifically what you
are saying. The state supporting less than 9 percent of our
operations. We believe this is a method to increase the state
share to finance the trial court operation.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

Judge Eagleson.

JUDGE DAVID EAGLESON: Mr. Chairman, I am David
Eagleson, the presiding Judge of Los Angeles Superior Court.
I
didn't know where this hearing is going. So, I really carne
unprepared. But, if I may, I'll address myself to the questions
which have been asked. You wanted some examples of local
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control. One is the power of assigning judges.
I have a judge
now that simply has fallen out of favor with those of his
district with good reason.
I intend to shift him forthwith.
I
would hate to have to go to a committee in San Francisco or
Sacramento to wait for an authority to do that. We have an 0. R.
program, where we release people on their own recognizance and
they work closely with the sheriff's office. You may know that
in our county we have so many people in jail that I am signing an
order letting them out, as the sheriff drives up to door with a
van load to put more in the front door. And, of course, the 0.
R. program permits people of certain risk, if there is such a
thing, to release, to return to their first assigned criminal
court date.
We have a very ambitious escalation of our arbitration
program in Los Angeles County, and I have asked Mrs. Owen to
staff up to handle it. I didn't get any permission from anybody
in Sacramento or San Francisco to do that.
I felt that now is
the time to go with the program and we had dramatic results. But
that is something that is handled locally.
I don't know how you
could draft a guideline statewide to apply to the different
counties with their different levels of needs.
Another simple example is the question of attorneys'
fees.
In Los Angeles County, I think is fair to say, lawyers
have more ambitious views of reasonable fees that they might have
in other counties.
I think we have to pay a minimum of $40.00 an
hour to get somebody to come down to take a look at a case,
whereas perhaps $25.00 is the going rate in Fresno.
I just don't
know how you would ever accept an office somewhere and draft
something that would fit the parochial views of people who do
this kind of work in 58 counties, it boggles my mind.
I don't
think it could be done.
I don't think Ralph Gampell could do it.
I don't think Kleps could do it, and the two of them together
couldn't do it. This is my view.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: What do you
of the state establishing some minimal
allotted so many dollars per judge, or
determine is going the state's support
basis, then •..

think of the idea, though,
foundation level? If we
some figure that we
level on a person to judge

JUDGE EAGLESON:
Yes, that's the only thing that makes
any sense without bringing the labor unions down on your head or
trying to pay the clerk in Mendocino the same as in downtown Los
You'd open a hornet's nest like you wouldn't believe.
Angeles.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
If we have to pay a hundred
thousand for an additional new judge, we are going to look at it
a little differently than when it's being sixty thousand.
JUDGE EAGLESON: That's true. A hundred thousand does
not come anywhere near what Mrs. Owens suggested to me as an
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appropriate level to increase state funding to.
It probably
could come to three hundred or four hundred thousand dollars per
superior court judge.
ASSEMBLY}ffiN STIRLING: When it is two hundred thousand
dollars for a superior court judge, how far down the list does
that get you? Does that get you to the library and equipment?
JUDGE EAGLESON:
of courtroom staff.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Yes, it would get to that first group
Mr. Berman, you asked a question.

Yes.
JUDGE EAGLESON: Mr. Berman, you asked the question
about the municipal court judges and how many utilizations
thereof. Governor Brown has recently appointed many of the
judges to our court from the Los Angeles Municipal Court, and
without exception, Jim Nelson, the P. J. called me on the phone
begging to let those people stay on. He simply could not
function without those judges staying on his court until he had
his replacements appointed by the Governor.
I have done that.
I
thought that his needs overruled mine. There is no
under-utilization, at least in my county.
ASSEHBLYMAN STIRLING: Your Honor, your reputation for
procedure, management ab1lity, and aggressiveness is excellent.
But for example, when somebody files a civil suit in the
municipal court and a cross-file, a cross-complaint at a higher
rate, doesn't that remove jurisdiction for the Superior Court?
JUDGE EAGLESON:

Yes.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: And don't you have a double
filing encouraged specifically by the bifurcation of the courts.
JUDGE EAGLESON:

Not a double filing.

They just put a

proper .•.
ASSEMBLY}ffiN STIRLING:

One clerk system, one record

system.
JUDGE EAGLESON: They put another case number on it.
They put another banner on it and put it upstairs.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: That would have been unnecessary
had we not have the jurisdictional bifurcation?
JUDGE EAGLESON: Well, that's true.
five minutes per additional ...

We're talking about

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, a delay of scheduling and
that sort ... I ask in your court system ...
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JUDGE EAGLESON: No, there is no delay in that, no sir.
That case, that you're talking about ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: There is an inherent delay when
you withdraw from one court and go to another in the service of
the public. The person who filed the complaint supposedly has a
legitimate grievance now when moved from one jurisdiction, which
may be in their community, to a court that may not be in their
community, most likely is not in ... Do you have, or do you allow
individual judges, or do you require individual judges to the
calendar (inaudible) done by some central calendaring process.
JUDGE EAGLESON: We have in our criminal division
downtown, we have, what we call direct calendar, which doesn't
work in civil cases. We have a master calendar in the central
civil area. We have a direct calendaring and master calendaring
in the other divisions of our court, based upon again upon the
personalities of the players. When you talk about a justice
system, it's not just a judge, it's not just the law, it's the
public defender, the sheriffs, the D. A.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I understand that, your Honor.
Could I ask my question again? Do you require the judges to do
their own calendaring? Once you assign the case, the judges from
then on is the delay or advance of that case his or her
responsibility?
JUDGE EAGLESON: As I say, we have different systems in
different areas in our court •..
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I didn't recognize your
terminology, that the reason ...
JUDGE EAGLESON:
... Central civil area, the cases come
to us based on the age of the case.
In the criminal division
downtown, the individual judge will move the cases on his
calendar as he can process them. He is in direct control of his
calendar.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
JUDGE EAGLESON:

Of that particular case?

Yes.

ASSEMBLYHAN STIRLING:
civil side because ...

And you don't do that on the

JUDGE EAGLESON: Oh, for a lot of reasons. Number one,
their different skills
Some judges are not as skillful as
others, they can 1 t process cases as fast.
If you start parceling
cases out willy-nilly to forty-five judges, you're going to find
some person with a t\venty case backlog and some person with a two
hundred case backlog.
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ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Wouldn't that cause you to call
in the one with the two hundred case backlog and have a
heart-to-heart chat with him?
JUDGE EAGLESON:
I have to be frank, sir. Some people
are more skillful than others. If they don't have it, they don't
have it; if they do, they do.
I have no control over the
players.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

No control over the players?

JUDGE EAGLESON: Whoever is sent to that court by the
power of myself 1s assimilated and they do the best they can.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: It's not incumbent upon the
judiciary to police its own, its colleagues and those that are
not productive, or even though the best political evaluation of
going in was that they will be a good judge, and if the on the
job performance indicates not, isn't that your responsibility to
call that to somebody's attention and either improve them or can
them?
JUDGE EAGLESON: Well, I can't can, number one.
Secondly, it's like people that play football.
Some people are
very fast and some people are not so fast.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: I only see the judiciary system
saying, some of our colleagues are weak, we didn't appoint them,
we're not going to embarrass them by getting rid of them, give us
some more judges to make up for those weak colleagues. That's
the direct impression that the entire judiciary gives.
JUDGE EAGLESON: Well, I am sorry if that's the case.
The first part of what you say is correct. We do not appoint
them, number one. Number two, I have no authority to dispense
with them ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
If I were one of your junior
superior court judges and you call me downtown to your
wood-paneled office and stern face and said, Stirling, turn those
cases out, I would. Yes, it could scare me.
I would be a little
more attentive to my duty than to a golf game.
JUDGE EAGLESON: Again, all I really have a right to
expect is that the person who works a reasonable workday do the
best they can. Having said that, there are vast differences in
capabilities, in skills, in swiftness, intellects, concern, and
all I can SRY to you is that you should work X hours a day and to
do the best you can. But still the work product of judge A is
going to be twice that of judge B. And to ignore that is just to
ignore reality.
That may be true of this, of this body here, I
don't know.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you
add? We keep interrupting you.
process.

's

anything you'd like to
nature of the hearing

JUDGE EAGLESON:
In response to Mr. Berman's earlier
question, Los Angeles Superior Court came up with an omnibus
pretrial concept in 1971, together with 38 other proposals. We
sent someone up here for six months to
and lobby the
proposals through. One passed the other 38 were shot down. The
motions to suppress was part of the omnibus pretrial hearings,
deliberated by the California Judges Association when I was
president a couple of years ago, and we decided not to support
the bill. We felt that the public defender, and this is based
not on guess work, it is based on hard core experience, was
confronted with a due date on filing his pretrial motions. He
worked all 37 of them, and then he would have those to go through
one at a time, but if you gave him time to sit through his case,
get his thoughts in order, talk to the defendant, do the things
that public defenders have to do, he might hit you with one or
two and that's what you have to field, and not the vast number of
these motions that can be filed.
It's a matter of discretion,
and those who practice criminal law as lawyers and those who sit
in trial judges, criminal trial judges were convinced beyond a
shadow of a doubt, that the omnibus pretrial concept was a step
backwards in terms of saving judicial time, and that's why they
didn't support it. Now, the L. A. Superior Court still has the
position that I announced; we had it for over ten years, but the
statewide experience is •.. Actually I see the Chairman shaking
his head, perhaps he knows.
That's the answer to that question.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

Mr. Stirling has another

question.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: How about the coordination of
your judges
s research, write his opinions ...
JUDGE EAGLESON:

Great idea!

ASSEf\1BLYMAN STIRLING:

All we need is money.

(Inaudible)

the bottom line is that you
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
support, but you'd be
obviously need additional
that would be put
very skeptical of any restr
on that
Is that right?
controls,

JUDGE EAGLESON: What I would call
would

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
day to day
acceptab
to you.

to day operations

as it does not interfere with
may, in fact, be
restr

So
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JUDGE

Of a broad nature, yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Okay. Very good. Thank you
gentlemen,
very much. Ms. Hoffman, please. Forgive
me, I
you inadvertently. Otherwise you could have
been up
Thank you.
MS. BEATRICE HOFFMAN: No problem. Some of what I was
going to say was said by Mr. Aikman. Let me introduce myself.
My name is
Hoffman, and I do not represent an
organization, just myself.
I am a San Francisco resident. I own
and
a small consulting firm, Court Research Associates,
which provides research and assistance for courts and law
offices.
I
done work in California along with about sixteen
other states, many of which are state funded.
ing the firm, I was director of Research
and Deve
the Colorado State Judicial Department,
starting there at the same time the state funding was first
implemented
1970. And over a seven-year period my
responsibi
s
luded data collection analysis, planning for
courts and probation departments, data processing and records.
From '78 to '81 I was a member of a two-person evaluation team
which semiannually reviewed the progress of the state court's
admini
office in implementing ... in the unified court
system.
member of that team ... Law School and former
Colorado
Court Administrator completed a study in 1979 of
more than
state funded judicial systems. And he found so
much variation among the systems that it was virtually impossible
to construct meaningful models for comparison purposes. This
diversity
s that it is difficult to make general
conclus
advantages and disadvantages of state funded
systems per
So, I would like to make a few comments on the
issues I'd
you to consider.

rel
financ
goes by
to resent
facili
funding
incurred
over the
begin to

, one of the most pressing problems
state funding legislation is the distribution
local municipalities are loath to give them up.
, however, one of the most nagging questions
ili
s. Let me explain this, I see these
The qeneral pattern has been that the bulk
revenue started to (inaudible), particularly
s from general jurisdiction of courts. In the
period, the county was very happy to
s in exchange for being relieved of the
idizing the courts. However, as time
they made a very good bargain, and they begin
fiscal responsibilities toward the court
about states that have taken over substantial
facilities.
This local resentment
state systems paid rent. There is controversy
the basis for payment. How do governments
le) space of the points that are taken up and
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they particularly opposed having to provide new
enlarge court offices whenever the state adds a
additional personnel. Court administrators may
negotiate for janitorial service, or electrical
upkeep of the physical plant.

courtrooms or
new judge or
even have to
repair, or simple

Since it would seem financially diff
lt for the State
of California to take over funding of all the state facilities, I
would suggest that the proposed legislation would specify clearly
that somewhere within the confines of local governments for their
general funds to cover among other purposes court facilities and
maintenance costs. Another matter I wish to discuss is
personnel.
And I bring in an example of what we talk about in terms
of state funding and local control.
If California goes to a
buy-out, I believe strongly in a separate judicial personnel
system. The ABA has stressed the need for a separate independent
personnel system in order that the judiciary maintains itself as
an independent and respected branch of government on par with the
executive and legislative branches, in order to take
responsibility for administering its own affairs effectively and
efficiently. There are advantages to installing a state judicial
personnel system.
It allows for equalization in pay scales for
like duties, permitting accountability to the Legislature.
It
provides career ladders for judicial system employees, allowing
them to transfer across county lines, and allows the system to be
cost effective.
In most states where the court system has been state
funded, statewide personnel rules have been adopted by the
Supreme Court. This transition from local to state
classification takes substantial time to work, with much review
by judges and non-judicial personnel.
In most states this has
taken about two years and would take at least that in California.
I think it's critical for such a system to work well that local
jurisdictions are allowed to hire locally, and administer the
system locally within the regulation of the state system. The
state office should do reclassifications, assist and monitor the
local jurisdiction in compliance with the rule and have an appeal
board composed of judges of the courts. That's my example of how
you have a state system, but you have local control. In other
words, the hiring of staff is done down there. Nobody in
Sacramento is telling Los Angeles or San Francisco who they can
hire and who not. And I think the same example can occur with
operating expenses and capital outlay as well as personnel. We
found out that when state funding is proposed, neither the
Legislature nor the judiciary recognize the need for adding
sufficient qualified administrative staff to help operate the
system and provide accountabil
The
is, that just as in
the executive branch and the Legislature,
state judicial
system needs administrative staff to
transition work and
the system operate efficiently.
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and Mr. Kleps that
between various
1 and state
suff

I

you need a
levels of
responsibil
admini
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
insights.
you?

Welcome.

Very good
to see you. How are

JUDGE ROY WONDER: Mr. Chairman. Thank you for inviting
me and
s Association to come and comment.
Very briefly, I'd like to state the position of the CJA with
respect to this
slation. The California judges support the
state funding
trial courts, but only where it provides
that some of
be left with the local jurisdiction.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You can say total control, or do you
think that perimeter control might be established?
JUDGE WONDER: Perimeters of the control, and Judge
Eagleson has given some examples of the control of the presiding
judge of course, who must be elected locally, in our opinion, and
the presiding judge must have the responsibility for making
assignments in the courts and taking care of personnel matters,
which I think Mr. Stirling has alluded to. That generally is our
position. You had a lot of testimony.
I'd be happy to expand on
that, although
's
CHAI~~N HARRIS:
I think that there is no question that
we are going to be heading into the direction either this
legis
or some other legislation, is going to bind the state
into assuming more of a role in the funding of the local courts.
And the real
st
is what controls will in fact give us the
we are not simply providing the deep pockets but also
make
the system is efficient and effective
not
just adding money to fuel the fire.

JUDGE WONDER:
In 1978,
the Post Commission report,
it was
t instead of a cost reimbursement for the
local judie
that there be an essential needs formula
establi
disagree with my colleagues from Los
Ange
thousand dollar subvention.
I believe
has
s own pecul
ties, and that there
that
established. And once that formula is
perimeters that
local jurisdiction
must
within
needs formula as
state?

opposed
That is correct.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I see. That's an interesting concept
we ought to look at. Thank you.
I apprec
it, Judge Wonder.
Okay. I would like to call up three witnesses if I might.
Frederick R. Ohlrich, Jim Simpson and Carl Olsen. Welcome
gentlemen.
MR. FREDERICK K. OHLRICH: Thank you.
I am Fritz
Ohlrich, Court Administrator of the Newhall Municipal Court,
representing the Municipal Court Clerks Association. I'd like to
try to list my comments first and specif
address the three
items that Mr. LeBov's memo raised. The Municipal Clerks
Association would support limited court financing of the
municipal courts in California. Our Association would endorse
the proposal that judges' salaries and the block grant approach
similarly which is now being used in the superior court be
expanded to include the municipal court.
I see no reason why
this is not presently done. One of the questions Mr. Stirling
has raised consistently all morning is why would we do that for
the municipal court judges? In the last few years there has
been, at least in my county, tremendous pressure, sometimes not
very direct, but always there, placed on the municipal courts to
generate more revenue. The judges, I think, are taking the place
of the tax collector, or tax assessor, since Prop 13. "We want
more money, let's go to the courts. We want a new typewriter, we
want a new automated record system, how much money can you give
us, how much can you increase the fines. 11 I think, the judges
must be isolated from that kind of situation. As long as you're
dealing with traffic tickets, you are obviously dealing with an
enormous amount of money.
In Los Angeles County we collect a
total of somewhere around a hundred and fifteen million dollars
in revenue last year. But I think, you need to try to isolate
the judges from that direct pressure.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Let me say something.

Yes.

Mr.

ing has a question.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
I am not sure that I
philosophically agree with that.
I don't think judges should be
in the mainstream, nor in the political fabric which is really
the allocation of resources. At the same time it is only judges
and the ancillary court personnel that know the reforms that are
available. We cannot do it because we don't practice inside the
courts. We don't know what the guts of the
inery are, we
don't know what opportunities for reform are there. We don't
know what the latest state of the art
running a clerk
operation is. But the times that I have looked into it, I have
found them to be
lly
And the technology has not
been brought to bear, and the only mes
out of the
whole ancillary situation is,
us more,
same as every
other operation has said in
s state. So
becomes incumbent
on the professionals and the brothers to demand, first of all
recommend and then demand the re
that
11 make a more
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sistent
revenue
we as court
However, I would
s County, our
traffic

admini
indicate
county just
record
out by
ticket
Yolo
that. we
resistance
possibly,
been there
It's just a
Angeles.
that
we're engaged
county-wide now
court
trators
legislation. We
CHAIRMAN

a year.
It is not
met enormous
And I think,
revenue hasn't
s just a
of money.
tern as large as Los
an incentive to make
back. That is changed,
productivity program
there.
Certainly, as
we have introduced
one other thing.
on
1 court efficiency
, in December, and we would
profession, from the c
,
the courts as to how
our disposal try to
that this is an
from Mr. Stirling's
other legislators as well,
does the court want to do.
more money, at some point
s
that may be considered to
But if we are not getting any
you will probably
receptive to our
measures. The second
forfeitures, and I
judges salaries
money.
His
lly,
cities and
to get a
assessments and
quite a fast rate.

41

costs of the action.
Three years ago, when the municipal court
jurisdiction was five thousand dollars, it cost approximate
$50
to file a fifteen thousand dollar lawsuit
Los Angeles County
in the superior court. Now that same fifteen thousand dollar
lawsuit is filed in the municipal court for $25.
does not
make good sense to me.
I think that there is
to look at a sliding scale in that particular area.
The second area has to do with traffic
forfeitures.
We think the traffic infraction f
misdemeanor fines need to be increased.
In
not been increased since infractions were created
The level should be raised.
There was great
fine schedule, the bail schedule in traff
infractions. We
would go so far as to endorse a statewide schedule
forfe
traffic fines, set by a state board and that f
would
all assessments.
You will now find $50 but it's real
$70 because of the assessments, and that will be
the first of the year. We should be saying what
overall fine is, and increase it perhaps to the maximum of a $150
- $200 on infractions. We should simplify the distribution
s
and forfeitures and get rid of the complicated formulas that
one can understand.
And I would say that without except
including the state auditors office and all of us that deal
th
that.
And there are portions of it that we all disagree on.
Very, very complicated!
Let's find a formula that can be split three ways and
share those fine revenues among city, county and state.
The
state should increase or should receive the increase newer ones.
I would basically suggest that the county's and the city's
portions of fine and forfeiture revenue could be frozen at
current levels with some kind of inflationary escalator to al
a-slight increase each year.
But let the new revenue, from
and forfeitures, accrue to the State General Fund to be
pay for judges, municipal court judges salaries.
Finally, as to the third question Mr. LeBov raised
v10uld be unrealistic to assume that the state should assume any
additional authority over state municipal court personnel.
If
you want me to answer any questions, I'd be happy to.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

Jim Simpson

MR. ,JH1 SH1PSON:
Jim Simpson, representing the County
Clerks Association.
I am taking the position that we are not
asking for any money.
We are neutral on the question. He did
conduct a survey in 58 counties. We got 40 responses. We asked
questions about what is the cost to operate the superior,
municipal, justice and county clerk in your county. What is the
total income generated, and what is the net cost to the county.
We received 40 county responses.
The one-line figure looks like
$162 million for those 40 counties that is being subsidized by
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the government. We did a proj
on missing 18 and looked at
them based
population and consumer planning and that looks
like another $26-1/2 million.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Are they just estimates, excuse
me, I didn't understand. What was the gap, money coming in, what
were you trying to
?
MR
What I am trying to say is, right now it
looks to us,
s s from data from budgets that were just
approved in July, that there is $190 million that has been picked
by local government.
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:

On the operation of ••.

MR. SIMPSON:
... operation of superior court, municipal
court, justice court ... It's very difficult to find numbers.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Could you give us some breakdown by
county of the disparity among counties on a population basis
similarly to Mr. Aikman's statistics for other states?
MR. SIMPSON:
summarize them.

I did not bring them with me, I tried to

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
Thank you.

Could you make them available to us?

MR. SIMPSON: We also would agree with the Municipal
•court Clerks Association, and the County Clerks have tried
repeatedly and have been very successful in trying to change
things.
You know, we live with millions of files that are
handreds of years old, Rnd why do we keep all that paper, so we
came down this year and got a bill through that allows us to
select. We're
looking for those things. They are
housekeeping
That costs money.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

Thank you.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
my court unification bill?
MR. SIMPSON:

Mr. Simpson, did you write me on

Yes, sir.

ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: You know, the only correspondence
I've ever rece
you and your association is what you're
against as opposed to what you're for, and that, unfortunately,
sets the tone of
tude towards your organization. You say
you support
se re
, but there should be a flow of those,
and if we're not picking up on them, you should be insisting that
we look at
s letter was the only correspondence I have
ever received from you and your organization, as were against
some proposed
in the system. Not even the
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discussion thereof. Not even recommended changes. We're simply
against any changes to the system. That doesn't sit well.
MR. SIMPSON:
I wrote you one letter
discussed the bill and
change or two would be

Well, with all due respect, Mr. Stirling,
because you had that one bill and we
looked at the bill and we thought maybe a
in order.

ASSEMBLYt1AN STIRLING: What I am saying, that's fine, it is
your First Amendment right to do that, but I think you also have
the responsibility as a professional to be constantly,
profession in general, to be constantly looking for reforms and
improvements in the efficiency of the system. Nobody else
where they are. The responsibility is yours.
MR. SIMPSON: I'd be happy, sir, to send you a list of
the bills we sponsored in the last four years ...
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING:
.•. And what they have done.
Terrific. How about a list of the ones that you want to sponsor
in the next five years?
MR. SIMPSON:
CHAI~~N

I'd be happy to send those too.

HARRIS:

Thank you.

Sir.

MR. CARL OLSEN:
I am Carl Olsen, County Clerk from San
Francisco, also supporting the County Clerks Association's
position.
I only have one thing to add, other than to point out
that some of the comments which have been made previously about
the administrative problems and some things like courts might
occur, and the the salaries and pension plans in the various
counties throughout the state which would become a burden
administratively, I believe, for toleration. Also, the fact that
there now is possibly bringing bailiffs and other important
personnel under this umbrella, now they're separated out from
other officers of the system.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, thank you very much, s
Okay. We have a number of witnesses who are not going to testify
but they have made their testimony available and I would just
mention John McCammon, Lari Sheehan, Robert Laurie as well as
John Gardenal.
Someone is here from the CTLA, so I won't mention
that. Mr. Vic Bellerue, would you come forward please? Welcome.
How are you sir?
MR. VIC BELLERUE: Thank you, Mr. Chairman, I am Vic
Bellerue from the Orange County Counsel's office.
I really
didn't bring any prepared remarks, I did bring severaJ copies of
the study that was alluded to earlier, conducted by the National
Center for State Courts with regard to the New York County
situation. Thank you.

-44-

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much. We appreciate
your being here. Mr. Stirl
is not going to let anyone get
away ..•
ASSEMBLYMAN STIRLING: Well, I am not trying to be
officious, but what motivated your court to go out and fund a
study or did the state implore you to do
?
MR. BELLERUE:
I don't know for sure.
I know that our
Board of Supervisors has been actively involved in determining,
trying to come up with a figure in terms of increasing the $60
thousand block grant. Our County Administrative Office has done
extensive studies to come up with a figure that is frankly higher
than the figure you see here. This study was, I think, motivated
by the courts and, I believe, the final decision made by the
Board of Supervisors was in the area of $13 thousand, which is
very close to the figure you have here. The point being, that
the figures are all over the ballpark.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
afternoon, how are you?

Thank you.

Mr. Campbell.

Good

MR. JOHN CAMPBELL: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My
name is John Campbell, I am the Executive Secretary of the
Economy and Efficiency Commission in Los Angeles County, that is
an advisory committee appointed by the Board of Supervisors.
I
have some very brief verbal remarks.
I have a little written
statement. The E&E Commission was asked about six months ago to
undertake an analysis of the congestion of the courts. The
commission consists of several lawyers and several people who are
professionals in other fields.
I have provided the Committee
with a copy of the study. We published that study in October and
one of the fifteen recommendations addresses the question of
state subsidy.
In
E&E Commission analyses, the commission had
recommended state financing of the trial court system, but only
within the framework of a comprehensive restructuring of the
entire local government system, counties, cities and so forth.
In this report we did not repeat that recommendation, instead we
said that the level of state subsidy needs to be tied to the cost
of the services provided, and when we use the word cost, we are
referring to total costs of all the departments and all the
operations
addition to the costs of facilities, costs of
maintaining facil
s. We don't see any realistic possibility
of one hundred
state financing.
In the area of fines and
forfeitures, that you've asked about, our commission stated that
the formulas need to be revised to base the distribution of
revenues on again
cost of the services that they were
intended to finance.
If you do go to buy-out of the trial court
system, I would suggest, of course, that all revenues go to the
state, except that whatever it is that's allocated to cities for
law enforcement should also be allocated to counties for
unincorporated area law enforcement.
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As to the area of personnel standard, work statements
and job descriptions, and so forth, our comment would be that, in
the event of total buy-out then the state should assume those
kinds of responsibilities. Of course the operating management
responsibilities are necessarily decentralized on the local
level. This report that I referred to, Mr. LeBov has a copy of
it, contains a fairly comprehensive approach to resources and
resource management issues. We address, for example, deeper
service questions within the context of their possible use as
incentives to create community pressure, legal pressure on, for
improvement kinds of issues.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Mr. Campbell, let me ask you a
question. Do you have a feeling or a position one way or the
other as to whether not a uniform standard for state subvention
would be appropriate as opposed to the formula allocation that
Judge Wonder advocated? Should we use a needs formula for the
county if in fact the state is going to assume a greater role in
the funding?
MR. CAMPBELL: Our recommendation was proportionality of
costs. The idea of a floor is not too appealing intuitively,
because it eliminates incentives. The idea of recognizing within
your allocation system that counties are different, the nature of
litigation is different, the nature of the judiciary, the kind of
formula that was suggested that would take those differences into
account, hopefully not on an entitlement basis, based on
population, but perhaps rather on some measure of complexity,
some measure of production.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you, thank you. Our next
witness is Mr. John Guthrie, the Finance Director of the City of
Oakland. Mr. Guthrie. Good to see you again.
MR. JOHN GUTHRIE: Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Committee.
If any of you are wondering what Oakland's interest
is in this, it's purely financial.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I see.

MR. GUTHRIE:
In relation to the question of how fines
and forfeitures "collected by the courts" should be distributed,
I'd like to make you aware that in the case of Oakland they are
not collected by the courts. They are collected by the City of
Oakland. We issue and collect all of our parking citations and
moving violations. The only point where the courts get involved
in this is the point where they go into warrant. Accordingly,
Oakland keeps about 78 percent revenue. The county gets about 22
percent for the court system.
In the case of Oakland, these
revenues amount to about four million dollars, or 3.4 percent of
Oakland's general fund budget. Now, I don't want to spend a lot
of time here, telling you how poor Oakland is.
I think you have
heard this before, but Oakland, nonetheless, has had to make $22
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million worth of
cuts over the last three years since the
passage of Prop 13.
s is
a good portion of revenue to
Oakland.
I would just like to request that you be cautious of
any forms of
allocations of the fines and forfeitures
that are col
In this case, especially the case of
Oakland, you'd
robbing a very, very poor Peter to pay Paul.
Oakland needs money too much. We use the money for general
operations, and
the case of moving violations that is
virtually the only money we're spending right now on
improvements.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

That is interesting.

MR. GUTHRIE:
I'd like you also to consider that there
is a possibility that were this money rechanneled there could be
some SB 90 considerations and the fact that we are spending the
money for collections, et cetera.
I think, if you are
considering this approach, you should probably look at some
approach to pay for incremental costs very similar to the Presley
legislation, which would raise these and distributions, or, in
fact, be considered new revenue sources, if the collective wants
a unification of the court system, perhaps they should be willing
to pay for it. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me ask a question before you
leave. As it relates to Oakland's costs, this is a revenue
generating item for the city of Oakland, the fees et cetera.
It's not a loser, is it?
MR. GUTHRIE: Yes, it is a revenue generator, however,
the costs are not that much below the revenues.
In the case of
parking violations, for example, we receive $2.5 million a year.
Approximately $700 thousand of that goes into collections and the
administra
of
We have to pay for the parking meter
collectors,
all the tickets that are issued. We have to pay
for the restorat
of parking meters.
So, in that case, ...
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Do you have any idea what the income
versus expenses is on that?
would probably, I am just guessing, Mr.
be a profit of a hundred million on

Harris,
that.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. GUTHRIE:

A hundred

llion.

Okay, I see.

I could actually look that up for you.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: No, I understand that, I was just
trying to get an idea, and that's all I wanted to know.
MR. GUTHRIE: Again, that million is paying for other
uniformed officers and parks, et cetera.
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CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
I understand, I understand. Thank you
very much. Okay. I'd like to call forward Mr. Britton, and Gary
Cramer, please. Mr. Cramer would you like to come forward?
MR. BOB BRITTON: Mr. Chairman, Members of the
Committee. My name is Bob Britton.
I am representing Local 715
of SEIU, and I am here today because we represent court workers
in Santa Clara County. We're concerned that control over
personnel, classification of hiring, discipline and things like
that remain with the County Board of Supervisors, not with the
judges. We have represented courtroom personnel for about eleven
years and recently have had some problems with the court in that
they are telling us that we no longer represent those workers
And the Board of Supervisors is preparing to file a suit against
the superior court.
In our recent contract negotiations the
judges of the Superior Court presented to the Board of
Supervisors their needs and desires in negotiations. A couple of
these were that they wanted to be exempt from a provision in the
contract that provided for (inaudible) agreements. They also
wanted to be exempt from (inaudible). That final (inaudible) for
worker in court would be with the presiding judge.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
civil service?

Are the court personnel of Santa Clara

MR. BRITTON: Yes. And that's another problem. The
judges have decided not to go through the County Merit System
rules and have set up their own hiring committee.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
MR. BRITTON:

Pardon me?

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:
of counties.
MR. BRITTON:

That is the case in a lot of counties.

I said, that is the case in a number

Okay.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I am not in favor of that, but that is

the case.
MR. BRITTON: Well, we're concerned. We've had the
problems. We recently won a grievance in arbitration, where the
superior court was not allowing their workers to go to
orientation and have union orientations, which is a part of the
contract. We won that grievance and the County had to pay the
union ten thousand dollars to provide the orientation. But now,
it's reverted back again. The court is refusing to provide
orientation.
So, I think, it's not just a matter of where the
control over personnel stays with the court or not, for us, we
need the control to stay with the Board of Supervisors.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS:

I see.
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Thank you, sir.

MR. GARY CRAMER: Good afternoon, Mr. Chairman. My name
--------~------~
is Gary Cramer,
I
Municipal Court Reporter in Los Angeles.
I am here on
Los Angeles Court Reporters
Association
is made of of the Los Angeles
Municipal and
les Superior Court Reporters.
I am
also here on
of the California Court Reporters
Association.
we're represented by another local SEIU,
Local 660
Los
s, and I am speaking on behalf of our
membership as an association and also as a member of local 660.
And there real
isn't anybody who is something other than a
management
or management type that's here to address you.
Since
aren't any specifics in AB 1820, I am going
to assume for
s of discussion here, that the state funding
of the trial courts will bring in eventual control of the courts
by the Judicial Council. Our chief concern of state funding of
the trial courts is the increased power which it eventually gives
to the Judicial Council, and we're concerned principally with the
loss of local control, affirmative methods of recording or
recording proceedings and transcript income retention. We don't
want to become state employees, nor do we believe the Judicial
Council can adequately oversee the day to day operations of the
trial courts, particularly in providing court reporting services.
Although, mechanical, all court reporters do the same thing,
there are vast differences in job requirements amount the
jurisdictions. There are also significant differences in
salaries from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, which appropriately
reflect the di
job requirements. Some jurisdictions
employ court reporters full time and some employ us part time and
we think it's just like a central control which helps to lower
the costs of providing court reporting services.
In L. A. County, as well as other counties, we are
members of
retirement system, and we wish to remain
of that
rather than being forced to become part of
the state
system, where our benefits would be reduced.
Fringe bene
court reporters vary from jurisdiction to
jurisdiction. A state takeover of the court reporting services
would probab
cost, with the standardization of benefits, an
overall increase to the taxpayers of California.
In L. A. County
alone, providing court reporting services vary for full. time
employed court reporters with the attendant costs of fringe
benefits. The individuals being employed full time without
benef
to
ition agencies providing reporters on an as
needed basis all of which lowers the costs, or the overall costs
of providing court
ing services.
Court reporting at times can be an extremely difficult
we be
1 control provides that impetus for the
among all the reporters.
The
re
tween the local reporter groups and the courts
they serve s an outstanding example of why local control is
necessary and des
le.
Reporters Association of Los
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Angeles conducts examination for the court, we conduct seminars
for reporters during bar week, we formulate scheduling every
quarter, we orient and rehire reporters, we've developed a number
of publications in conjunction with and for the court and at no
expense to the county or the court, or anybody else. The
representation we received by Local 660 in L. A is outstanding.
We believe our rapport with both the municipal and superior court
administration is excellent. We wish to continue to be
represented by Local 660. We believe, though we may have our
differences from time to time, the court and the county of Los
Angeles collectively, have treated us fairly.
Many of the court,
and this has been brought up, I think perhaps indirectly,
the court personnel decisions are duplicative of those within
county government, and it's standard practice to increase
salaries.
If the state required salaries of court reporters to
be different from those of comparable county personnel, there
would probably be morale problems and a lowering of efficiency.
The reporters of Los Angeles County for at least ten
years, that I am aware of, have been tied to a salary movement to
include the legal stenos and legal secretaries of the county.
The advantage of local control and its flexibility is
demonstrated by the fact that in Los Angeles Municipal Court the
court reporting services are provided in a strict pool system and
in the Los Angeles Superior Court they are provided in a modified
pool system, which best serves each of those court's needs.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Let me interrupt you.
I think we're
getting the gist of what you got to say. You submitted this in
writing, right?
MR. CRAMER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Would you like to summarize and
conclude, because I think we understand that you are really
interested in local control, but I think I understand why.
MR. CRAMER:

Yes.

CHAIRMAN HARRIS: You have emphasized that very well and
with very poignant example.
I think we've gotten that point.
MR. CRAMER: Basically, we're concerned that the loss of
local control will result in, not only increased costs generally,
but no advantage in terms of providing court reporting services
to the courts throughout the state. We think that local control
is necessary to hold down the costs. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN HARRIS: Thank you very much.
the hearing. Thank you very much.
# # # # # #
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November 16, 1981

TO:

Members of the Assembly Judiciary Committee

FROM:

Ray LeBov

RE:

Interim Hearing on State Funding of Trial Courts

On November 18, 1981, the Assembly Judiciary Committee will
hold an interim hearing on AB 1820 (Berman), which would
provide for state funding of the trial courts.
AB 1820, which was introduced on behalf of the Judicial
Council of California, merely states that "notwithstanding
any other provision of law, funding of the trial courts
shall be provided by the state in accordance with the provisions of this chapter." The Judicial Council requested
that the bill be referred to interim study in order to obtain the necessary information and the viewpoints of the
potentially affected entities before adding specific provisions and details of its plan for state funding to the
bill.
BACKGROUND
Following the passage of Proposition 13 in 1978, Chief
Justice Bird called a special session of the Judicial
Council, at which the Council unanimously passed a resolution calling for state funding "in view of fiscal
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pressures being exerted by boards of supervisors on the
courts." According to the Judicial Council, many courts
were advised that their budgets were to be cut by specified
percentages, thereby directly affecting court staff and
services and "threatening the ability of the court system •••
to carry out its constitutionally mandated responsibilities."
The Council has also recently noted that while the legislative "bail out" of local government lessened the immediate threat of the judiciary, "substantial danger continues
to exist as the full impact of Proposition 13 begins to be
felt."
The Judicial Council has also argued for state
funding on the grounds that it would simplify the system
and probably save administrative costs.
In a statement released at the time of the bill's introduction, the Judicial Council noted that "the issue of state
funding of the trial court system raises a series of fundamental questions that will have to be discussed and resolved:
a.

What costs ought to be included within the
trial court budgets if state funding is to
occur?

b.

How should the fines and forfeitures collected
by the courts be distributed?

c.

How much authority should the state assume over
job classifications, salary levels and workload
standards of trial court personnel?

Clearly, the cost to the state of funding the trial courts
system cannot be finally determined until decisions are
made on these issues."
OPTIONS FOR STATE FUNDING
Under existing law the State pays the major portion of the
salary of each Superior Court judge.
It also pays the employer's contribution to the judge's retirement system for
municipal and superior court judges, the employer's contribution to the Meyers-Geddes health plan for Superior
Court judges, a $60,000 annual block grant for each superior
court judgeship created since January, 1973 and the total
salaries of authorized circuit justice court judgeships.
Under existing law, the counties pay a designated portion
of the salaries of municipal and justice court judges, and
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the total salary and fringe benefits of clerks, bailiffs,
marshals, constables, and other officers or attaches of
each superior, municipal, and justice court.
The estimated 1981-82 trial court operational costs are
between $512-678 million, with $457-613 million to be paid
by the counties and $55 million by the state. The estimated total trial court receipts from fines, forfeitures
and fees for 1981-82 are $373.5 million, approximately
$62.5 million of which goes to the state, with $185-193
million going to the counteis and $126-131 million to the
cities.
(Note:
please see accompanying Legislative Analyst and Judicial Council memos for a more detailed breakdown of costs and revenues.)
Following the passage of Proposition 13, Governor Brown
established, by executive order, the commission on Government Reform (commonly referred to as the "Post Commission"
after its Chairman, Alan Post.)
The Commission's Task
Force on "Transfer of Program Responsibility from Local
Government to the State: Courts" issued a report on the
fiscal alternatives and implications of the state's
assumption of financing of all or selected elements of the
existing trial court system.
The Task Force Report outlined five options, as follows:
Option 1
Buy-out the superior, municipal, and justice courts;
public defender and probation (presentencing report
costs) including transfer of employees to the state
system.
(Estimated 1981-82 cost:
$671.2 million)
Option 2
Buy-out the superior, municipal, and justice courts
including transfer of employees to the state system.
(Estimated 1981-82 cost:
$465.6 million)
Option 3
Bail-out (as a temporary expedient) the cost of superior, municipal, and justice courts; district attorney; public defender; and probation (presentencing
report costs) or any combination thereof, based on a
percentage of the 1977-78 actual expenditures.
(Estimated 1981-82 cost:
$920.8 million)
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Option 4
Buy-out the same elements contained in option 1 or
2, but do not include transfer of employees to the
state system. Provide overall management
Judicial
Council in terms of standardizing, to the extent
feasible, accounting, budgeting, and reporting.
(Estimated 1981-82 cost:
$465.6 or $671.2 million)
Option 5
Buy-out superior, municipal and justice court judges'
salaries.
(Estimated 1981-82 cost:
$38.1 million)
(Note:
see accompanying excerpts from Task Force
Report for explanations of the five options as well
as discussion of implications to the Justice System
of each.)
The Task Force's listed options of course do not represent
the totality of alternatives for state funding. However,
they are representative of the range of possibilities of
methods of increased state financial participation. Among
the approaches considered by the Task Force were:
A.

Buy-Out would be a permanent transfer of the
local court costs of the county to the state,
with a resulting increase in the state's authority to supervise court operations.

B.

Bail-Out
A "Bail-Out" would be the use of state funds
to cover all or part of the local court costs
on a temporary, year-to-year basis, and with
little or no increase in the state's authority
to supervise court operations.

C.

Reimbursement
"Reimbursement" involJes the payment in arrears
for costs of pro~rams determined to be eligible
for state financial participation based on claims
submitted to the state.

D.

Shared Revenue
"Shared revenue" involves providing funds to
counties on a block grant basis with strings
attached to require a given level of service
in the court system.
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Clearly then, state funding of the trial courts can refer
to a range of alternatives and can include or exclude
various agencies that are part of the broader aspects of
court activity.
(e.g., district attorneys, publ
defenders, probation, etc.)
The National Center for State Courts has supplied the Committee with a "Check-off List of Items to be Considered
Connection With Possible State Financing of Trial Courts
(enclosed).
It illustrates much of the range of issues
which must be considered in any plan for state funding.
Among the questions raised in that list are:
I.

Functional Scope of Assumption
are clerks offices to be included?
are juvenile court social programs to
be included?
are court officers or bailiffs to be
included within the judicial branch or
left with sheriff and law enforcement
agencies?
are law libraries at the county level to
be included?

II.

Specific Types of Costs to be Assumed
are facility costs to be included?
can the state assume trial court operating costs without attempting to rectify required disparities in spending?
how does the state handle costs of employee
fringe benefits?

III.

Revenues
Is the current system of court-generated
revenues (fines, costs and fees) efficient
and fair or does it require restructuring?
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IV.

Types of Assumption
Which of the following types of state assumption
are anticipated?
inclusion of trial court operating costs
in state budget;
reimbursement by state to localities for
actual costs of operating trial courts;
a state subsidy to localities without any
direct connection to operating costs, e.g.,
- a grant or remission of court generated
resources;
some mixture of the above.
COST AND CONTROL

The most significant fundamental issues inherent in any
consideration of increased state responsibility for financing court operations are cost and control. As summarized
in the document "Current Status of State Financing of Trial
Courts", which was also supplied by the National Center,
opponents of state financing frequently cite the objective
data generated by those states which have made the transition to state financing to indicate increased cost under
state funded systems. Proponents, on the other hand, cite
qualitative improvements and expectations of cost reductions to provide equivalent levels of service over the long
run. Further, it is stated that the issue of altered statelocal relationships and the shift in the control of court
operations which results from state financing are even more
important than cost considerations. According to the "Current Status" paper, "State funding opponents fear the loss
of local control over policy and procedure which accompanies
increased centralization of state financed system.
In contrast, proponents cite both qualitative and economic advantages to system-wide administration of state funded
judicial operations." Please see the enclosed "Current
Status" document for a more complete analysis of the cost
and control iss~es.
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EXHIBIT B
CALIFORNIA LEGISLATURE-1981-82 REGULAR SESSION

No. 1820

ASSEMBLY BILL

Introduced by Assemblyman Berman
March 27, 1981

An act to add Chapter 1.6 (commencing with Section
68300) to Title 8 of the Government Code, relating to courts.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

AB 1820, as introduced, Berman. Trial courts: funding.
Under existing law, the state funds a portion of the
compensation for superior court judges.
This bill would add unspecified provisions for state funding
of trial courts.
Vote: majority. Appropriation: no. Fiscal committee: yes.
State-mandated local program: no.

The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Chapter 1.6 (commencing with Section
2 68300) is added to Title 8 of the Government Code, to
3 read:
4
5 CHAPTER 1.6. STATE FUNDING FOR TRIAL COURTS
6
68300. It is the intent of the Legislature in enacting
7
8 this chapter to improve the administration of justice.
68301. Notwithstanding any other provision of law,
9
10 funding of the trial courts shall be provided by the state
11 in accordance with the provisions of this chapter.
1

0
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Prepared by
R. LeBov

BILL DIGEST

BILL:

AB 1820

HEARING DATE:

5/13/81

Berman
SUBJECT:

Trial Courts:

funding

03.JECTIVE:
This bill is intended to provide for state funding of trial
courts.
3:LL DESCRIPTION:
Under existing law, approximately 10 percent of the total
annual operating budgets of the California trial courts is
paid by the state and the remaining 90 percent by the
counties.
This bill would provide that funding of the trial courts
would be provided by the state in accordance with unspecified
provisions.
SOURCE:
California Judicial Council
SUPPORT:
U::1known
OPPOSITION:
Unknown
(CONTINUED)

I
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HEARING DATE:

5/13/81

COMMENT:

1.

The Judicial Council has advocated state funding of the
trial courts "in view of fiscal pressures being exerted
by boards of supervisors on the cou~ts ... (which)
threaten ... the ability of the court system, as a
separate branch of government, to carry out its
constitutionally mandated responsibilities."

2.

The bill's source has informed Committee staff that the
author intends to ask that the bill be referred to
interim study because "the issue of state funding of
the trial court system raises (the following) series of
fundamental questions that will have to be discussed
and resolved:
a.

What costs ought to be included within
the trial court budgets if state funding
is to occur?

b.

How should the fines and forfeitures
collected by the courts be distributed?

c.

How much authority should the state
assume over job classifications, salary
levels and workload standards of trial
court personnel?"

Further, the source states that the cost to the state of
funding the trial court system cannot be finally
determined until decisions are made on these issues.
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November 9, 1981

Hon. Elihu M. Harris, Chairman
Assembly Judiciary Committee
Room 6031, State Capitol
Sacramento, California
Dear Assemblyman Harris:
In response to the request of Mr. Ray LeBov of your staff, we have
updated a task force project report to the former Commission on Government
Reform on county costs of the courts and related functions. As requested,
we have updated the cost figures displayed in the tables on pages 9, 22,
and A1-A5 of that report. We used the same sources, indirect cost, and
inflation assumptions as were used for the task force report.
The report listed five options for full or partial state funding of
the various court functions. Using the 1978 assumptions, we estimAte the
1981-82 state cost of these various options as follows:

Option

Estimated
1981-82 Costs
(in mi 11 ions)

1 (page 19)

$671.2

2 (page 20)

465.6

3 (page 20)

920.8

4 (page 21)

465.6 &
671.2

5 (page 21)

38.1
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Hon. Elihu M. Harris

-2-

November 9, 1981

Because the 1978 assumptions may no longer be valid, the actual
costs of the five options could vary considerably from these estimates.
However, the amounts shown above probably realistically reflect the relationship between the costs of the various options.
Sincerely,

Wi 11 i am G• Hamm
Legislative Analyst
Enclosures
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Table Page 9

1981-82 Estimated County Costs of
Selected Elements of the Justice System
1981-82 Costs
(in millions)

Function
Superior Courts

$227.7

Municipal Courts

226.5
11.4

Justice Courts
District Attorneys

249.6

Public Defender

120.1
85.5

Probation-Presentence Reports

$920.8

Total
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Table Page 22 &A-2

Summary of Combined (State and Counties')
Court System Costs

Estimated 1981-82
(in mi 11 ions)
Counties' Share:
$227.7
226.5
11.4

Superior Court
Municipal Court
Justice Court
Subtotal

$465.6

State's Share:
Superior Court Judges' Salaries
Judges' Retirement Contributions
Assigned Judges
Block Grants
Supreme Court (including
Judicial Council, Commission on
Judicial Performance, and
Legislative Mandates)
Courts of Appeala
Court-Appointed Counsel
(Appellate Courts)
Justice Court Temporary
Judgeships

$33.9
10.5
0.8
9.1

13.9
18.4
2.5

0.5
$89.6

Subtotal
Total, Estimated 1981-82
Court System Cost

a.

$555.2

Does not include costs of facilities for new court division in Orange and
Santa Barbara Counties, and a new court district in Santa Clara County.
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Table Page A-1

Summary of Estimated 1981-82
Local Government Court Costsa
(In Mi 11 ions)

Superior
Court

Municipal
Court

Justice
Court

Total Court
Costs

1979-80 Actual Costsb

$134.1

$141.3

$ 9.0

$284.4

Estimated Indirect
Costs (20 percent)C

26.8

28.3

1.8

56.9

$160.9

$169.6

$1o.8d

$341.3

Estimated 1980-81
(15 percent growth)

185.0

195.0

10.8d

390.8

Estimated 1981-82
(10 percent growth)

203.5

214.5

10.8

428.8

24.2

12.0

.6

36.8

$227.7

$226.5

$11.4

$465.6

Estimated Total,
1979-80 Actual

Estimated 1981-82
Bailiffing Costs
Total, Estimated 1981-82
a.

b.

c.
d.

Includes direct and indirect costs of superior, municipal, and justice
courts, estimated court-related services of the county clerks. Grand jury,
jury commissioners, court reporters and certain fixed assets are not
included.
Source: State Controller's 1979-80 Annual Report, Financial Transactions
Concerning Counties. Since staff benefits are not reflected under the
respective budget units (they are reported under "Other Genera 1"), a derived
basis was used to determine and allocate these costs.
Represents countywide support services costs allocated to budget units.
Growth factors were not applied to justice courts because they have
experienced a decline in numbers due to conversions to municipal courts.
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Table Page A3-A5

Estimated 1981-82 County Costs for
Public Defender, District Attorney, and
Probation (Presentencing Only)
(in Millions)

Public Defender
1979-80 Actual Costs
Estimated staff benefits (13 percent)
Estimated indirect costs (20 percent)
Total, 1979-80 estimated costs
Total Estimated 1980-81 (15 percent growth)
Total Estimated 1981-82 (10 percent growth)
Less State Reimbursements
Net Estimated 1981-82 Costs

$ 76.0
9.9
15.2
101.1
116.3
127.9
7.8
$120.1

District Attorney
1979-80 Actual Costs
Estimated staff benefits (13 percent)
Estimated indirect costs (20 percent)
Total, 1979-80 estimated costs
Estimated 1980-81 (15 percent growth)
Estimated 1981-82 (10 percent growth)

$148.3
19.3
29.7
197.3
226.9
249.6

Probation (Presentencing Only)
1979-80 Actual Costs (total probation)
Estimated staff benefits (15 percent)
Estimated indirect costs (20 percent)
Total, Estimated 1979-80 estimated costs
Estimated 1980-81 (15 percent growth)
Estimated 1981-82 (10 percent growth)
Estimated 1981-82 presentence costs
(estimated 16 percent of total
probation costs)
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$313.0
46.9
62.6
422.5
485.9
534.5
85.5

EXHIBIT D

CHECK-OFF LIST OF ITEMS
TO BE CONSIDERED
IN CONNECTION WITH
POSSIBLE STATE FINANCING
OF TRIAL COURTS

-66-

INTRODUCTION
There fo+lows a listing of the threshold questiqns that must
be addressed by policymakers in states considering the
assumption of trial court operating costs. The purpose of
the listing is to provide a discussion format and to ensure
that relevant topics are systematically covered. The listing
is divided into six parts:
Functional scope of assumption
Specific type of costs to be assumed
Court revenues
Key groups affected by assumption
'I'ime phasing of assumption
Types of assumption
Not all of the items will be applicable to each state. Moreover, there may be some items which cannot be addressed for
lack of information.* However, most of the items should lend
themselves to discussion by state teams.

* A companion hand-out is a paper on court financial
data.
It is entitled Developing Financial Data
on Courts •

2
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CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUM?'J'ION
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS
Part I - Functional Scope of AssuM?tion
Issues
Which trial courts
are to be encompassed by state
assumption?

w
I
0"1

Subissues

Special
Considerations

Treatment of:
- general jurisdiction
courts
- limited jurisdiction
courts
- municipal courts
- special jurisdiction
courts
probate
juvenile/family
other courts of
special jurisdiction

. degree of structural
and organization
unification in
courts

Treatment of:
- clerks of general
jurisdiction
·
courts
clerks of special
jurisdiction
courts
clerks hired under
special federal
programs (title
IVD) to enforce
support payment

. whether clerks at
each level are
elected or
appointed

00

I

Are clerk's
offices to be
included?

----------------·- ----·

• optional inclusion of
some courts, e.g.
municipal courts
degree of administrative unification,i.e,
court authority over
trial courts, system
of administrative
judges, court administrative offices.

. whether clerks have
non-court functions
which are difficult
to separate from
court functions
• political posture of
clerks
. unionization

Comments
State assumption Of trial court
costs is administratively
difficult in a state where
trial court structure is
fragmented. Normally, state
assumption occurs after or simultaneously with some degree
of horizontal unification
(uniform state-wide jurisdiction of each court level)
and some degree of vertical
unification (administrative
mechanisms centered in the
supreme court and extending
to trial courts) .
Clerical·offices can be absorbed into a state budget but
special problems exist where the
clerks are elected, paid from
fees collected from litigants
or perform such non-court functions as recording deeds, issuing
licenses or election registration.
It is possible that some clerks
can be included (e.g., appointed
clerks
lower tier courts or
clerks on civil service in homerule counties) , while elected
clerks are excluded, at least
initially.

CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION
OF TRIAL.COURT OPERATING COSTS
Part I - Functional Scope of Assumption
Issues

Subissues

Special
Considerations

Are social services Treatment of:
• extent to which adult
for adults to be
• adult probation
probation is a funcincluded?
• family counseling/
tion of a state-level
other counseling
corrections depart• referral services in
ment
connection with
pre-trial release
• extent to which adult
or diversion
probation is locally
programs
financed
pre-trial release
programs
. unions
• overlap with prosecutors or social
agencies in referral
programs

I

0'\.e:.,
1.0

I

Are juvenile
court social
programs to be
included?

Treatment of:
• juvenile probation officers/
caseworkers
juvenile detention facilities
• referral and
reference
services
juveni

• extent of state and
local executive
branch involvement
in processing
juvenile social
services in juvenile courts
. role of sheriffs
and juvenile correctional

Comments
Adult probation is not necessarily a judicial branch
function for budgetary purposes. Not uncommonly, some
probation officers are on the
court payroll, some on the
executive
branch payroll •
Some perform parole officer
functions. The inclusion of
adult social services in a
court budget is determined by
gover~~ental organization
in
each state

Juvenile courts are often
difficult to fit into a
state-financed svstem,
because so many social or
correctional services are
handled
non-court agencies.
The final deci
a~ain is
determined by govern~ental
organization
each state.
posed

CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS
Part I - Functional Scope of Assumption
Issues

Special
Considerations

Subissues

Comments
Indigent defense costs tend
to get passed up to the
state level. Often courts
are burdened with handling
payments because no other
agency exists to handle the
chore. Where there is a
state-level defender, the
chore could go to that office.
Some states earmark certain
costs for indigent defense,
in which case the system may
be relatively self-supporting.

Existence of public
defender offices
at the state level

Is the cost of
assigned counsel
fees and transcript fees for
indigents to be
included?

. ability of judicial
branch to administer system
. whether indigent
defense is paid
from a special fund

I

U1

...)

::::>

I

Are the costs of
the jury system
to be included?

Treatment of:
. jury commissions
. sequestered juries
. grand juries
. jury size
• juror fees

. jury management at
the state level
requires administrative mechanisms
which may be beyond
the capacity of
judicial branch
• reimbursement of
local governm~.1ts
invites some
laxity in controlling costs

Are the costs witnesses and guardians ad liteM
to be included?

t;...,.-

Juries are integral to adjudication and are a logical
state assumption if the costs
of general jurisdiction court~
are assumed. The problem
tends to be partly administrative since thousands of
jurors must be paid through
a state system.
The use of one-day, one trial
jury calls can possibly be
addressed on a state-wide
basis.
There is a wide variation
among states in treatment of
items. They can be sigexpense to states,
particularly the costs of
ionals appointed by
the court in connection with
litigation.

Treatment of:
. regular witness fees
. court appointed guardians, experts

-

CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION
OF TRIAL. COURT OPERATING COSTS
Part I - Functional Scope of Assumption
Issues
Are the costs of
various professional services
included?

I
...)

0\

Subissues

political posture
of sheriffs
. unions
dearee to which
court officers
are regular, more
or less full-time
court employees

-'

'

Are there any
other problems
of scope?

Access to library?
. Attorneys
. Public

Comments
These costs are logical
inclusions but are escalating
in recent years. They are
not minor items.

Treatment of:
. sanity exams
. attorney fees

Are court officers
or bailiffs to be
included within
the judicial
branch or left
with sheriff and
law enforcement
agencies?

Are law libraries at the
county/parish
level to be
included?

Special
Considerations

bar association
involvement
snecial fundino of
libraries from
court revenue

Normally in rural states the
need for bailiffs is so
sporadic that it is economical·
ly advisable to leave the
bailiff functions with sheriff,
However, in urban courts ~ith
full-time bailiffs, it may be
desirable to include bailiffs
on the court budget. Occasion·
ally, bailiffs are used as
law clerks and should be on
the court payroll.
States vary markedly in how
they view libraries. Some
include them as part of the
court budoet, includinc
librarian~.
Not atypically
a bar association pays so~e
library costs.

-~~~~-~~

Sp~_~i~ic ~y~~s

CHECK OFF LIST L STATE ASSUMPTION
OF' TRIAJ. COURT OPERATING COSTS
of Costs t~-~-~ssumed _______________________________________________________

Issues

I

Subissues

Special
Considerations

Comments

Are facility costs
to be included?

. Methods of reimbursement
- square footage
rental
- repayment to
localities for
court share of
building operations costs and
debt services
- simple allocation
to localities of
court revenues
in an amount sufficient to cover
facility costs
- difference between
space in county
court houses and
space in rented
facilities or
court dedicated
facilities
imposing standards
for facilities
- sheer amount of
facility costs

Assumption of facility costs
is very expen9ive, perhaps
20% of the total budget, and
administratively complex to
handle.
It can involve multi·
ple negotiations and unending
political bickering. It is
commonly ducked in the initia:
stage of state assumption of
trial court costs.

Can the state assume
trial court operatin9
costs without attempting to rectify
regional disparities
in spending?

. Differences in salary
levels for same job

It is hard for a state to
assume court operating costs
without attempting to create
some rough equality in
itures. When trial
courts become a state system,
some incremental spending to
balance inequities is usually
involved.

......,]

......,]
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I

. Differences in staffing
equipment
levels for courts
with similar workloads

-

CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS
Part II - Specific Types of Costs to be Assumed

----

Issues
Should the state
take title to all
supplies ahd equipment of courts as
one aspect of state
assumption of trial
court costs?

I
-....1

00

-----

------------------------------------------Subissues

Special
Considerations

Authority to transfer . reaction of local
equipment from one
governments
•
need
for an invencounty to another
tory
of equipment
(obviously not feas.
need
for
link
ible if county owns
between
inventory
court equipment) .
maintenance and
purchasing and
Which government has
budget control
responsibility for
equipment maintenance
if county retains title
to some court equipment?

w
I

If the state
assumes financial
responsibilities
for trial courts,
which agencies
should assume the
cost of financial
and personnel
management support
formerly provided by local
govP.rnments?

Treatment of:
budgetary
accounting
budget formulation
purchasing
cost accounting/depository control
payroll
computerized
management
systems
maintenance of
person

• degree to which
state executive
branch can or
should provide
management support
• possibility of decentralizing management through a
system of pres
ing judges and
trial court administrators

Comments
A state can simply pick up _
newly acquired court propert
as it is acquired with state
funds, but normally all cour
property is taken by the sta
on a date certain since the
~urden of maintaining
all court property passes to
the state. It is a complex
administrative problem to
inventory court property and
then to build this inventory
into ongoing administrative
systems.
A commonly ignored cost of
state assumption ·is the admi
istrative
overhead costs
associated with financial ar
personnel management. Sone
strengthening of court adMin
iEtrative offices ts alwars
a necessity.
Such strengthening need not
a strong trial cour
preparing a budget
t, making minor pur, selecting personnel

level.

CHECK OFF LIST 0~ STATE ASSUMPTION
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS
Part II - Specific Types of Costs to be Assumed

Issues

How does state
handle costs of"
employee fringe
benefits?

I
-...J
,j::.

I

\.0

Sub issues

Treatment of:
• employee benefits
that are better
than those offered
by state
• vested interests in
pension plans or
leave entitlements
under union contracts or local
personnel systems

Soecial
Considerations

Administrative difficulties of transferring
employees into a single
system, special shortterm accommodations to
protect legal rights

Comments

Governments budget for fringe
benefits in various ways,·
often treating them as a
central overhead cost and not
allocating them back to
particular agencies. Thus,
compensation costs of local
courts are often underestimated.
The aoolication of
state frinae benefits usuallv
drives uo costs state-wide
but mav still not be the
equivalent of benefits in a few
affluent counties or cities.

_1

CHECK OFF LIST ..{ STATE ASSUMPTION
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS
Part III - Revenues
Issues

Is the current.
system of courtgenerated revenues
(fines, costs and
fees) efficient
and fair or does
it require
restructuring?

Subissues

Effect on:
• individual
lit:! gants
• bookkeeping
and cash control functions

..1

I
I

Comments

• Average case costs imposed, amount too
high?
• Number of discrete
costs? Is system
administratively
unwieldy?

State assumption of trial
court costs, usually prompts
a look at offsetting court
resources. Normally, this
look reveals that the system
of costs, fines and fees requires some revision.

• Use of court cases to
generate money for a
variety of government
programs.

::>

......:1
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Special
Considerations

Are revenues
allocated in proportion to the
expenditures of
courts or simply
retained where they
are collected?

Reasonableness of
Allocation:
- to state
- to counties
- to cities
- to other
recipients,
such as fee
offices

• Extent to which lowertier courts have
"surpluses"
Extent to which uppertier courts have
"deficits"
. Probable opposition of
cities to changes
which affect revenues
• Rooting out
vestiges of
of

systems

It is unfortunate, but not
uncommon practice, to view
trial courts as entities which
should be self-supporting.
Generally, lower-tier courts,
particularly municipal courts,
have a stake in keeping
revenues where it is
collected. They make a
"profit." However, as states
assume more trial court costs
they usually seek more courtgenera
revenues.

CHECK OFF LIST ON STATE ASSUMPTION
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS
Part Ill - Revenues
Issues

To what extent
do court revenues
go into special
purpose funds,
rather than
general funds,
and are these
special funds
legally and
.politically
sacrosanct?

....
...

Subissues

Special
Considerations

Special legislation
giving particular
localities or
courts special fines
fed by a particular
court cost or fee
• Use of court costs to
feed pension funds or
library funds and
even facility funds;
special legal rights
involved

Comments

Court costs may be earmarked
for a variety of purpose£,
many related to courts.
There may be vested legal
interests in these funds
which must be respected.
Often they represent a
diversion of money from the
general fund, as well as a
dubious imposition on
litigants.

I
-....!
~

I
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PA~T

IV

KEY GROUPS AFFECTED BY ASSUMPTION

~.

stated Positions or
Concerns, if any

Key Groups
Governors Office/Budget
Office
Legislature:
Differences, if any,
By Chamber
Party
any

positions~

if

Regional positions,
if any,

Committees:
House Judiciary
House Appropriations
Senate Judiciary
Senate Appropriations
Joint Appropriations
Judiciary:
Supreme Court
Judicial Council/
Conference
Judjcial Planning
Body (JCC)

12
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Possible Concerns
and Positions

PART IV

KEY GROUPS AFFECTED BY

~SSUMPTION

~,----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Key Groups

Stated Positions or
Concerns, if any

Judiciary:
Presiding Judges
General Jurisdiction
Judges
Limited Jurisdiction
Judges
Special Jurisdiction
Judges

Court Personnel:
Clerks
Reporters
Probation
Officers
Court Officers
Unions
Administrators
Local Governments
County Organizationn
City Organizations
Individual Stance
of Major Counties
or Cities

13
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Possible Concerns
and Positions

PAF:T IV

Key Groups

KEY GROUPS AFFECTED BY ASSUMPTION

Stated Positions or
Concerns, if any

Legal Organizations
Bar Associations:
State
Local
Prosecutors
Defenders

Public Interest
Group/Other

14
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Possible Concerns
and Positions

PART V

QUESTIONS ON riMING

What are the key dates in the political and
governmental cycle? Specifically:
- elec~ion of judges
- state budget cycles, budget submission
dates
- local budget cycles
- other dates of significance (for example,
da~es relating to pending constitutional
amendments)
What lead time would be necessary to implement a
state assumption of trial court costs, if the
amount of state assumption was substantial?
Specifically, the time to recruit needed personnel and to obtain contractor help; to identify
affected personnel; to do desk audits; to prepare
job definitions and individual classifications; to
do a pay plan; to handle employee appeals; to set up
a personnel system for the affected employees. Also:
to do a state-wide trial court budget;
to establish control over cash flow in
trial courts and deposit of funds:
to ~rain and orient trial court personnel
in new systems;
to establish payroll and accounting systems;
to do property inventories and to have
purchasing and maintenance systems
established;
to have settled major union or employee
interest problems; including new bargaining
uni-:s;
to identify federally funded positions and
possible assumption of costs.
The above steps would have to be authorized in the legislation
on state assumption, and the date for assumption.
The scope
of assumption would also have to be set.

15
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PART VI
TYPES OF ASSUMPTION

~ich

l

of the following types of state assumption are

~~ticipated?

inclusion of trial court operating
costs in state budget;
reimbursement by state to localities for
actual costs of operating trial courts;
a state subsidy to localities without any
direct connection to operating costs,
e.g. - a grant or remission of court
generated resources;
some mixture of the

abov~J

Is the state assuming trial court costs of only a particular
geographic segment of the court or excluding some geographic
segment of the court?

16
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Annendix

SCOPE OF ASSUMPTION

I
(X)

tv

I

....
._J

COUkT LEVELS

FUNCTIONS

EXPENSES

•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•

General Jurisdiction
Limited Jurisdiction
Special Jurisdiction
Municipal Courts
Probate Court
Juvenile Court

Judges
Reporters
Administrative staff
court personnel
Clerk's office
Adult probation
Juvenile probation
Juvenile detention
Jury commission
Uefense services
Security/bailiffs
Diversion programs
Pre-trial release
Administrative services
Referral services
Family counseling

Law Library
Jury fees/expenses
Witness fees/expenses
Sanity exams
Travel
Professional development
- education
- memberships
- training
• Facilities
• Equipment
• Assigned counsel/transcripts

-

Appendix B

SPECIFIC TYPES OF COSTS TO BE ASSUMED

I
00

w
I

SALARY AND WAGES

FRINGE BENEFITS

SERVICES

OPERATING COSTS

FACILITIES

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

•
•
•
•
•
•
e
•

•
•
•
•

e
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Permanent positions
Temporary positions
Match funds
Overtime
Shift differential
Acting assignments
Reclassification
lloliday pay
New personnel
Longevity

•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Hospital Ins. Prem.
FICA
Li[e Ins. Prem.
Workman's Comp.
Accrued vacation
Pension
Education (tuition)
Prior pension contributions
Unemployment comp.
Cost of living adj.
Unused sick leave
Optical plan
Uental plan
Clothing allowance
Uond premiums
Prescriptive drug
plan
Nemberships
Training

e

e

•
•
•
•
•
•
e
•
•

Translators/interpretors
Data Processing
Witness fees
Grand jury
Appointed counsel
Jury fees
Prof/contractual serv.
Sheriff fees
Visiting judges
Sanity exams
(medical/psychiatric)
Court reporting services
Bail interviews
Prob. referral agencies
Security
Laundry/towel service
(medical/psychiatric)
Court reporting services
Bail interviews
Prob. referral agencies
Security

•
•
e
e

•
•
•
•
•

Telephone
Office supplies
l.aw library
Judicial chambers
books
Vehicle mileage/
travel
Advertising
Printing
Subscriptions
Transcript fees
Postage
Juror expenses
Witness expenses
Forms

Equipment/Furniture
• Purchase (new)
• Rental/lease
• Maint./repair
• Purchase (existing)

Building rent
Parking lot rent
Bldg. improvements
Utilities
Custodial services
Liability insurance
Repairs
Purchase

Appendix C
"HIDDEN" ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS
Most trial courts are to some extent dependent upon local
governmental units for central services in many administrative
areas.
budget.

These expenses are not usually found in the court's
They may not even be identified as court expenses in the

budget of the department proviaing administrative services.
These "hidden" costs include:
• Central stockroom

• Purchasing

• Labor·relations

. Human relations (EEO/AA) . Treasurer

• Data processing

• Civil Service Commission . Payroll

• Audits

• Corporate counsel

. Executive

• Budget

• Maintenance

. Utilities

• Rent

. Custodial (grounds)

. Personnel

• Security

Liability insurance

• Postage

Which of these "hidden" costs are to be covered by state
assumption?

19
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Appendix D

BUDGETS WHICH MAY INCLUDE COURT·RELATED EXPENDITURES
STATE
• Supreme Court
•

Executive Budget
- Bureau of Retirement System
- State Planning Agency
- Office of Administrative Services

•

Department of Corrections

•

Department of Social Services

•

Other ancillary Supreme Court agencies

•

State Court Administrative Office

•

Judicial Planning Committee

•

Judicial Council

COUNTY
• Court Budget
• County Building Authority
• Sheriff Department
• County Clerk
• Probation
• Central Service Cost Allocation
• Fringe Benefits
LOCAL GOVERNMENT
• Court Budget
• Police Department
• Building Authority
• Fringe Benefits

FEDERAL GOVERN~ffiNT
• LEAA
• Department of Social Services
• CETA .
• Urban Corp. Program

•

*These budgets may contain appropriations for trial court expenses.
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EXHIBIT E

STRATEGIC CONSIDERATIONS IN STATE ASSUMPTION
OF TRIAL COURT OPERATING COSTS

By
SUE K. DOSAL
SENIOR STAFF ATTORNEY
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NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE COURTS

APRIL 1980
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Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to assist those states actively considering
political action to bring about increased state financing of trial courts.
The paper assumes that a policy decision has been made on the merits of
increased state financing and addresses the strategic considerations germane
to this transition.

These considerations have been gleaned from the

experiences of those states which have already undergone the transition from
local to state financing of trial courts and those states which have tried and
failed to make a transition.
The major strategic considerations which emerge from this examination of
both successful and unsuccessful state financing campaigns can be categorized
as follows:
•

Political dynamics of assumption;

•

Scope of assumption;

•

Phasing of assumption;

•

Budgetary methods of assumption; and

•

Administrative mechanics of assumption.

It is hoped that these accumulated experiences will assist in the
identification of possible political obstacles and will suggest possible means
of overcoming these obstacles.

Representatives of each state will determine

for themselves how the lessons learned in other states can be applied to their
own political environment.
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A.

Political Dynamics of Assumption
The major groups which potentially may be galvanized for or against state

financing of court operations include:

judicial branch administrative

officials, trial judges, clerks, local government, the Governor, the
legislature, the bar association, law enforcement, and the public.

While one

or more of these individuals or groups has taken a leadership role in
achieving state court financing in the past, experience seems to indicate that
it 1s difficult to succeed if there 1s active and organized opposition from
some of these potential opponents.

For that reason, the following discussion

attempts to highlight the bases of opposition by these various power centers,
drawing upon the history of both successful and unsuccessful state financing
efforts in various states.

1.

Judicial Branch Administrative Officials

Although it would be expected that judicial branch administrative
officials, such as the Chief Justice, members of the Supreme Court, and State
Court Administrator, would be most likely to take a leadership role 1n
initiating efforts to achieve state financing of court operations, the history
of state funding movements reveals that this is often not the case.

The Chief

Justice and other Supreme Court members may be disinclined to initiate or
actively support efforts to obtain state financing of trial courts for several
reasons.

First, these judges frequently are uninterested in the

administrative aspects of the judicial system and actively seek to avoid the
additional burdens of trial court administration which would divert time and
attention from their judicial responsibilities.

Second, the Chief Justice and

other members of the Supreme Court may have served previously at the trial
court level.

Thus, they may .share the concern of their trial judge colleagues

that state financing and the

associat~d

centralization of administration will
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replace the historical independence and individual prerogatives of judges with
a system which

place~

system-wide operation.

greater emphasis on administrative efficiencies and
Third, judges traditionally have shied from

entanglements in politics and many believe non-involvement in state financing
efforts is required to be consistent with that policy.

1

Moreover, the

radical nature of the organizational change involved in the transition from
local to state financing runs counter to the education and professional
training of judges, which stress gradualism through case-by-case
decision-making based on historical precedent.

Finally, where the Chief

Justice and members of Supreme Courts share this reluctance to support
financing reform, it is unlikely that the State Court Administrator, who
serves at their pleasure, will play a significant role in initiating state
funding efforts.
Nevertheless, the Chief Justice and the State Court Administrator have
provided leadership in promoting state funding of trial court operations in
several jurisdictions.

For example, the strong leadership of Chief Justice

Howell Heflin in initiating fundamental reorganization of the Alabama judicial
system and state financing of all trial court operations 1s well known.
Similarly, the active leadership of Mr. Jim James, as State Court Administrator

lrndeed, in several states legal issues surrounding state funding
necessitated the non-involvement of this group. For example, during the 1975
state court financing efforts in the state of Washington, the Supreme Court
prohibited the State Court Administrator from acting in support of a state
court funding bill because of a pending lawsuit challenging the
constitutionality of the proposed method of submitting the amendment to the
electorate.
2rt is interesting to note that Chief Justice Heflin's efforts to reform
the Alabama court system cannot be viewed as an internal judicial branch
1n1tiative. Chief Justice Heflin was elected to that post with a mandate to
reform the judicial branch and on his promise to do so in one term.

-3-
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of Kansas, generally is recognized as a substantial contributing factor to the
achievement of state funding of the trial court operations 1n that
jurisdiction.

While these serve as examples of judicial leadership, judicial

branch administrative officers have not consistently assumed active roles in
state financing efforts.
2.

Trial Court Judges

Trial court judges frequently can be the source of active and organized
opposition to state financing, since their operations are the primary object
of reform.

Not infrequently, they fear the effects of change more than they

dislike the weaknesses in the existing system.

Thus, organized and effective

opposition is likely to be marshalled if trial judges perce1ve state financing
as a substantial threat to their autonomy and authority.
For that reason, it appears that state financing is a much more difficult
goal to achieve in judicial systems with substantially diffused and
decentralized internal administrative authority.

For example, in states

without constitutional or statutory authority for judicial system
administration vested in the Chief Justice or the Supreme Court, without
specified state-wide management responsibilities given to the state court
administrator, and without centralized power to reassign trial court judges
vertically or horizontally within the system, state financing clearly means a
major shift in control of trial court operations from the local to the state
level.

In response to such a proposal, the Washington Superior Court Judges

Association overwhelmingly opposed a state funding plan, fearing that local
control of judicial operations would be replaced with new and unwanted
hierarchical control and supervision by the Chief Justice and State Court
Administrator.
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In contrast 1s the experience of a state such as Connecticut which has had
a long history of centralized administration, including the designation of the
Chief Justice as the chief administrative officer of the judiciary in 1953,
and the creation of a single administrative judge, appointed by the
Justice, for each trial court level in 1959.

Given this history of highly

centralized administration, it was possible in that state to consolidate the
trial courts and to bring them under the umbrella of state court

on

an incremental basis without organized opposition by the trial court
In between the two extremes represented by Washington and Connecticut are
states such as Minnesota, which recently consolidated its trial courts, state
funded all judges, and provided by statute for a unified and central
administrative structure, but retained substantial features of local control
including county funding and peer election of administrative judges for each
of its ten judicial districts.

Yet, in 1978, the District Judges Association

overwhelmingly opposed state financing of trial court operations.

The bases

for this resolution included the generalized opposition to further state
intrusion and the feeling that there was nothing to be gained by shift

the

funding burden.
State financing perhaps is less likely to be opposed by trial j
it accompanies proposals for

fundam~ntal

when

restructuring of the judicial system

to eliminate widespread public dissatisfaction with "cash

registe~'

and

"speed-trap" justice dispensed by fee-paid and often non-lawyer judges of
m,unicipal or justice of the peace courts.

Typically, state financing easily

is carried on the coat tails of such popular reforms as is evidenced in the
states of North Carolina and Alabama.

Even in Kentucky, where the County

Judge's Association publicly opposed state financing for fear that the state
would not provide as adequate a level of funding as the existing system,
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popular support for eliminating alleged abuses overwhelmed the opposition of
this group.
Based on the experiences of these states, it

~s

possible to speculate that

trial judge opposition is less likely when state funding is tied to trial
court reorganization or at least to increases in judicial salaries and
benefits.
either of

The Minnesota experience would seem to indicate that, in absence of
~hese

elements, state financing is perceived by trial judges as

offering only a diminution of their individual prerogatives.
3.

Clerks of Court

Frequently the most powerful and outspoken opponents of state finaAcing
are the clerks of court.

Traditionally, court clerks are elected county

officials with independent political power bases.

As a result, there are a

number of reasons why clerks of court may be opposed to state financing.
First, the centralized administration which accompanies state funding
tends to limit the autonomy and flexibility of the court clerk.

Under local

funding, clerks work independently with local judges and are free to develop
their own procedures and office practices.

State funding inevitably leads to

statewide standardization of budgetary, accounting, records, filing, and other
office practices.
Clerks under the decentralized system may be charged with responsibility
of judicial budgets, and at the very least, control their own office budgets.
They negotiate directly with local governing boards on funding matters, often
without any consultation with local trial judges.

Moreover, as elected

officials, the campaign platforms of clerks typically center on their ability
to minimize judicial expenditures and maximize revenues collected and
submitted to the local unit of government.

In some states,

operations, including the salary of the clerk, are funded
-6-
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cl~rk'~

d~rectly

office

by fees

collected for the serv1ces provided to the public.

Typically, where this

financing method is employed, clerks of court have total financial
independence, free from local government appropriations approval and from all
pre-expenditure review.

State funding eliminates the central role and

independence·of the clerk 1n fiscal matters under any locally based financing
method.

State funding is perceived by this group as a system of centralized

budgeting and appropriations in which clerks may have some input, but over
which they have little control.

This loss of power over fiscal matters

primary impetus to the organization and successful lobbying effort of Florida
court clerks in excluding complete state funding and unitary budgeting from
the 1972 proposed amendment to the judicial article.
Additionally, court clerks often oppose state funding because of the added

ly,

administrative responsibilities with which they may be burdened.

state funding carries with it increased local workload and financial reporting
requirements and causes clerks to devote substantial attention to the
justification of budget requests and evaluation of on-going operations and new
programs over that currently necessitated to obtain local funding.

This

spectre of additional administrative responsibilities was a significant cause
of clerk opposition to state funding in Kentucky.
Clerks also tend to oppose state funding when it is accompanied by, or

,

po~itions

perceived as the precursor of, a movement to change their
elective to appointive.

from

It is strongly felt that this change in method of

selection means a loss of power, status and independence.

In North Carolina,

the provision to appoint court clerks was withdrawn from the unification/state
financing package to gain clerk support for the proposal.

3

3In the mid-Atlantic states of West Virginia and Virginia, elected
circuit clerks stayed out of the unified court system and are still locally
funded.
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Finally, perhaps the most vehement opposition to state financing proposals
arises from clerks of court who are charged by constitution or statute not
only with the clerical responsibilities of trial court operations, but also
with executive functions such as election registration, licensing and county
recording.

Since state funding in such jurisdictions would encompass only

that portion of the clerk's office relating to judicial activities, it is
inevitable that proposals will emerge to sever the judicial and executive
functions since it would seem unworkable to require that two separate
administrative policies (including classification plans, compensation levels,
fringe benefits, leave policies, etc.) operate simultaneously in one
office.

4

In such states, it is natural to expect active opposition to state

funding by clerks since splitting the office would reduce the clerk's scope of
authority and responsibility, and retention of one office would result in an
unreasonably cumbersome administrative structure.
Examination· of previous successful state financing efforts indicates that,
regardless of the potential benefits of state funding for the judicial system
as a whole, court clerk support of state financing proposals is likely only if
a majority feel that state financing will result in an increase in personal
compensation or at least more adequate funding for their office operations.
4.

Local Government

Local officials, including county comm1ss1oners, city council members and
mayors, have opposed state financing in the past for two reasons.

First,

local governments fear the loss of political control over local judges.

For

example, in Alabama, the League of Municipalities strongly opposed

4Yet, the New York state funding plan has resulted in this dual
administrative structure of the clerk's operation in which some clerk staff
are county employees and the remainder are state personnel.
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consolidation and state financing in part because it would eliminate the
mayor's power to appoint local judges.

Second, state financing and unitary

budgeting are opposed by this group since traditionally local governments have
financed many public service functions from court-generated revenues.

State

financing typically requires that n1ost or all of the fines and fees generated
locally be transmitted to the state treasurer.

For these reasons,

state financing packages have been defeated by the active opposition of
municipal associations, as 1n Idaho.

H~wever,

other states, which have

successfully enacted state funded court systems, have dealt with this local
concern by excluding municipal courts from the state funded system as
Oklahoma and Kansas; by including a provision allowing municipal courts to opt
into or out of the state funded system by local resolution as in Alabama; and
by providing substantial distribution of court revenues to local government as
1n West Virginia, where 60% of fees and 100% of all fines of its limited
jurisdiction courts are paid to local government.

Additionally, when

ordinance jurisdiction is included within the state funded judicial system,
the processing of parking violations is almost always established as an
administrative activity within municipal government, which results in
retention of substantial levels of revenue.

1

Such provisions also tend to

lessen local opposition to state financing proposals.
In contrast, county governments are increasingly supporting state funding
of trial court operations.

This is true for two reasons.

First, some states

have severely limited local government discretion over court system
expenditures.

In Colorado, the Supreme Court held that the county commission

may not control court expenditures unless the county can show the court's
actions to be arbitrary and capricious.

In Michigan, trial court

personnel~

although locally funded, are held to be state employees, not subject to local
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-

government personnel policies and compensation plans unless such inclusion 1s
deemed by the court to be in its best interest.

Without fiscal control of the

court system, county boards are inclined to support actively proposals to
shift the·financial burden for court operations to the state level.

It was

this argument by county boards which resulted in state funding of the Colorado.
judicial system.

County governments also are increasingly supportive of state

financing proposals purely as a local property tax relief measure.

Local

pressure in Massachusetts was the main reason for the enactment of state
funding of trial courts in 1978.

5.

The Governor

Although governors are sometimes 1n the forefront of judicial reform, 5
generally they lack enthusiasm for state financing because of its fiscal
implications.

State funding was defeated in 1967 in Idaho primarily by the

governor's opposition to the proposal on the grounds that there was a lack of
sufficient information on the fiscal impact of the measure.

During the Kansas

state financing movement, the governor successfully delayed the introd4ction
of a state court financing bill also for lack of fiscal impact information.
Even after an in-depth study provided the information sought, the governor
recommended further delays in state assumption of the full financial
responsibility for trial court operations.

Comprehensive fiscal impact

information would seem to be a major factor in reducing executive branch
opposition to state financing proposals.

5Governor Milliken of Michigan has made state financing of courts one of
his prime objectives; former Governor Dukakis of Massachusetts made court
reform a major objective and set up a blue-ribbon commission on the subject.
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integral part of the patronage system of that state.

With the enactment of

state funding, the legislature has guarded this prerogative, in part, by
severely limiting the size of the state court administrative staff.
Currently~ there are approximately 10 professional employees (exclusive of

data processing staff) to administer a system comprising of over 5,000 court
positions.

Legislative appropriations for state level administration equals

7/10 of 1% of the total judicial branch budget.

The exercise of legislative

power to control judicial branch "empire building" by restricting the s1.ze of
its central administrative staff is evidenced 1.n West Virginia and other
states as well..
7.

Law Enforcement

When state financing

l.S

tied to a trial court unification effort, law

enforcement officers may oppose the program.

Typically, such proposals

include the elimination of justices of the peace and non-lawyer judges, which
reduce the total number of judicial officers throughout the state, and make
the warrant issuance process more difficult and time consuming for law
enforcement officers.

Particularly in rural areas, where the proposed system

provides for a single judicial officer in a county or for a designated
judicial area comprised of several counties, law enforcement officers within
that jurisdiction must travel substantial distances to appear in person and
swear under oath before a judicial officer to the facts alleged as the basis
of the warrant.

Typically, this has been resolved by the provision of

magistrates as in South Dakota.

However, other states with large sparsely

populated areas have refused to authorize non-lawyer magistrates to issue
warrants.

Although this problem is not directly caused by state financing of

trial operations, it typically is inter-related since historically court
consolidation appears to be a condition precedent to state funding.
-12-
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8.

Bar Association

State bar associations frequently represent a maJor force in initiating
court reform efforts, including state court.financing, as was illustrated in
Alabama and Kentucky.

In other states the potential for disruption of

existing local relationships and practices has generated the opposition
trial attorneys who have learned to manipulate
best advantage.

th~

existing system to their

Greater centralized administration of trial court

(including standardized rules relating to judicial assignment, c
management and administrative practices) curtails not only the individual
prerogatives of trial judges but also the flexibility of the attorney-judge
working relationship.

When state funding is accompanied by proposals for new

rule-making authority to be vested in the supreme court, attorney opposi
seems even more likely.

In Washington, the state bar association and several

local bar associations publicly denounced the state funding proposal on the
grounds that if the supreme court were granted rule-making authority, the
trial courts would be inundated with numerous procedural changes, which in
turn would severely disrupt trial practice.
9.

The Public

The examination of previous successful and unsuccessful state funding
efforts indicates that active, broad-based public support is unlikely in the
absence of widespread belief in the existence of abuses within the judicial
system, as was the case in Alabama and North Carolina.

Indeed, Ln several

states rural citizens organized successful campaigns to prevent the loss of
control over the local judge who they feared would be assigned to other parts
of the state under a state financed system.

States such as Oklahoma and

Kansas were required to exclude municipal courts from the purview of the state
funded system to achieve widespread support for the proposal.
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E·.

Scope of State Funding Assumption
A second strategic consideration in developing a state financing program

relates to the breadth of the new state responsibility which is proposed.

The

scope of the assumption clearly is interrelated with, and often dependent
upon, the identification of sources of opposition to state financing.

Having

identified likely opponents, it may be possible to make decisions relating to
the scope of the assumption which can defuse substantially these forces
resisting change.

In the past, state funding strategies developed around

scope of assumption considerations have involved limiting the definition of
the state funded judicial system by function or by court level.
1.

Functional Limitations of State Funding

The exclusion of specified functional activities from the state funded
program is a strategy which has been successfully employed in a number of
state financing efforts to increase the likelihood of success.

The essence of

the strategy is a narrow functional definition of court system scope to keep
the state appropriations within politically acceptable limits.
Typically, the following functions may be considered for exclusion:
•

indigent defense

•

sanity examinations

•

witness fees

•

juvenile detention

•

adult and juvenile probation

•

clerical functions performed by elected clerks

•

bailiff functions performed by elected sheriffs

•

law library expenses

•

juries
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The ultimate decisions on exclusion are widely varied and are detailed in
Table 2 of Current Status of Financing of State Courts, prepared as a
companion piece to this paper.
The most frequently excluded functions are adult and juvenile probation,
yet even these functions may not be totally excluded.

6

In North Carolina,

for example, urban jurisdictions had probation staffs serving the
directly, while most other courts were provided probation services
executive branch department.

a

When the state assumed trial court costs, only

the locally funded probation officers in urban areas were included in the
state judicial budget.
Clerical services have been excluded 1n a number of states, more
political than financial rasons, but the exclusion has made state assumpt
more palatable.

As indicated earlier, the mid-Atlantic states have largely

excluded elected clerks as an item of state assumption.

In Oklahoma, a

largely state-funded system, counties still pay part of the personnel cost of
court clerk operations.
The open-ended somewhat volatile costs associated with indigent defense,
sanity examinations and witness fees are not eagerly included in sta
judicial budgets, but they often end up there for want of a better budgeting
mechanism.

Where state public defender systems exist, courts can be relieved

of indigent defense services (Wisconsin is in the process of such a transfer now)
Eventually, jury costs may gravitate to the state level, but stringent
management is needed to limit unnecessary costs, once the local governments
are released of this expense.

South Dakota, though state funded, has left

jury costs with local governments.

6rt should be noted that probation is considered a state level executive
function 1n many states and is excluded from the state judicial branch budget
for that reason.

-15-103-

2.

Ccur:..: Level Limitation

Other states have limited the scope of state assumption on the basis of
court level as a strategy in achieving substantial increases in state
financing of trial court operations.

Typically, this strategy has been used

to undercut the strongest forces of opposition to state funding.

Illustrative

of this strategy are the state financing proposals enacted in Nebraska,
Virginia and Maryland.

In all three states, reorganization and consolidat

of the limited jurisdiction trial courts accompanied state funding of those
operations.

However, the more powerful general jurisdiction trial courts

(including the offices of elected clerks of court) which were unaffected by
the lower court reorganization reform, remained outside of the state financing
proposal and continue today under local financial control.
Similarly, municipal courts were excluded from the state financing package
~n

over half of the state funded judicial systems because of pervasive local
. .

oppos~t~on.

7

Opposition mounted

.

aga~nst

.

state fund1ng by these local

officials has been reported as the most powerful opposition force to financing
reform.

In fact, it is speculated that successful passage of state funding

bills in most of these jurisdictions would have been unlikely without the
successful neutralization of this group.

Some or all municipal courts are

excluded from the state funded judicial system 1n Alabama, Colorado, Delaware,
Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island
(Provid~nce only), and West Virginia.

A variation of the municipal court strategy is the exclusion of
specialized courts from state funding proposals.

This approach was used

primarily in the New England states where the funding of the probate courts

~n

7counties have, on the whole, been more sympathetic to state assumption
than cities and are now active in support of state assumption in some states.
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Connecticut, Rhode Island and Vermont remained a local responsibility, even
though essentially all other trial court costs were shifted to the state level.
Finally, state funding strategies have included special deference to large
and politically powerful geographical areas of states.

To secure successful

passage, the Nebraska reorganization/state financing package, which created a
single limited jurisdiction county court system within the state, included a
provision for the retention of locally funded municipal courts in the two
largest cities of the state, Lincoln and Omaha.
C.

Phasing of Assumption
The third strategic consideration 1n planning a state financing effort is

the identification of a time phasing approach to state assumption which best
meets the unique needs and circumstances of a particular jurisdiction.

Four

time phasing approaches have been used by the 22 jurisdictions which have
adopted state funded judicial programs.

•

Percentage phasing,

•
•
•

Geographic phasing,

1.

These include:

Functional phasing, and
One-time assumption .
Percentage Phasing

State assumption of trial court costs through percentage phasing is an
approach which entails the immediate inclusion of all court expenditures
(identified within the scope of the assumption) in a single state judicial
budget and provides for increased levels of state contribution to the total
cost over a period of time--typically, 3 to 6 years.
has two major advantages.
state budget.

Phased state assumption

First, it eases the financial impact on the total

Second, it provides for immediate implementation of statewide
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administration and fiscal control of trial court operations even though state
assumption of the total financial responsibility is delayed.

The percentage

phase-in approach has been used in such states as South Dakota, New York, and
Kansas.
2.

Geographic Phasing

Only in North Carolina has a gradual approach to state assumption of trial
court costs been accomplished on a geographic basis.

Initial state assumption

took place in 1966 with the inclusion of all costs of court operations in five
of the 26 judicial districts.

The initial five districts, which included

small, medium and large jurisdictions, were selected on the basis of
cross-representativeness and district willingness to be brought under state
funding.

In 1968, 19 additional judicial districts were added to the state

judicial budget, followed two years later by the remaining six disticts which
had indicated the least interest in early state funding assumption.

It should

be noted that state funding in North Carolina was accompanied by a major
reorganization of the lower trial court level so that state financing and
lower court reorganization became effective simultaneously.

Thus, in addition

to easing the financial impact on the state budget, the geographic phase-in
approach in North Carolina provided the opportunity for valuable
experimentation.

By selecting a relatively small, but representative, group

of judicial districts, it was possible for North Carolina to test operations
under a centralized administration and to resolve problems 1n its functioning
before applying the system to the rest of the state.
3.

Functional Phasing

Phasing state assumption of trial court costs by functional activity is
the third approach which has been used by the state funded judicial systems.

-18-
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4

This approach schedules total state financing of specified judicial functions
over a fixed time period.

For example, in Alabama, all judges salaries,

related benefits, travel, and office supplies; juror costs; witness fees; and
the salaries and benefits of circuit clerks and registers were funded by the
state during FY 1976-77.

In the following fiscal year, the state assumed the

expense of the remaining non-judicial personnel and all other trial court
costs with the exception of utilities and space.
In Alabama, the usefulness of this approach related primarily to the
mechanics of implementation.
implementation was limited.

Lead-time necessary for planning the details of
The enabling legislation was enacted less than

three months before the effective date of the first phase of assumption.
Thus, those functions for which fiscal impact could be readily ascertained and
relatively easily administered were included in the first stage of
assumption.

State assumption of the more complex budgetary items was delayed

one year to allow sufficient planning and to synchronize implementation with
the beginning of the new fiscal year.

These included the assumption of such

items as non-judicial personnel salaries which required the development
state-wide classification and compensation plans, and equipment which
necessitated a state-wide property inventory.
4.

One-Time Assumption

Finally, states have elected to assume the total cost of trial court
operations included within the definition of the state funded judicial system
on a specified future date.
and New Mexico.

This approach was used in such states as Colorado

Like the percentage approach, one-time assumption provides

for the immediate implementation of statewide administration and fiscal
control of all judicial system operations.
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Additionally, however, one-time

assumption provides certainty of r:otal state financing which is not always
guaranteed under the percentage approach.

For example, the original South

Dakota state financing implementation bill established a schedule of
increasing levels of state financing of trial court costs to total &tate
funding.

However, as passed, the implementation bill provided for state

funding contributions to trial court costs of 50% in 1975, 62 1/2% in 1976,
and 75% in 1977 and thereafter.

The state contribution remains at the 75%

level today.
D.

Budgetary Methods of Assumption
The fourth major issue to be considered in developing an effective state

financing strategy is the development of the budgetary method by which
increased state funding is to be accomplished.

Generally, five approaches

have been employed.

•
•

central lump sum, categorical or program budget,
central line item budget,

•

central budget with local reimbursement,

•
•

central budget with local chargeback, and
local subsidy .

As 1s discussed below, the method of state funding assumption is significant
1n determining the location of authority for fiscal administration of state
appropriated funds, which in turn may be of strategic importance in obtaining
system consensus for state financing proposals.
1.

Central lump sum, categorical or program budget

State assumption of trial court costs under this central budget approach
provides a single state appropriation to the judicial branch which encompasses
all Bt.:lte funded artivities with few categorical breakdowns, if any.

This

budgetary method of state assumption max1m1zes judicial branch discretion in
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the allocation and expenditure of appropriated funds.

This approach

authorizes internal distribution of funds as deemed appropriate by judicial
branch administrative officers usually without additional external
(legislative or executive) authorization.

Typically, judicial systems which

have adopted this assumption format are characterized by highly centralized
fiscal control and administration.

States which have employed the central

lump sum, categorical or program budget approach include Alaska and
2.

Central line item budget

The central line item budget approach to state assumption results in the
appropriation of state monies on the basis of individual budget items such as
each position, each piece of furniture and equipment, and each category of
operating expense such as supplies, postage, and printing.

This more rigid

and detailed appropriation format typically shifts administrative and resource
allocation control from central judicial branch administrative officers to the
legislature.

Tight legislative control appears to have been a motivating

force in the adoption of the line item budget in Massachusetts.
In turn, by tying the hands of central judicial branch administrators, the
central line item budget tends to increase local fiscal control in the sense
that it assures trial courts that the appropriations fixed by the legislature
are not subject to reallocation by central judicial branch administrators.
Massachusetts, for example, has over one hundred line items in its judicial
budget.

New Mexico also illustrates heavy use of line item categories.

The

New Mexico budgetary format provides for a lump sum, centrally administered
state appropriation for all limited jurisdiction courts, but mandates a line
item appropriation by individual judicial district for the more politically
powerful general jurisdiction trial courts.

Indeed, for budgeting purposes,

each of the 13 district courts is viewed as an autonomous state agency.
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3.

Central budget with local reimbursement

A third approach to assuming increased state responsibility for the costs
of trial court operations entails the submission of a central judicial branch
budget request which includes a direct reimbursement to local government of
monies in support of specified operating expenses or court activities.

This

approach is used in Kentucky where the legislature appropriates funds not only
to cover the cost of those activities included within the judicial branch
budget request, but also for direct reimbursement to local governments for the
cost of trial court facilities.

This approach makes possible both continued

local control of specified court support items and simultaneous recognition of
state financial responsibility.
4.

Central budget with local chargeback

The fourth assumption method employed by several states in accomplishing
increased state court funding provides for legislative appropriation of state
funds to cover all costs of state funded activities, on the basis of a central
judicial branch budget, but specifies a percentage reimbursement to the state
from local governments at the end of the fiscal year based on actual court
expenditures.

This method not only assures maximum state-level financial

control, but also eases the fiscal impact on the state budget.

Currently,

Kansas, New York, and South Dakota employ this approach to state assumption of
trial court costs.
5.

Local subsidy

A final method used to increase state funding involves state grants to
local government 1n reimbursement of costs incurred for the administration and
operation of the trial courts.

These local subsidies are paid directly to the

local government general operating fund with no requirement that such funds be
spent directly for court support.
-22-
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Of the five state assumption approaches, the local subsidy method provides
the greatest degree of local government control over the administration of
state funds appropriated for trial court operations.

However, such subsidies

do not necessarily increase the amount of funds made available to trial courts
nor expand the control of trial court judges or administrators over fiscal
administration of their operations.

Indeed, the use of local subsidies is

entirely unrelated to the administration of trial courts.

Because the 22

currently state funded judicial systems have tied state financing to
state-level supervision of trial court expenditures, the local subsidy
approach to state assumption has not been employed in these jurisdictions.
It appears that only Pennsylvania and Oregon are using the subsidy system
as a way of increasing state-level financing of the court system.

Such

subsidies were approved for the first time in Pennsylvania in 1971.

In that

year $8 million was distributed to the counties on a pro-rata basis,
representing approximately 12% of each county's expenditure for court costs.
For the last several years, the total annual subsidy appropriation was $24
million, which represents approximately 30% of the total trial court cost.

It

is of some interest to note that these subsidy appropriations were made
possible by federal revenue sharing funds.

As a result, their continuat

may be dependent upon the future availability of such federal monies.
A different formula approach is used by Oregon in appropriating direct
subsidies to local governments as partial reimbursement of trial court costs.
In that state, the legislature annually apppropriates a fixed dollar amount
per circuit judge to defray the costs of each judicial office.

An additional

fixed sum per circuit judge is paid to local government annually as
reimbursement to the counties for the cost of indigent defense.

In the

current biennieum, the state legislature appropriated an average annual sum of
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$44,500 per circuit court judge to defray judicial related expenses and
$20,000 per circuit judge per year for indigent defense costs.
E.

8

Administrative Mechanics of Assumption
The final area of strategic consideration to be explored in developing

state financing proposals relates to the numerous administrative policy
decisions which must be made and administrative activities which must be
undertaken to ensure a relatively smooth transition to state financing.
Inadequate attention to these details will cause severe difficulties in
implementing the state funded system and cause on-going operational problems.
The following identifies the significant administrative issues which most
frequently arise during state funding transitions.
1.

Specific Identification of Items to be Assumed

The most serious transitional problems are caused by the failure of the
enabling legislation to identify specifically those personnel, activities, and
other items of expenditure to be included in the state funded judicial
system.
Maine.

This lack of specificity created major implementation problems in
Virtually every expenditure item required individual considerat

and

was subject to extensive negotiation before reaching a policy decision to
include or exclude it from the state budget.

This included such expenditures

as the sheriff's cost to transport prisoners to state penal institutions, the
cost of indigent defense transcripts, the salaries and related expenses of
court bailiffs, the cost of law enforcement officer appearances in court, and
reimbursement charges for services provided to the court by local government
such as facilities, maintenance, utilities, and equipment purchase and repair

Brn ~he first year of t~e current b:ennieum $43,000 per circuit judge
for judicial expenses was approved. In the second year of the biennieum, that
amount will increase to $46,000 per judge.
-24-
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expenses.

Negotiations to resolve these outstanding issues spanned a two and

one-half year period and created significant intergovernmental conflict during
this time.
These problems have been avoided in other states by conducting adequate
pre-implementation planning.

For example, in Colorado a series of studies was

conducted over a three-year period to determine precisely the total
impact of a state funded judicial system, including the ident
issues relating to the scope of inclusion within such a budget.

f all

Based on this

information, the legislature was able to enact implementing legislation which
specifically enumerated items to be state funded.

In similar fashion, the New

York state financing legislation listed in great detail those items to be
included and excluded.

Indeed, complex expenditures such as security costs

actually were itemized within the legislation as state or local
responsibilities.
2.

Identification of State Funded Personnel

Even when the implementing legislation provides clear definition of budget
items to be included or excluded from the state funded judicial
variety of policy decisions in these areas are still required during
implementation.

For example, in many jurisdictions it is discovered in

transferring court personnel into the state system that a number of employees,
particularly in rural counties, are assigned to work for the county
commission, county treasurer and other county offices as well as for the
court.

In Maine, this issue was resolved by giving the individual the option

to work exclusively for the court and be included 1n the state judicial system
or to be excluded as a county executive employee.

A more difficult problem

was encountered in New York, where the county clerk by statute is charged with
executive functions such as county recording and election registration in
-25-
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addition to court clerical functions.

To implement the transition to state

funding, it was necessary to perform on-site visits in each court location
throughout the state to distinguish those employees performing county
functions; who would be excluded from state

funding~

from those employees

performing court duties to be included in the new statewide court system.
3.

Personnel Classification and Compensation

A related and time-consuming activity required 1n implementing state
financing of trial court costs is the development of a statewide
classification and compensation plan for all court employees to be included
within the state funded budget.

The time required to develop such a program

has ranged from almost three years in New York (9,000 employees) to just over
three months in Maine (250 employees).

Several specific classification and

pay 1ssues frequently arise in implementing state funding systems.
First, most states have found it prudent to mandate by statute or
administrative rule some procedure for limiting increases in employee
compensation during the interim period between enactment of state financing
and the subsequent implementation date.

In New York, the implementing

legislation provided that no court employee could be granted a salary

e

pending implementation of the statewide court personnel system without the
approval of the chief administrative judge of the judicial branch.

Similarly,

in Colorado, by administrative order of the Chief Justice, all salary increase
requests during the transition period were required to be approved by the
state court administrator's office.
A second issue which arises in transferring court employees to the state
system relates to the difficulties in developing a salary plan which
accommodates the disparate compensation levels of the various trial courts
throughout the state.

This problec,) i,o more difficLlt when cost-of-living
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differences exist in particular jurisidictions within the state.

For example,

in Maine, it was found that the prevailing labor market compensation levels
were higher both in resort areas of the state and in those labor markets
compan~es.

dominated by paper manufacturing

Nevertheless, as a matter of

policy it was determined that geographic differentials would not be applied
and it was expected that the job security and better fringe benefits features
of state employment would offset the higher direct salary levels of
industry in those locales.

Even in New York, which would seem the most likely

candidate for the application of geographic differentials to the basic
compensation plan, only a relatively insignificant annual sum of $200 is
authorized for court employees in three high cost geographic areas.

However,

the consideration of the necessity and appropriateness of area salary
differentials almost always arises during state take-overs.
Finally, the classification and compensation process requires the creation
of some method of employee appeal from the classification of his/her position
within the state funded plan.

Typically a review board of three or more

members is established, independent from the state court administrator's
office, to hear these appeals.

In New York, the appeals board is

of

three members, one member appointed by the State Comptroller, by the Director
of the Civil Service, and by the Public Employees Relation Board.

In

scheduling the state funding transition, sufficient time and funds must be
provided for the appeals process.
4.

Employee Unions

A further personnel issue

~n

implementation relates to the status of

existing collective bargaining units upon transition to state funding.
York, this 1ssue was resolved by statutorily
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p~eserving

In New

existing bargaining

units.

Through negotiation, judicial branch administrative officials securec

agreements from union representatives to bargain in coalition by geographic
areas.

In doing so, the state effectively was able to reduce the number of

bargaining units from over 150 to a much more manageable number of 41.
5.

Fringe Benefits Issues

Fringe benefits issues also ar1se upon the transfer of trial court
personnel to the state system.

The most important relate to retirement,

insurance, and accrued vacation and sick leave.

The implementation process is

made more difficult when clear direction is not given by statute for the
treatment of these administrative aspects of transition.
Where state and local retirement systems are not integrated, typically
employees are g1ven the option to come under the state retirement plan or to
remain in the local plan, into which the state will pay the employer's
contribution upon assumption.

Practical and political considerations require

that the state grant trial court employees pr1or service credit to facilitate
their merger into the new system.

The factors to be weighed in determining

criteria for pr1or service approval are complex and the financial impact is
always very substantial.
Decisions must also be made relating to 1nsurance coverage for merged
employees.

Transferred court employees may be required to accept the state

insurance program as in Alabama and Maine, or may be allowed by statute to
elect to remain under the local government health plan as was provided in New
York.
An additional benefits issue in tranferring trial court employees to the
state system involves the treatment of accrued sick and annual leave.
Generally, these accruals are unfunded liabilities of local government and
represent a substantial future liability to the bCate court system.
-28-
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However,

if local government payoff of these liabilities is required upon state
assumption of trial court expenses, it will represent a significant one-time
cost to local governments.

For that reason; states which have accepted the

financial responsiblity for trial court operations typically have assumed
these accruals without local government reimbursement.

In Alabama, each local

unit was required to certify to the state court administrative office the
accrued vacation and sick leave for all employees to be transferred
state system.

•

For employees of trial courts without a leave policy or written

record of accruals, the Alabama court administrator applied a standard formula
for crediting such employees with a deemed rate of accrual upon transfer to
the state system.
The fringe benefits 1ssue potentially is the most difficult transition
item.

Decisions relating to fringe benefits have substantial cost

implications and can be the source of prolonged litigation.

Thus, it

1s

essential that adequate time and careful attention be devoted to this
administrative aspect of implementation at an early stage of state fund
consideration.
6.

Administrative Support

Recognition of the need to erect a court administrative structure to
manage the state financed system also is critical.

If a statewide system is

to assume the costs of financing and administering the operations of trial
courts, it is necessary to create an administrative structure within the
judicial branch to replace the administrative support services previously
provided to the courts by local units of government, including purchasing,
accounting, budgeting, data processing, and such personnel-related functions
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as recruitment, testing, classification, and payroll serv1ces.

The

development of this internal administrative support structure requires both
adequate lead-time and staff.
Past experience indicates that adequate lead-time is rarely provided by
the legislature.

The Massachusetts state funding experience is the most

extreme illustration of this problem.

Although the implementation legislation

was passed in mid-July of 1978 it was made retroactively effective as of
July 1.

Since state funding was a fait accompli, judicial administrators were

not afforded the luxury of transitional planning and organization.

While

those who have been involved in state funding implementations generally
believe 18 months to be a minimum lead time, most states have provided the
court system one year or less to organize the transition.
Moreover, legislatures frequently fail to provide monies necessary to
obtain adequate staff to undertake the administrative duties involved 1n
planning and executing the transition to state funding.

Indeed, most maJor

state financing transitions in the last five years have been underwritten
primarily by LEAA funds.

To achieve in the judicial branch the level of

accountability which legislatures have come to expect of executive agenc
comparable administrative support must be provided.
Where sufficient lead-time and resources to acquire needed in-house staff
are not made available prior to implementation, it may be necessary for the
judicial branch to rely on the performance of some of these functions by
either the state executive branch or local government.

Responsiveness to the

operational needs of the court system is jeopardized when substantial
administrative support is provided by external agencies over which the
judiciary can exert no control and little leverage.

Consequently a critical

strategic consideration involves the early determination that:
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1) thP-

necessary internal administrative components to operate a state funded system
currently exist and are in place, or 2) leg:alative commitment to provide
adequate resources to develop such a structure has been obtained or will be
forthcoming.
7.

Other Administrative Issues

The final group of administrative issues involved in transition
relate to two significant court expenditure items:

equipment and facilities.

Frequently the treatment of these items is not clearly articulated in enabling
legislation.

Even if the implementing legislation provides adequate direction

in regard to these items, the treatment selected by the legislature will have
substantial implications for central court administrative staff during the
transition period.
Jurisdictions which have enacted state funded judicial systems have
treated the provision of equipment to trial court operations in three basic
ways.

In states such as Kansas and Missouri, furniture and equipment (as well

as operating expenses) remain a local funding responsibility.

This

arrangement has created some dissatisfaction since increased cost to
government is automatically mandated when the state acts to increase staffing
levels.

A second method of dealing with this expenditure is illustrated 1n

such states as New York, South Dakota, and Maine where all furniture and
equipment used by trial courts as of implementation must be continued to be
made available thereafter.

However, in all three states, the purchase of new

equipment or furniture is a state financial responsibility.

Finally, in

Massachusetts, Colorado and Alabama, implementing legislation provided that
all equipment and furniture in the possession of the court became state
property upon the effective date of state funding.
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If this latter method of

handling equipment

~s

selected, it is almost imperative that the transition

period include the performance of a statewide property inventory.

If state

responsibility is to extend only to the acquisition of new equipment and
furniture, the transition period will require at least the development of a
statewide property inventory system to be incorporated into

on-go~ng

administration.
The method of dealing with facility expenditures also has impl
the administrative burdens of the court system during the transition period
and after implementation.

Four basic methods of handling facility expenses

have been used by state funded judicial systems.

First, states such as

Alaska, Connecticut, Hawaii, and Rhode Island build and maintain all trial
court facilities.

Under this system, unless the administration of these

activities is provided by the executive branch, the judiciary is required to
obtain specialized resources to manage this function.

Second, states such as

Massachusetts and Delaware have assumed the cost of trial court facilities on
a square footage rental basis.

This method of handling facilities requires

that central court administrative staff be available during the transition
period and thereafter to participate in negotiations for leasing
and to execute resulting rental agreements for all trial court space
throughout the state.

Some states have been overwhelmed by the problems

caused by this method including the use by counties of whipsaw tactics in
contract negotiations and the substantial difficulties
marshall approval of most local courthouses.

~n

securing state fire

Finally, at least one state has

funded trial court facilities by lump sum reimbursement to local governments
on a pro-rata basis.

In Kentucky, this method has proven to be a satisfactory

compromise in retaining local ownership of court buildings, yet providing a
sufficient financial contribution to give the state leverage to obtain
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adequate facilities for trial court operations.

Typically, however

jurisdictions which have failed to assume the full financial responsiblity for
trial court facilities expenditures can expect to encounter both transitional
and on-going reluctance by local government to improve or build court
facilities.

Several of these states anticipate the need for legislative

resolution to this problem in the near future.
Conclusion
The strategic considerations which prove to be important

~n

organizing an

effective state financing program take a unique form in each jurisidiction.
The history, political climate, court system organization, and individual
personalities of key actors in each state determine the elements necessary to
build general system consensus on this issue.

The basic strategic

considerations outlined above have been offered to provide the state teams
with an historical perspective of problems encountered and compromises made to
secure financing reforms, and with an understanding of some of the
administrative problems which make the transition a long and difficult
process.

It is hoped that these illustrations will provide useful guidance as

seminar participants evaluate the feasibility and desirability of increased
state assumption of trial court costs in individual jurisdictions.
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EXHIBIT F

CURRENT STATUS
OF STATE
FINANCING OF
TRIAL COURTS
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Over the last two decades, as more and more states have considered and
adopted structural reorganization and simplification of their state court
systems, there has been an ever-increasing interest in, and concomitant
controversy

about, the ways in which state court systems should be financed.

This debate not only has centered on the relative merits of state vs. local
funding, but also has revealed differing views of what constitutes a state
funded court system.
The purpose of this paper is to provide seminar participants with a
general framework of information on the status of state co~rt financing
throughout the country.

This overview will focus on the following three

areas:
•

Level of state financing by state court system.

•

Scope of financing in totally or substantially state funded court
systems.

•

Relative merits of state vs. local financing of trial courts.

Much of the information contained in this document is derived from the most
recent study of state court financing in the United States conducted by
Harry 0. Lawson, et al.

1

Other information has been generated as a result

of the National Center's State Court Financing Project.
Levels of State Financing by State Court System
The trend toward increased state financing of court operations has been
uneven in recent times.

Although a number of states moved to underwrite all

or substantial portions of their trial court operations during the 1960s

lLawson, et al, State Funding of Court Systems: an Initial Examination,
(The American University, Criminal Courts Technical Assistance Project, No.
J-LEAA-011-78, 1979); hereinafter referred to as the Lawson study.
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and early 1970s, that trend slowed substantially in subsequent years.

At the

end of the 1960s, state expenditures for all courts in the United States were
between 27-28% of the total operating costs.

By 1975-76, the total state

expenditure for court operations had increased only slightly to 30%
.
.d e. 2
nat1.on-w1.

In the last six years, however, 11 states have moved to fund

all or most of the cost of state court operations.
Until recently, state financed court systems were concentrated primarily
in the less populous states.

Early state funded court systems tended to be

located in the New England area, such as Maine (1961), Vermont (1961),
Connecticut (1965) and Rhode Island (1965).

To those were

added Alaska (1959) and Hawaii (1965), which carried the centralized system of
their territorial governments into statehood. State financing subsequently
spread to other parts of the country, emerging as an element of major court
reform movements in North Carolina in the late 1960's and later Colorado (1970)
and South Dakota (1972).
Only in the last two years has state funding been achieved in the more
populous stat:es.

Besides New York and Massachusetts, North Carolina is the

(

only other state funded jurisdiction with a population in excess of 5
million.

In contrast to their predecessors, state financing in New York

(1977) and Massachusetts (1978) clearly was a product of government
economics.

In both states, state funded judicial systems were enacted to

provide a vehicle for relieving the financial burdens of local taxing authorities.
At the present time, there are 22 state court systems which are totally or
substantially state funded.

3

These include:

Alaska, Alabama, Colorado,

2carl Baar. unpublished speech to a joint meeting of the Conference of
Chief Judges and Assistant Chief Judges, Council of District Administrators,
and Judicial Planning Committee of the state of Minnesota, St. Paul, .
Minnesota, October 16, 1978.
3"Substantially" as defined by the Lawson study includes--state funding
of at least one trial court or trial court major expense, such as non-judicial
personnel.
(
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Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii. Kansas, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Virginia and West Virginia.
Table 1 on the following page categorizes judicial systems by
of

stat~

4

p~rcentage

financial commitment to the total cost of their operations.

These

classifications parallel the categories developed by Dr. Carl Baar in his 1975
state court budgeting work.

5

·Although the states included within the four

categories have changed somewhat since that time, the patterns of state-local
distribution of judicial funding throughout the country continues today.
Categories 1 and 2 which are shown in Table 1, include 28 court systems
which are financed primarily at the local level.

Limited state funding

characterizes the first category of state judicial systems which receive from
0 to 25% of their appropriations from state government.

Generally, state

funded judicial agencies in these states include the appellate

court(s~

the

state court administrator's office, and the Judicial Council or Judicial
Conference.

Additionally, some or all of the salary and travel expenses of

judges of the general jurisdiction court may be funded by the state.
Category 2 (25-50%) includes state funded expenditures of category 1 and
other itemized

itures of the trinl courts.

Typically, these additional specified items include the salaries and
travel expenses of all general and limited jurisdiction judges, the salaries
of court reporters and/or judicial secretaries, and related trial court
expenses such as jury fees, indigent defense expenditures, witness fees or
psychiatric examination costs.

4Lawson, supra note 1 at 1.
Searl Baar, Separate But Subservient: Court Budgeting 1n the American
States, (Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1975).
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TABLE 1
PERCENTAGE OF COURT SYSTEM EXPENDITURES FINANCED BY STATE APPROPRIATIONS

LOCAL FUNDING

TOTAL/SUBSTANTIAL STATE FUNDING
4

3

2

l

100% - 80%

80% - 50%

50% - 25%

25% - 0%

Alabama

Kansasc

Florida

Arizona

Alaska

Maryland

Idaho

Arkansas

Colorado

Missourid

Illinois

California

Connecticut

Nebraska

Louisiana

Georgia

Delaware

Virginia

Michigan

Indiana

Hawaii

West Virginia

Minnesota

Iowa

.

Kentut::ky

New Jersey

Maine

New Hampshire

Montana

Massachusetts

North Dakota

Nevada

South Carolina

Ohio

New York a

Pennsylvania

Oregofl:

North Carolina

Utah

Tennessee

Oklahoma

Wisconsin

Texas

Rhode Is land

Wyoming

Washington

New Mexico

I

Mississippi

South Dakota
Vennont
16 statesb

14 states

6 states

14 states

~tate funding is being accomplished on a phase-in basis. In FY 1979, the
state financed 56% of the trial court costs and will pay 100% in FY 1981.

brne District of Columbia also can be assigned to this ·category.
cPercentage phase-in to be completed in FY 1982.
donly assumes personnel costs, effective July 1> 1981.
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The

fal

22

state funded

of

as defined

which are
typ.es.

The six states

category of state financing are of two

Two

Kansas and Missouri$ are in

to

may end up in Category 4 in the near

greater state fund

the judicial systems of the remaining

State
this c

states

the Lawson

, Nebraska, Virginia and West

include all state level court agencies, all or most of limited
court costs and most

jurisdiction court expenses with the except

those funct

elected clerks of court.

Category 4 includes those state court systems which essentially are
state funded.

, expenditures which may remain locally funded in

these courts are facilities, some or all of the probation function, and
special court and munic

1 court costs.

Scope of Financing in Totally or Substantially State Funded Court Systems
The examination of state appropriations for the 22 state funded judie
systems revea

differences

but also di ferences
commitment to fund
systems from

the breadth or inclusiveness of each state's
operations.

Looking at state funded judie

ive, it is apparent that what constitutes a s

s

funded system

among the states.

in items inc
abili

state-local distribution percentages.

As suggested by Dr. Baar. variat

state funded judicial budgets may affect "

of a

ontrol its internal operations (e.g •• whether

clerks are

t) and

judie

s

defenders and

, a

id are

l

indicate} the

court-related
the judicial budget and

are

whether

6

the

1

luded) ."

.
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systems.

As shown in that table, probation and juvenile detention functions

typically exist as executive branch activities or are included in the judicial
budget in a limited way if at all.

Only in six of the 22 states are

facilities expenses fully funded by state appropriations, while such expenses
are entirely excluded from state judicial budgets in 14 jurisdictions.
states do not fund the cost of special courts or municipal courts.

Many

A major

court activity which also is excluded from state funding in five of the 22
states is the operation of general jurisdiction trial court clerk's offices
(four of which invdlve elected clerks of coutt).

Finally, a similar

percentage of states exclude general jurisdiction jury, witness, indigent
defense, sanity exam and law library expenses from state appropriations for
judicial operations.
A per capita comparison of state funded judicial system judges, support
staff, and expenditures for FY 1979 1s presented in Table 3 on page 8.

As

shown in that table, the population of those states which have general state
court funding ranges from a low of 382,000 in Alaska to a high of 18 mill

in New York.
2 million.

However

the median population of these states is approximate

The number of judges and court support staff vary widely as well,

from a high of 577 judges in New York to a low of 41 judges in Maine, and from
11,641 court emp

1n New York to 176 employees in Vermont.

Tne median

staff 1s 168.5 and 739, respectively.

number of j

Total

state appropriations among these judicial systems range from almost $264
mill ion in New

7rn FY 1979, on
1981, the state wi l

to $7.

million in South Dakota.

8

The median level

($108.97 million) was funded by the state.
100 percent of i:rial court operations.
350 million.

By FY
Currently,

the court
is
Brt should
noted, that the state of South Dakota funded only 75
percent ·Of tria court operations. South Dakota's current budget is in excess
of $8 million.
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fmploye~s

lilaba11111
Alash

3,665,000

Colorado
Conn!'ctlcut

2,583,000

216.25

J ,117,000

17.2

]82,000

!Iawall
K~nsas

3,42R,OOO
J ,070,000

Kentucky

3,137.8
1,091.4
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IJ,095.2

I ,543 .6
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1.591.9
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48
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1,5!)
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~I

26,097.6
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4,022.5
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20,411?,300
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430.1
176

404.1
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1,821,000

63

731

794

28,904.8

2,491.1

14,726,046

8.08

59 ,31'1,000
J,li!l,789
2.065,500

3, 153.75
165.99
168.5

28,544.85
1,502.36
739

31,758
1,662
1,090
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s 12.28
$ 10.07
s 53.62
s 5.80
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of state financing in these largely state funded judicial systems is almost
$21 million.

Per capita expenditures for state funded systems range from

$53.62 in Alaska to a low of $5.80 in Maryland.

The average per capita

expenditure for the state court systems in these states is over $12., while the
median per capita state expenditure for court operations is approximately $10.
Relative Merits of State vs. Local Financing
Empirical information concerning the advantages and disadvantages of state
financing is limited.

However, the perceptions of system participants in

those states that have made the transition from local to state financ:ing 9
and the issues frequently raised in considering increased state responsibility
for financing court operations generally relate to two issues:
control.

cost and

10

Cost
Cost considerations are an important issue in the state funding debate.
(opponents frequently cite the objective dat~ generated by those states which
have made the transition from local to state financing to indicate increased
cost under state funded systems.

Proponents, on the other hand, cite

,,

qualitative improvements and expectations of cost reductions to provide
equivalent levels of service over the long run._j The most frequently cited
disadvantages and advantages of state funding are as follows.

9"Experience of States with State Funding of the Trial Courts",
Minnesota Judicial Planning Committee, September, 1978. (Survey responses
received from 10 states: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Hawaii, Maine,
Massachusetts, New Mexico, North Carolina, South Dakota, and West Virginia.)
lOsee e.g. Baar, supra note 4; Larry Berkson and Susan Carbon, Court
Unification: History, Politics and Implementation (Washington: Nati~
Institute of Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice, 1978), pp. 40-43.
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(l)

because of the necessity to equalize
the state and to grandfather in all existing
because of the necessity to upgrade
transition to state funding.
Cost will increase because it is necessary to employ central
and local
ive staff to perform new monitoring.
personnel,
ial and budgetary management functions.
Costs
1 increase to accommodate pent-up demand itt poor
jurisdict
pending state funding.
Funding will be more difficult to obtain since all costs appear
in one budget, making the expense appear greater.ll
Funding
precarious when the entire state system is
on only one source of appropria-tions--the Legislature.
Since state financing does not guarantee greater funding of
court operations, the process of equitably distributing
available resources under a state funded system will result
decreased funding levels for at least the wealthy courts after
implementation of a centralized system.
Imposes on local governments one-time costs for payment of
accrued annual and sick leave, which typically are unfunded
liabilities (but it is possible to permit transfer of accrued
days to the new system).
May eliminate some local courts' surplus revenues, which are
earmarked or channeled for other local services.
(2)
e

financing problems with local governments which have
imited tax bases and increasingly are becoming tenuous sources
of
te funding of court operations.

e

Relieves local governments of a significant financial burden.
the long run to provide an equivalent level of
realizing economies of scale through bulk
forms standardization and simplification,
, and el
ion of duplication of effort.

, however, is not
ished
in
75. Dr.
court budget
percentage of court system
itures
differences in the
of difficulty
supra note 4, at 23.
llrh is propos it
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borne out by Carl Baar's s
of
Baar concludes that differences in the
funded by the state do not account
in obtaining state
s. See Baar

Control
More important even than cost considerations in the debate over state
funding is the issue of altered state-local relationships and the shift in the
control of court operations which results from state
oppone~ts

financing.~tate

funding

fear the loss of local control over policy and procedure which

accompanies increased centralization of state financed system.

In contrast.

proponents cite both qualitative and economic advantages to system-wide
administration of state funded judicial

operation~)

The major disadvantages

and advantages of state funding in terms of system control are as follows.
(1)

Disadvantages
•

Local control and accountability of judges and other court
officials to the constituency which they serve is restricted
(less so where judges are elected).

•

Initiative and incentive for developing individualized
administrative solutions to individual local problems is lost.

•

Local problems will be resolved unsatisfactorily in terms of
increased delay awaiting action from a distant central
administrative office or because of the lack of familiarity with
local traditions, problems, needs and operations.
Creates a new layer of bureaucracy which tends not only to
increase red tape but also to reject innovative ideas.

(2)

•

Imposes new administrative demands in the form of planning,
evaluation, and justification of operations and expenditures.

•

Centralized administration inevitably emphasizes system-wide
programs which often disregard individual characteristics of
trial courts, and frequently are not applicable to all local
court systems.

Advantages
•

Provides for a more equitable distribution of resources throughout the state, which fosters more equitable delivery of court
services to the citizens of the state. Fiscal appropriations to
local courts are determined according to need rather than
relative wealth of the county in which the court i~ situated.
Makes possible unitary budgeting and centralized administration
which provide the basis for a more cohesive judicial system and
the ability to pool resources, so that they can be transfered to
areas of need.
-11-
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e

The revenue sources of the state government, such as the personal
income and the sales tax, are more inflation~proof than the property
tax, making it easier to plan for the future and to maintain a con-

sistent level of

oper~tion.

•

Enhances the image of the court system as an independent branch
of state government, rather than an amalgam of administratively
unrelated departments of local government.

•

Facilitates control of expenditures by providing the vehicle for
developing comparable measures of performance.

•

Encourages uniform operating and management procedures.

•

Eliminates the pressure on courts to "pay for themselves" by
generating revenue through finea, thereby freeing judges from
the pressures of the balance sheet to objectively consider the
merits of each individual case.

•

Eliminates the appearance and possibility that judicial
decisions are affected by the dependence of eourts on the
largesse of local officials.
~ncourages

essential research and planning which typically
cannot either be afforded or cost justified in an individual
local court.

•

Provides the vehicle for replication in other courts of
experimental programs found successful in individual local
courts.

•

Provides statewide coordination of federal grant projects.

•

Reduces the role of politics and patronage in the employment of
staff.

Provides new avenues for career advancement to court employees
in many states.
•

Insures minimum qualifications of court employees statewioe.

•

Permits uniformity in job classifications and equal pay for
equal work.

Conclusion
The examination of the experiences of the 22 state funded judicial systems
bears out neither all fears of state funding opponents nor all claims of its
proponents.

However, the

definition of state fund
individualized in

s of these states suggest that the
and the method of its accomplishmept may be

state. ·Within that context, the primary issues of cost

-12-1 1 !.:i-

..
and control may be dealt with on a state-by-srate basis and tailored to
individual court structures, traditions and needs.

Thus, in developing the

outline of a state funded court system, it may be of value for each state to
consider the following l.n formulatfng an approach best suited to its unique
requirements.
Cost Considerations

•

Developing the functional scope of the court system in narrow terms to
reduce state financing costs.

•

Employing regional differentials, based on cost of living, to reduce
the expense of transferring local employees to a state funded,
uniform personnel system and to minimize potential disruption of
local government compensation scales.

•

Permitting local governments to retain some portion of cou~t revenues,
to soften the revenue loss occasioned by the state taking these revenues
as a quid pro guo for assumption.

Control Considerations
•

Defining narrowly the state funded judicial system in terms of
inclusiveness of court activities to provide an opportunity for
retention of local involvement in local judicial policy-making.

•

Institutionalizing decentralized administration in such areas as
personnel management (e.g., state level responsibility for
system-wide policies with delegation of hiring, firing, and other
day-to-day operational authority to lor.al courts on a post-audit
basis) and purchasing (local acquisition of items up to a maximum
dollar amount).

•

Building-in local partl.cl.pation and policy-making in terms of annual
budget formulation and system-wide implementation of rules,
procedures, new programs and state-mandated requirements.

•

Erecting in advance the necessary administrative structure to manage
a state financed system which includes the acquisition of expertise
in such areas as personnel management, budgeting, data processing,
financial management, legislative and other governmental liaison and
research techniques having familiarity with the organizatiou,
structure. problems and needs of both the state-wide system and
individual local courts.
----
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EXHIBIT. G

EFFECTS OF SfATE FINAOCING OF TRIAL COURTS
UPON '!RIAL COURT AIMINISI'RATION

Source#

State Court Finance Project of the
National Center for State Courts
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INIRODUCTION
There ·has
a
, inexorable trend toward state financing of
tdal courts.
Some tto1enty-six states have assuned the primacy
responsibility
funding trial courts;l and while few of these states
have assumed total financing responsibility, the scope of assumption has
been ver:y br:oad.
the first time it can be said that a major:ity of
trial court systems are primarily state-financed.2
S_tate financing
trial courts can occur in various ways. It may
take the f~ of a tightly centralized state budgetary process for trial
courts, or it can take the fo~ of subsidies or r:eUnbur:sements to local
govern:nents for court expenditures. 3 The latter arrangement provides
state financing with a minfimun of state control, but it is r:arely used.
State financing of trial courts is normally accanplished by including
trial courts in the state budgetary process and paying court expenses
from the state general fund.
The principal result of state financing upon trial courts is to
remove them fr:om the str:ucture of local government and to place them
within the administrative framework of state government. This involves a
difficult and sometimes traumatic change in administrative relationships,
as local ties are severed and state relationships established. The
transition is not unccmnonly acccmpanied by clarificaton of the
administrative lines of authority within the judiciary and an increase in
the power of presiding judges.

0.
work entitled, State Funding of Court
An Initial Examination, (The American University Criminal
Systems:
Courts Technical Assistance Project, No. J-LF.M-100-78, 1979), identified
twenty-two states
primarily state-funded court systems: Alaska,
Connecticut
Kentucky, Rhode Island, Maine. New Mexico,
Alabama, Colorado, West Virginia, New York,
, Maryland, Oklahoma, Virginia, Missouri, Kansas
the publication of this work, Michigan has
a phased state assunption of tt"ial court
has assumed trial court costs; North
significant portions of trial court
costs.

is considered that twenty of
in the last decade. ~

the

3A
recently
counties

to counties for court expenses was
Oregon appropriates a set subsiQy to its
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This paper describes major effects of these changes upon trial court
administration. It is intended for clerks and trial court administrators
who are facing, or may soon face, a transition to state financing of
their courts.
A.

State Financing Changes - Administrative Relationships and Controls
1.

Inclusion in the State Budgetary PLocess

The first and most iliiilediate effect of state financing is the
necessity for trial courts to adapt to the state budgetary process. This
means using a new set of budgetary procedures, usually those specified by
the state executive branch pursuant to legislation. This occurs even in
states where the executive branch has limited control of judicial budgets.
T.n addition, the state supreme court may impose internal
budgetary processes to facilitate development and presentation of a court
budget at the state level. If, for example, the state has adopted a
particular form of budgeting (PPB, ZZB), the trial courts will have to
supply the state court administrator with the infonnation required to
implement such a system. 4
Trial court judges and administrators rarely have much role in
presenting the budget at the state level. They may not even have much
role in developing the trial court budget, which in sane states is
prepared by the state court administrator with limited local
participation. Even budgetary monitoring may be centralized. Absorption
into the state budgetary process thus may lead to diminution in the
administrative autonomy of trial courts.
2.

Accountability to Agencies of State Government

State financing, at the very least, will require increased
reporting to the state court administrative office. Caseload reporting
is not necessarily related to state financing, but periodic reporting of
expenditure, revenue, and personnel transactions is a usual feature of a
state-financed system. It may also be required that trial courts report
to executive branch agencies concerned with finances and personnel. for
example, a State Treasurer, Comptroller, Personnel Office, or Auditor.

4The South Dakota court system v1as recently required to submit a
zero-based budget pursuant to state budgetary policy.
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Increased
o-r executive branch auditing may also be a
feature of state financing.
Such audits may not be restricted to
finances but may extend to performance. Internal audits may also be
pe-rformed by audito-rs employed by the state court administrative
office.S
Trial courts may find that theit' activities a-re subject to Ct'itique
by legislative ccmnittees and executive bt'anch budget officials. Thus
the successes Ot' failures of cou-rts are more likely to be publicized in
state fo-runs.
3.

Changes in Admininstt'ative Ot'ganization of Trial Cou-rts

State financing of trial
administ-rative changes within the
cla-rification ot'. st-rengthening of
authority running from the Supreme
changes are necessa-ry for a cou-rt
state-wide administ-rative entity.

cou-rts is usually accompanied by
judicial system, most comoonly a
ve-rtical lines of administrative
Cou-rt to the trial courts. Such
system to start functioning as a

The changes often include a strengthening of the supreme cou-rt's
administ-rative authority over trial courts, but usually this is balanced
by increasing the power of presiding trial court judges. Often trial
court administrative offices are created o-r enlarged to support presiding
judges.
In effect, the whole internal administrative network of the
courts is made more coherent.
The
these changes on trial court administration varies
greatly. The authodty of a presiding judge and administrators may
actually
in an envi rorment where trial court
administration
tionally weak due to the autonomy accorded
individual judges.
a trial court already characterized by strong
centralized administration,
the trial court
judiciary and
its
administrative
may experience loss of some authority to the
state-level
Understandably, opposition to state financing is
often found
urban trial courts, which have reasonably adequate
financing and
strong administrative authority.6

5E.g.,

this type

urba::-~ counties of California exemplify
financing.
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4.
The

goverrment
t-&::11'1•.:.... ,.
have a
a member
manifold:

cout'ts from the structut"e of local
courts become state entities. they
~ .. ,Ju~•c~, more that of a tenant than
effects of this transformation are
use and renovation beccmes rore a matter of hat"d

0

particularly where the state assunes an
to repay localities for costs of court
0

occur
over
equipment
ownership
and
equip:nent repair since the state may
title to all court equipment;8

0

occur over differences in state and local pay
as over relative abilities to acquire goods

o

some

agencies may remain locally funded, 10
• prosecutors and sheriffs,) and asstme
relationship with the court; and

to pay for trial court
of negotiation between the
counties on the funding of
Bsuch a

took place in Alabama under state
state financing of trial courts has
officials have frequently expressed
of state-paid court employees
court employees.
, Maryland and Virginia, elected
courts have remained county-funded,
court sysem are state-funded
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o

4.

on the plus side, local officials may be pleased that the
courts no longer require local funding and may actually be
mot'e coopet'ative, provided that loss of court-generated
revenue to the state doesn't mean a net loss to the local
treasury.

Revenue Allocation

The normal pattern in a state-financed court system is that the
bulk .of court-genet'ated revenues go to the state.ll This is a natural
quid pro guo. Ft'om an administrative viewpoint it may only mean that
coUt't personnel send checks to the state treasurer rather than a county
treasurer.
From a political viewpoint the change is roore dramatic. One of
the major barriers to state court financing is the fear of local
governnents that they will lose revenue to the state. The fear is
usually most pronounced in municipal goven:ments. which often have a
large net gain from operation of a traffic and ordinance court. Counties
generally have a net loss fran court operations and are less fearful of
revenue drain.
However, even counties will not'tllally seek to retain
revenue to cover facility costs or other operating costs not assumed by
the state.l2
Not unccmnonly, state assumption · of trial courts
operating costs does not extend to municipal courts due to the political
opposition of those courts.l3
In the final analysis, trial court administrators will have to
live with the political arrangements on reallocation of revenues. One
advantage of a state-funded system is that pressures on the courts to
produce revenues fot' local government are reduced.

llSee Lawson, supra, P. 63, Table X.
12North Carolina imposes a facility
compensate local governments for facilities.

cost

upon

litigants

to

13rn Oklahoma, the municipal courts remained outside the unified
system. In Alabama, municipal courts were given the option to enter or
leave the unified system.
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5.

Competition with

Othe~

Trial Courts

In a locally financed system trial courts may have to ccmpete
with local gove~nment agencies fo~ funds.l4
In a state-financed
system, this canpetition ends but is ~eplaced by less intense form of
competition with other trial courts.
Inevitabily. trial courts are
canpared to one another in such areas as m.mber of personnel.
productivity and efficiency, usually with some levelling process that may
curb or cut back the rate of expenditure in more affluent jurisdictions
and increase resources available to less affluent jurisdictions.l5
Trial cout"t officials must adjust to the new gt'Ound rules and
justify theit" resource requests in the broader context of a state-wide
system.
B.

Availability and Allocation of ResoUt"ces
1.

Access to State Resources; Loss of Local Resources

For most trial courts, state court financing represents access
to the state general fund, usually a more stable and richer funding
source than the general funds of local governments. There are, however.
a few exceptions. Affluent local govet't'l01ents may be more able and
willing to support trial courts than the state.l6 ·

14In New Jersey, where trial courts are funded primat"ily by county
and municipal government, tight statutory constraints on local government
funding has placed courts in tough competition with local governmeot
agencies for appropriations.
15The power of a state court administrator in a state-financed
system to reallocate funds is a major issue of unification, which
surfaces even in long-unified systems such as Alaska. Some state-funded
court svstems, such as Massachusetts and to a lesser extent New Mexico,
have budgetary formats t.Jhich inhibit reallocation of funds from one trial
court to another.
16For example,
Minnesota the trial courts in the Twin Cities
area are well-funded
local government, and there is limited desi::e
among judges in that area for state financing.
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Even where local govetTII.Ilents are not particularly affluent Ot'
generous to courts, judges and administrators may prefer the familiarity
and frugality of local govenment to the more remote and impersonal
processes of state goverrment. State goverrment financial procedures
tend to be mo~e complex and sophisticated than local government
processes .17
In short~ most jurisdictions will gain financially if the state
pays the costs of trial courts, but may have to pay the price of reduced
infl~nce on the budget process.
2.

Changed Distribution of Federal Funds

The LEAA program, now ending, has since 1976 tended toward more
centralized allocation of LEAA block funds for courts. The advent of
Judicial Planning Coomittees increased supreme court control of LEAA
funds, even in states where trial courts were locally funded. However,
it is clear that the power of the supreme court over allocation of block
funds is greater in state--financed systems, where match money canes from
the state budget, and grants are made on the basis of state-wide
considerations.
The majOL future concern of trial courts is the extent to which
they will be eligible for participation in federal programs for local
governments. As locally funded agencies, it has been possibe for trial
courts to participate in the CETA program or local revenue-sharing
funds. As state agencies, the ground rules change. If, for example, the
judiciary share in an increased block grant program to states (the
approach favored by the Reagan administration), it may occur that these
state supreme courts will determine the allocations for trial courts in
unified systems.

3.

Participation in Local Funds Earmarked for Courts

A coomon feature of trial court financing is the existence of
special funds from which courts are legally permitted to make
expenditures.l8 These special funds are

17Harry 0. Lawson observed in a speech to the 1980 NACA-NATCA
conference that state-funded courts were encountering more and more
problems in dealing with budgetary con3traints imposed by economy-minded
state legislatures, in particular FTE limitations.
l&rypically, certain court costs are paid into a special fund under
control of the chief administrative judge of the court (e.g., law library
funds in Dade County, Florida; a fund fed by fees charged by judges for
performing marriages in Cook county, Illinois).
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normally created
to legislation petmitting the earmarking of
cetain fees and costs for court use. Such funds are outside the budget
process and are
to courts as a supplemental source of funds •.
In a state-financed system thet'e is nonnally less tolerance for such
local funds.

C. Administrative Systems

1.

Desigp and Implementation of Administrative Systems

State financing of courts involves design and linplemeotation of
supp:>rting administrative systems, most cc:mr.only budgetary. accounting
and personnel systems. Other systems may be involved, such as jury
management systems and unifatm records systems. The key fact is that
these systems ·are state systems, reflecting· state-level policy and
usually designed by state-selected contractors or the staff of a state
court administrator.
The role of trial court administrators in designing such systems
vades. but it is normally not vecy g-reat.
Even the training and
orientation process is usually state-directed.
Yet the ultimate
responsibility for making the new system work will fall upon clerks and
other administrators.
System design may recognize variations between trial courts, but
occasionally this is not the case.
It takes a while for state
administrators to adapt to local variations, and conversely it takes time
for local officials to accept state-level administration.

2.

New Administrative Support Agencies

courts
depend on local governments for various
supporting administrative services, among them payroll, purchasing,
accounting, and personnel services.
State financing ends these
relationships
leads to a new set of relationships.
Supporting
administrative
may be assuned by the trial court itself, but
more comronly
at"e provided by the state administrative office of
courts or by a state
branch agency.l9

19t.awson,
on the execut

et seq., indicating the extent of reliance
state-funded systems.
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Administ~ative suppo~t services which are geographically remote
may cause problems or delay, perhaps problems of red tape. Thus. trial
courts in a state-financed system may be given freedom to handle sane
administ-rative matte-rs locally. Small pu-rchases may be handled through
-revolving funds; most personnel matters may be handled locally; and data
processing. suppo-rt may be handled locally, if such services are already
being provided by local government.20

3.

Personnel

The most difficult aspect of state financing is the necessity to
remove employees from local government and incorpo-rate them into a wholly
new system, with new classifications and compensation scales and a new
set of goveming procedures, including new EEO plans and possibily new
collective bargaining agreements.21
In the t-ransitional stages of a new personnel system, there are
a variety of adjustment problems. Fitting individual employees into a
new job scheme often produces some calssification appeals and some
disputes over vested interests of employees in local government systems.
Special problems may occur in incorporating confidential employees of
judges into the system.
These problems necessarily involve trial court judges,
administrators and cle~ks. In fact, top administrato-rs and clerks (at
least those who are appointed) may find that they have personal
reservations about their own classifications in state personnel systems,
as well as their authority over day-to-day personnel administration.
Generally. however, great authority over personnel management is
delegated to trial court officials in a state judicial branch personnel
system. Most basic decisions on employees remain local. subject to the
caveat that they must conform to the policy and procedures of the
state-wide system.

20rt would be rare for local governments to provide EDP services to
a trial court, after it had become state-funded
21New York exemplifies the difficulty of dealing with a great
m.mber of different bargaining units. There are over forty different
bargaining units of court employees.
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4.

Accounting

State financing normally involves new accounting lrocedures.
Appropriations or budgetary accounting is usually a state-leve function,
but accounting for cash collected in courts is normally performed at the
trial court level subject to procedures laid down by the supreme court
and state auditing agencies.
unifotm
business
aspects
function

5.

Cash accounting systems define uniform charts of account,
books of account, banking and depository procedures, use of
machines, employee bonding requirements and various other
of a controlled system. Implementation of the system is a
of local court officials.
Purchasing

Purchasing for state-financed trial courts is sometimes
centralized in the sense that trial courts can take advantage of prices
negotiated by the state purchasing department. 22 There may even be
central warehousing of some major equipment items.
Centralized voucbering is coomon. Yet, such centralization is
not practiced in all state-financed systans. Some trial courts are
permitted to purchase goods and services locally and to process these
purchases through local bank accounts.23
It can be assu:ned that state financing will usually increa.Je
constraints on the authority of trial court off:lcials to purchase goods
and services.
D.

Conclusion

While the administration of trial courts is affected significntly by
state financing, many basic administrative functons are largely
unaffected.
Scheduling and caseflow management and the basic
adjudication activities ranain very much a local concern. New state
adminstrative systems are initially burdensome but tend to become
routinized fairly quickly. since these systems impose a uniform framework
but leave most day-to-day management functions at the local level.

22North
procedures

broad

use

courts.

23E.g.,
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of

centralized

purchasi~g

•)

The essential change is in the locus of cont~ol, which shifts to the
state capitol. This shift means that the~e may be less pe~sonal access
to the conttolling fo~ces in th~ system and thus a mo~e impe~sonal,
bu~eauc~atic system of administ~ation.
The shift may also appea~ to mean
that local c~t officials lose status and influence. it is ha~d to
evaluate such facto~s as status and autonany, but they a~e c~ucial to
consid~ation of state financing.
Fea~ of the unknown is also an
impo~tant facto~.·

The plain fact is that state money will b~ing some de~ee of
from the state level, but such controls need not be oppressive. ·
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con~ol

EXHIBIT H

Transition to State Financing of Courts,
The Implications for Financial and
Personnel Management
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PREFACE

The State Cotn:t Finance Project of the National Cente-r fo-r State
Cou-rts, since its inception in July 1979, has been involved in the many
occur~ing

changes
court

financial

ex~ience

in the financing of state courts and the management of
systems.

is

a

distillation

of

the

gained by Project staff in assisting states in transition to

state financing.
judicial

This roonograph

The monograph is "intended as a reference work fOt"

administ~ators

entering or involved in the ?rocess of transition

to state financing.
Since this

monog~aph

marks the conclusion of the State Court Finance

Project, it is fitting to thank all those

pe~sons ~ho

have

cont~ibuted

their knowledge and support to the Project during the course of its
existence;

in particular,

Harry Lawson,

who has been a mainstay in

writing, research,* technical assistance and training; Barbara J. Gletne,
who has been a major collaborator of Harry Lawson · in assisting the
Project; Gerald Kuban, who has provided the Project his expertise on
personnel

management;

Barry

Mahoney

of

the

Institute

for

Cout-t

Management, who has organized the major

*The major research products of the Project were state-of-the-art
monographs co-authored by Harry 0. Lawson and Barbara J. Gletne, Workload
Measures in the Court, National Center for State Courts, 1980; Fiscal
Administration in State-Funded Courts, National Center for State Courts,
1981.
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conferences for the Project; Sue Dosal of the National Center for State
Courts; Ron Stout of

Administrative Office of .. the
of"+:....:''\'~-:··... ,:

Court~

for New.

_.l:J::.... :.· -··: .· Lo:.-.,'1;

York; Keith Bumsted, NCSe Controller; and members of the Project Staff,
1\

both past and present, Linda Sweeney, Alan I. Herman and Richard Hoffman.
Particular thanks for help are extended to Einar Bohlin, foDmer State
Court Administrator/

from Michigan.

who edited

this monograph and ~

contributed to the content from the perspective of a State Court
Administrator,~

Robert W. Tobin
Project
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Director,

1981

Table of Contents
Page
INTROOlK:fiON

2

A.

3

Pre-Legislation Stage
1.
2.

B.

C.

Participation of Administrative Office of Courts
in Basic Policy Decisions on State Financing

3

The Management Implications of Basic Policy
Decisions

4

a.

Timing of Trans it ion

4

b.

Ccmplex Methods of Assumption

5

c.

Overly Broad Scope of Assunption

7

d.

Management Authority and Resources of the
Administrative Office of the Courts

8

Defining the Transition Management Approach

9

l.

The Management Team

9

2.

The Management Plan

10

Preparation For First Budget:
and Budgetary Steps

The Personnel Management
10

1.

Grasping the Personnel Situation

10

2.

Bringing Trial Courts into the Budgetary Process

15

a.

Defining the Parameters of the Budget
System: (i.e., identifying the budgeting
entities)

16

b.

Supreme Court Policy on the Budget

16

c.

Training and Orientation

17

-152-

Page

D.

E.

d.

Budget Process Pertaining Prlln8rily to
Non-Personnel Costs

17

e.

Integrating Personnel Costs

18

f.

Budget Submission and Defense

18

D-Day Financial Systems

19

l.

D-Day, the ~t of Truth

19

2.

Payroll

19

3.

Appropriations Accounting and Expenditure Control

20

4.

Cash Accounting and Money Control

22

5.

Property Control

23

6.

Personnel

24

7.

Budgeting

25

8.

Conclusion

25

Refining and Augmenting Basic Management Systems

30

Conclusion
Appendix A:

25

Effects of State Financing of Trial Courts Upon Trial Court
Administration

-153-

List of Tables

Page
Table 1

Stages of Developnent
in Court Management Systems
Under State Financing

Table"2

Netwot:k of Financial
and Personnel Systems

2

26 - 29

-154-

)
INl'RODUCr!ON

This monograph deals with the financial and pet'sonnel management
aspects of transition from local to state financing of courts. It is
WLitten from the perspective of a state-level court administt'ator.l
Viewed nar~Hly, the period of tt'ansition starts with legislation
outlining the scope and timing of state assumption and concludes with the
advent of state financing. Viewed broadly, the period of tt'ansition
starts prior to the implementing legislation with attempts to strengthen
the statutory provisions on management and concludes with the development
of mature management systems several years after the switchover to state
financing.
This monograph takes the broader view of transition, dividing the
process into five stages, which are not neatly sequential, but which
gener~lly reflect the evolution of personnel and management systems under
state financing. Table 1 summarizes the five stages. The remainder of
the monograph discusses the management activities needed in each stage.
TABLE 1

Stages of Development in Court Management Systems
Under State Financing
Stage

Characteristics of Stage

Time Sequence

1. Pre-legislation

Efforts to ensure sound
management provisions in
implementing legislation.

Period prior to
implementing
legislation.

2. Defining
transition
management
approach

Choosing management
team; making consultant
choices; developing the
work plan.

Period immediately
following legislation.

3. Preparation
for first
budget

Constructing the job
classification and
pay plan; classifying
employees; bringing trial
courts into state budget
process in time for budget
subnission.

Period from
completion of #2
until budget
sul::mitted.

lAo article written from the perspective of a trial court
administrator has been prepared as an appendix. See Effects of State
Financing of Trial Courts Upon Trial Court Administration, Appendix A.
-2-
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TABLE 1

Stages of Development in Management Systems

Stage

Characteristics of Stage

Time Sequence

4. Preparing
basic
management
systems for
D-day

On D-day, the actual switchover date, management
control must be asserted by
having accounting, payroll,
inventory and personnel
management systems in place.

Overlaps the initial
budget cycle but
runs beyond date of
budget submission to
D-day and beyond.

5. Refining
and
augmenting
basic management
systems

Adding management information features and systems
linkages which go beyond
mere control to management
analysis and planning;
adding systems for
facilities management,
fiduciary accounting,
cashflow control, and other
special management systems.

Occurs roughly 2-5
years after switchover to state
financing.

It should not be implied from Table 1 that improvement in management
systems is found only in states progressing toward state financing, court
reorganization, or both.
Improvement may be required and, in fact,
instituted in court systems where state financing is partial and no major
reorganization is anticipated. However, experience indicates that there
is a special cause-effect relationship, between state financing and
improvements in management systems. The simple fact is that state
financing leads to close scrutiny of management systems and to changes in
.those systems.
These changes occur in the context of policy debate on such issues as
centralization within the judicial system and judicial independence fran
executive branch systems. Policy is often fluid and shifting, thus
blurring the time sequences in systems developnent. In short. Table 1
portrays with artificial neatness what is actually a politically dynamic
process.
A.

Pre-Legislation Stage
1.

Participation of Administrative Office of Courts in Basic Policy
Decisions on State Financing

A ccmnitment bv the state to pay the operating costs of trial
courts, or at least a substantial part of these costs, involves a set
of major policy decisions, usuallv reflected in statutes which are
supplanented by administrative rules of court. Among these policy
decisions are:

-3-

-156-

choosing the
the scope of state assumption;
selecting the
state assumption; and deciding the
management authori
be allocated to .the supreme court
and the
courts. These decisions have
profound management
sometimes made without due
consideration of
The risk
judiciary, in particular the state court
administrator
given management tasks which cannot be
successfully implemented within the specified policy guidelines. Two
particular policy
a great effect on the management
responsibilities
a state court administrator:
(1) the degree of
centralization in
systems; and (2) the degree of dependence on
executive branch management systems. The management burdens of a state
court administt'ator have a direct, proportionate relationship to the
decision made on these
issues, yet these issues are often resolved
in a _politico-philosophical context which includes scant consideration of
management concet'ns.
Unfortunately,
no canned approach one may find in the
literature (ot' this monograph) to insure that proper attention will be
paid to the management effects of changes from local to state financing
of courts.
The
is determined by the local political
environment,
attitudes toward management and administrators, and
the personal style and stature of a particular administrator. Subject to
these constraints, some attempt to provide an operational management
perspective is necessat'Y, usually something more than routine educational
presentations and something less than personal ventures into the
political process. ·A court manager must somehow make policy-makers aware
of the management implications of their policies before those policy
decisions are made final.

2.

The Management Implications of Basic Policy Decisions
a.

tion
transition to state financing is timed to
beginning of a state fiscal year. This
of a state budget for courts which will
at the beginning of a fiscal year, facilitating
accounting and the implementation of all
to the state fiscal cycle.
actual date of switchover to state
first day of a state fiscal year, the first
must be submitted months in advance of the
budget is linked. Moreover, the court
prepared in final form before locally
be integrated into a job classification
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and compensation scheme. . In
,
time for transition must
allow for the fact that budget preparation is contingent upon a
canplex procedure
employee classification and that budget
sul:mission precedes by many months the actual date of
transition. Therefore, transition periods of two years or more
are usually required.
Unfortunately, management considerations may not govern the
length of a transition period.
A legislature under heavy
pressure from counties to relieve them of the burden of courts
may act hastily.2 Problems not only occur from a speedy
assumption, but from failure to initiate assunption at the
beginning of a fiscal year. Such a situation may occur when
state financing occurs in the context of a major court
reorganization, and state assu:nption is timed to coincide with
the date when newly elected or appointed judges take office.
Choice of such a date may require seeking state funding for part
of a budget period and local funding for part of a budget
period, or some scheme of state reimbursement to counties. Both
are complicated processes. Whenever the transition date ignores
the chronology of fiscal years, some degree of chaos results.
b.

Ccmplex Methods of Assumption.

The
way in which a state assumes the financial
responsibility for trial courts can create major management
problems. Mbst states have phased in court financing in stages,
although a ·few have made a one-time assumption. 3 VJJ:-,ile phased
assumption may appear to be easier than one-time assumption, it
carries its own management risks. The most significant risk is
that the legislature will change its position in the middle of
transition and leave the courts half-way between state and local
funding.4 Typical methods of phased assumption are:

2rn Massachusetts, the state assumed financial responsibility
retroactive to the beginning of the state fiscal year in which the
legislation passed. The only possible method of state assumption was
reimbursement of counties. Extensive use had to be made of consultants
to prepare systems prior to the next fiscal year. In Michigan, it
appears that state financing will commence for a part of the system (see
next page) on September 1, 1981. A new fiscal year begins October l.
3E.g., AlabarE,
initially ani
lvrhis happened

Kentucky,

~fussachusetts

Dakota.
-5-
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(but

even

these

states

courts in one
courts;S

the

a gradually
costs;6
new functional
0

different courts,8

or
.9

on toe state
burden on the state court
nntu"""'"",.., that phased assumption
worth, since it drags out
management problems can result when
a fact of nature that
Extending the period in
an almost irresistible
through appointment of
concerns
about
legal
missing when there is too

three steps, taking in
plans to start by
courts and later
s

Dakota and New York.
, and not all of these.

8Where

courts, it
financed, while total
courts is deferred. In
all with largely
personnel in general
but
sane motion
some operating
organized Circuit
state intends to

titled
getting
long
before
propecty
replacement,
one o-r mcrre county
depat'tments
and may
even · be
requisitioned
by
those
depa·ctments.
, it
not u-nusual for local officials to
delay any
p-cogram for irnp-covement
court facilities in
the hope that this will soon be a state p-coblem. This may occur
even if state assumption
facility costs is uncertain.

c.

Overly

Scope of Assumption

Mo-ce often than not, legislatures seek some means of
limiting the scope
state financial assumption. usually for
monetary reasons rather than management reasons. Thet:e are,
however, linpot:tant management linplications in the scope of
assumption. This
not to say that a particular cost should
not be assumed because it raises management pt:oblems, only that
management problems should be considet:ed as a factot:.
Invariably sane, perhaps all, trial court personnel will
beccme state employees by reason of state financing.
It is
inevitable therefore that the management issues related to this
cost assumption must be addressed. There are, however, a numbet'
of othet: costs which frequently are not assuned by states, at
least in the initial phases of state assumption. Assumption of
these costs ~2y
deferred to reduce the cost to the state, but
also for some of
reasons noted below.

Cost Area
Facility expense

Reasons for Deferring Assumption
most complex and costly element of state
It involves facility surveys to determine
occupied by courts, need for improvement or
of facilities; time-consuming negotiations
governments; and negotiation with state
aghast
at
the
cost.
Facilities
may also require a sizable staff with
technical skill, again increasing costs.
reasons, state assumption has commonly been

-160-

•

Furnishings and
capital equipment
(rental, replacement and
maintenance)

An issue in state assumption of these costs
is title to existing furnishings and
equipment. If the state assumes full
responsibility, it must pay for rental of
existing equipment and for maintenance. This entails
a transfer of title to the state, which in turn
entails an inventory, which in turn entails an
inventory maintenance system, which in turn requires
linkage to purchasing and appropriations accounting
systems. Some states simplify the transition by only
assuming the cost of equipnent purchased after the
date of state assumption, but even this requires some
semblance of the various management systems outlined
above.

Law libraries

Tnis expense can involve substantial cataloguing of
books, in effect an inventory. It raises on a llinited
scale some of the same management problems associated
'"ith furnishings and capital equipnent.

Jury costs

Jury cost (primarily juror fees, mileage and meals) is
a difficult item to assume since it involves hard
choices.
Centralization of juror payrr.€nt carries
r ks of delay and bureaucratic red tape, but
reimbursement of counties involves possible loss of
control.
To keep control, vouchers for individual
jurors are typically processed centrally.
Tnis
requires a special jury management system that not
only monitors juror payments, but has features which
allm.; managers to keep jury costs within bounds. It
is a managarent task not to be assumed lightly, since
rrBny
transactions
and
considerable
management
oversight are involved.

Open-ended costs

Costs of indigent defense, medical exams and witness
fees
can be included in the scope of state
assumption. They are costs which must be monitored
closely and thus handled centrally. Like jury costs,
they can escalate unexpectedly and wreak havoc with a
hudget.

d.

Mnnngar.ent Authority am! Resources of the Administrative
Office of the Courts

The nightrmre of any state court administrator is to be
saddled '~lith the major rntmagement res{XInsibilities of a
state-financed court system without the legal authority and
budgetary resources to perform the responsibilities.
This is
-8-
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..

'yv.~(

not an ~~real fear
judges, ~ not
fully appreciate the
stemning from state
financing. Once implementing legislation passes it may be too
late to obtain the necessary authority and resources.
Toe ideal is, of course, for the state court administrative
office to have authority and resources commensurate with
responsibilities, specifically: (l) explicit authority to manage
personnel and finances at all court levels; (2) authority to
compel trial court judges and administrative officers to produce
management info~tion; and (3) appropriations to hire a
personnel manager, a financial manager, accountants and such
other personnel as are required by the size and nature of the
system. The need for personnel is dependent to a large extent
on two policy decisions:
(l) use of state executive branch
financial and personnel systems in lieu of in-house systems; (2)
decentralization
of
administration,
using
trial
court
administrators and clerks for many aspects of personnel and
financial administration. There
no all-purpose model, and it
is quite possible to choose a low profile approach, delegating
many
functions
and
avoiding
the
potential
charge of
empire-building.
B.

Defining The Transition Management Approach
l.

The Management Team

Tne Suprerre Court, or some advisory team of its choice, l!Jl'ay
oversee the transition process, but the operational responsibility is
likely to rest with the state court administrator, even if tbis
responsibility is not formally assigned.
Yet a state cooct
administrator cannot handle the job alone. Help can be obtained from
among the following sources:
o

<Jdministr.ative office staff, in particulaL" those persons
with peL"sonnel, budgetary and accounting skills;
~vill

0

new hires, in particular personnel who
systems being developed;

0

executive branch officials, such as auditors, accounting
staff of comptroller or treasurers, and personnel system
managers;

manage tlle

o

trial court administrators and clerks, who r:rwy be the key
to the tvhole effort since they have the knowledge and the
grass roots support to obtain data and build support; and

o

contractors, in particular to develop a job classification
and pay plan, but perhaps also for accounting systS!IIIS,
payL"oll systems and inventory systems.
-9-
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2.

The Maoagerr.ent Plan

Within a month after passage
state court administrator should have a
0
0
0

what tasks must be
the tline frame for
the person or organization

legislation, the
specifying:

them.

The work plan is keyed to two dates; transition (or D-day) and
tbe date of budget sut:mission.
not
fix the time
sequence
tasks but also influence
on
contractors
must be used. The choice of contractors may add several months to
the schedule because of the procurement process, but it adds
personnel resources that can be focused on discrete, complex tasks
beyond the capability or available time of staff personnel.
The closest date is the date of budget submission and the tasks
related to that event have priority. Typically.
are those tasks
.qssociated with:
(l) withdrawing locally paid court personnel from
local government structures
integrating them into a single state
personnel system; and
(2) bringing the various trial court
organizational units into the state budgetary process.
The other tasks are keyed to the transition date and involve
preparation of those IT'.anagernent systerns •.;hich must be in place on
D-day to ensure basic management control, typically:
payroll,
appropdat ions,
cash accounting,
personnel administration,
and
inventory systems.
C.

Pre~1ration

For First Budget:
Budgetary Steps.

1.

The Personnel Management and

Grasping the Personnel Situation

Personnel costs constitute the largest single
in a court
buclg,et. The key to the initial budget under state financing is to
bring hundreds of trial court employees under the coverage of the
state budget. Although in the long run the purpose of a state funded
court personnel system is more comprehensive than a simple assumption
of existing salaries (read: state reimburser~nt to counties) paid by
local govet:'t1!1lents, a court system may not have any choices in the
matter initially. The ultiiT'.ate goal is to integrate each trial court
employee into CJ uniform classification and pay plan, usually
accompanied by the other normal features of a personnel system. It
is no small feat to classify hundretis of employees and to erect a
personnel management structure in time to provide the salary data for
the initial budget submission.
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There follows a cursory listing of the tasks which must be
performed to organize a personnel system. They adequately indicate
the complexity of the undertaking.
f113Jor Task
\

---

f
f-

·'-lnitial Policy
Cecisions:O

-\

Subtasks""'
To determine relation to or with the
executive branch personnel system and
scope o.f system.
To determine
used.ll

Data Gathering

whether

contracto-rs

general

a-re

to

be

The following steps are necessary to build a data
base.
o

develofEent of background data on each
employee:
age,
experience,
education,
skills, work history and salary record
(i.e. , the data necessary to later classify
employees and determine pay scales; this
will nounally be done by questionnaire, but
there may be existing biographical data that
is accurate);

o

analysis of job functions by interviews r;.;ith
individual employees (i.e., desk audits) or
by questionnaires or by both;

o

survey of administrative personnel
for
system overview and job interrelationships;
and

o

development of collateral data that
influence job classifications and pay:

will

10Same policy may be set by legislation, concerning rights of
employees, collective bargaining and use of the executive branch
personnel system.
Normally much policy will be made by the judicial
branch, and reflected in rules.
llDue
to
the technical aspects of job classifications and
canpensation, contractors are C()(T[IX)nly used, requuwg:
(l) that an
estimate of contractor costs be made; (2) that funds be set aside or
obtained; (J) that p-rocurement processes are set in motion, proposals
appnised, And a contractor chosen; (4) that a contract is negotiated;
and (5) that the contractual (,vork be ;:nonitored by in-house personnel (at
least an in-house project director).
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pay

•
vested
- existing
fringe
benefits,
rights, accumulated leave of court
employees;
•
- collective bargaining rights
under
existing contracts; and
local
- wage
differentials
between
governments.

Job and Pay
Structure

Toe typical process for developing
a job and pay structure
:12
0

o

developing a set
job
cations and descriptions;
relating current posit{ons to the
new job classes;

0

determining the compensation scale to be
used (often the executive bt"anch pay grid)
and related issues of in-grade Increase
steps and mmber of grades between jobs in
the same promotional

0

relating
job
classifications
compensation scale·

o

classification

to

the

individual employees;

0

establishing a procedur-e for classification
appeals;

0

hearing classification appeals;

0

revision
required;

0

subnission of job classifications,
pay
scheme and employee classifications to the
court for approval; and

of

job

classifications,

as

l2The process is not, in actual practice, very neat, as numerous
initial adjustments must be made to accomnodate such situations as:
senior employees who lack the qualifications required in the new system;
existing pay differentials between employees doing essentially the same
work; employeE's whose existing pay is close to or- exceeds the rnaximun pay
in their new classjfication; and major pay increases for employees whose
positions were undercL1ssified. Such decisions as "grandfathering" and
placerrent of employees in the upper steps of a pay grade are likely to be
necess~ry for equitable treatment of employees.
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4

0

Developrent of
Administrative

One

Instrurnen~alities

0

0

process;
0

0

Detailed Policy

The

final

0

trators,
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o

Rule Making

Orientation and
Training

control of

pt:ocess;

0

employee status (e.g., exempt, probationary.
permanent and temporary);

0

promotion procedure and lateral entry;

0

employee obligations and conditions of work;

0

disciplinary and grievance procedures;

0

work hours, ·leave, holidays; and

0

travel.

It is then necessary to enact rules containing
personnel management policy and then:
0

disseminate them for comment;

0

revise them; and

o

promulgate them.

It is necessary to prepare manuals and to conduct

training sessions for the benefit of all persons
affected by the personnel rules, specifically:
o

to clarify court policy and to spell out
diffet:ences
between
the new and
old
environments;

0

to clarify participant roles;

0

to build understanding and support fot" the
system;

o

to convey basic infot"mVtion about system
operation
in
a
fot"um
which
permits
questioning and free discussion; and

o

to introduce
persons responsible for
personnel administration and to make their
functions knry#n.
-14-
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2.

Bringing Trial Courts into the Budgetary Process

The lifeblood of any
The first budget oE a
important, since it tends
inc-rements are determined. Moreover,
under increased state financing
establish,
the ~.;0rking relationship
administ-rative office and trial courts.
test of the state court
legislatu-re on behalf of trial courts.
budget.

A lot

begins to
state court
provides the first
with the
the f:i rst

Fortunately, there is no need to
new budgetary
process. The problem consists of integrating
courts into a
state budgetary process already familiar to the state-level
judiciary. If state financing
virtually total. trial courts not
only are int~rated into the state budgetary
but must
withdraw from toe city or county budget process.
, it is not
ur~ommon for counties to retain some responsibility
tr
courts.
requiring that courts participate in two budgetary processes. In any
event, trial courts must be made part of
state
process.
In a state where assumption is
costs, the
problem oE budgeting for trial courts is s
from a
state-level perspective) since the basic
data
the budget
can largely be deLi ved from the data generated
process of
setting up a personnel system.
Usually, hot11ever,
state also
assumes non-personnel costs, perhaps even facility costs. This data
must be initially derived from budgetary
formulated at the
trial court level. This type of budgetary
while
salary levels are being determined
ication of
individual employees, since the implementation
process
does not depend on completion of employee classi
budgeting
State budgetary processes di
in
costs, the style
period, the type of FfE limits placed on
of other details.
of budgeting (e. g. , PPB, ZBB, MBO) and a var
steps, except
This makes it difficult to discuss the ini
in fairly broad generic form. Below are noted the principal tasks in
developing the initial budget.l3

l3anitted
advocacy.

are

the

steps

relat

-15-
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to

budget

presentation

and

a.

Defining the
identifying the

.e. ,

State assunption of
court
is rarely
accomplished with precision.
statutory
descriptions of the scope of state responsibility, there ace
invariably gray areas, services or functions which fall between
the cracks in the first budget cycle.
~~reover, it is necessary to note that locally funded trial
courts are rarely well-organized administrative entities with a
single local budget for all court functions. In fact. in each
trial court there may be separate budgets sul:mitted by two or
more court components, or no formal budget presentation at all.
Tne state court administrative office, pursuant to the
irnplrn~nting legislation, must identify which official can speak
for the organizational units to be included in the first state
budget.

Often the implementing legislation defines entirely new
management responsibilities at the trial court level, further
complicating the process.
Further problems may be encountered if the state budgetary
p'Locess features a great deal of sophisticated esotedca. It
~~y be prudent to seek waiver of fancy requirements in the first
budget cycle, since the basic mechanics of a new system are
enough burden.
b.

Suprerre Court Policy on the Budget

Early in the process the policy of the supreme court must
be reflected in some fo~n of budget directive, outlining roles
and responsibilities in the judicial branch budget process.
Some of these directives may be pro forma application of state
budgetary procedures to trial courts, but others will reflect
the degree to which budget formulation
to be centralized
within the judicial branch. The supreme court may also reflect
its policy in dealing with the other branches, perhaps
indicating departures from normal state budgetary process to
protect judicial independence, for example, presentation of a
lump sum budget.
The policy decisions on centralization may be prompted by
the legislature, which may choose to deal with individual trial
courts directly.
rbre often, the supreme court has the
authority to define the budgetary roles and responsibilities of
-16-
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trial court

The key
permitted
of trial courts
trial courts;

budget decisions
c.

Training

A basic
been lack
(usually
budgetary procedures
disseminated, but

durirg field ori

Budgeting
hard to handle
help.
reasons, but
state strategy to secure
will of the trial court
Td.al

COUt't

openly opposed to
the manner
sessions.
opportuni
budgetary
management.
opportunity
and often.
A key
point. IE
requires f0t:'
the
provide an
data collection
point.

d.

Budget

Depend
help, the
process: (l)
sign-off by
administrator;

ty of

basic
; (2)

presid
(l~)

judicial branch budget

court
total

'

.

It will be necessary to
tr
courts with budget
subnission forms so
the central office does not have to
reformat se?arate budget submissions (states should already have
forms -the slinpler the better, especially the first ttne). The
state review may involve budget hearings at which local budgets
are presented, explained, and defended.
Although perhaps at a disadvantage initially, due to lack
of detailed knowledge regarding trial court expenditures, the
state court administrator and staff can again build good will
and reliable budget figures by taking care to enlist the aid of
the trial judges and staff.
The initial process can prove to be quite long due to lack
of familiarity with the state system. The budget directives
should anticipate such delays, so that the final submission is
on tline. Psychologically, a timely submission is tmportant for
credibility with the other branches.
e.

Integrating Personnel Costs

The s::ilary data derived from the creation of a personnel
system must also be received in time to meet budget deadlines.
It must be combined with the budget for non-personnel costs
obtained from trial courts. It should be noted that this salary
data pertains to existing personnel and would not preclude
requests for additional personneL In fact, there is a cudoos
dilemma posed for courts in the first budget - a desire to avoid
overstaffing before a full r.eview of needs can be made and a
cot..rnter-desire to avoid being trapped with FTE levels that are
Ear too low.

f.

Budget Submission and Defense
The first court budget is judged by fairly simple standards:
o
o
o

Was it prepared on time?
Did it avoid omissions?
Was it sufficiently well prepared to be
credible to the other branches?

No one expects great sophistication or total grasp of trial
court details in the first budget. Adequacy is expected. The
state court ar:!:-ninistrat:or must establish the office as the
budgetary focal point for trial courts, a ne~.; role. How far to
go in enlisting support of trial court judges, clerks, and
administrators is a judgment call.
Some authot:"ity may be
sacrificed, but knowledge and political support may be gained.
-18-
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D.

D-Day Financial Systems
D-Day, the

1.

~"oment

of Truth

Cn the date of switchover to a predaninantly state-financed
system, the state court administrative
ice must be ready to
discharge its increased responsibilities for financial and personnel
management:. :Management systems to meet these responsibilities must
be in place, already tested and ready to operate.l4 The months
immediately following switchover are somettmes a frenetic period
chat:"acterized by ongoing modification and adjustment of management
systems in the light of day-to-day operational realities.

The initial set of management systems do not have to be
sophisticated in a management sense. They simply have to work on a
rudimentary level.
The acid test is the first payroll.
Also
crucial, but less visible are those sys terns required to obtain and
maintain basic management control.
Typically, the areas where
control must be asserted are:
0

o
o
0

expenditures of appropriated funds
cash receipts and disbursements
property belonging to courts
personnel functions

Stated briefly, the state administrative office
control money, propeL'~] and personnel as of D-day.
2.

•
~ust

be able to

Payroll

Paying trial court employees with state checks would not appear
very ccmplex, but the first payroll is a crucial system test. It
demonstrates that the system will work in an area cf basic employee
concern. It also syrrul._x}lizes the administrative unification of the
system in a very tangible way.
Fortunately, there is an existing state paYLoll system on which
to build. Payt:"oll for
state-level judicial branch ca:rrponents
(e.g., supreme court, inteLmediate appellate courts, administrative
office of courts) is already pr~luced by the state payroll system, so
that system requit:"ements are already defined. PaYLoll data on each
employee, the form of the payroll, verification procedures and
updating procedut:'es are set. The essential changes brought about by
state firwncinc, are the sheer nlJU'ber of employees added to the
payroll and their geographic diffusion. A state judicial payroll of
50 - 400 persons may grow to 1. 000 to 3, 000 persons, pet:'haps 8, 000
persons in lat:'ge states.

14. For a systen1tic review of financial manngement systen~ in state
court administrntive offices, see Fiscal Administration in State-Ft..rnded
Courts, Harry La\vson and Barbara Gletne, National Center for State
Courts, 1981.
-19-
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Such a large leap
n~hers poses its own systems problems and
may require automation at the state level to prepare and certify the
payroll to the state agency which writes the checks.lS
The
essential demand upon the system is to produce accurate checks for
all employees and to have these checks in their hands on time. Same
state-wide systems fail at the distribution level, rather than at the
check preparation level. To insure that the first payroll is not a
fiasco, slinple precautions are necessary:
o

3.

all state-paid employees should be identified;

0

fot" anployees covered by a personnel survey, salary data and
fringe benefit data should be obtained;

0

the payroll data base and address data should be constructed and
then squared with the budget and with personnel records;

0

the data should be field-verified;

0

liaison with
established;

0

if software is to be used, selection of the package should be
made and the data base converted to machine-readable form;

0

payroll verification and
updating pocedures
established and communicated to the field; and

0

the timing and distribution elements of the payroll cycle should
be analyzed exhaustively, so that delays are avoided.

the

appropriate

state

agencies

should

should

be

be

Appropriations Accotmting and Expenditure Control

The state administrative office of courts must be able to
account for expenditures of appropriated moneys on a scale of
expenditure previously unknown. It does not follow, however, that
the judicial branch must have its own accounting system. There are
several options:
lSThis agency may or may not mail the checks. If the judicial
agency has to mail out the checks, an added administrative step is needed.
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o
0

o

reliance on the executive
reliance on the executive branch with maintenance of a backup
system; and
creation of a judicial branch system.

In a state with a small administrative office and a carmitment
to keep it small, heavy reliance on the executive branch for
appropriations accounting may be
means that
expenditure control will depend largely on
timeliness
rep~ts
from the executive branch. Rarely do such reports suffice for
pre-audit purposes or to locate overspending or underspending in
specific courts.
Even where heavy reliance is placed upon the
executive branch, it is advisable to:
0

negotiate with the executive branch a series of changes in
charts of accounts and coding of information, so that the
administrative office can oversee and even provide feedback
reports to each organizational component of the court system;

0

maintain some running record of expenditures against major
budget lines to facilitate pre-audit of expenditures; and

0

maintain some running record on relatively volatile costs.

In short, it is- possible to be overreliant on the executive
branch, leaving the jud-icial branch without adequate controls in key
areas. To guard against this possibly the state court administrative
office may choose to maintain its own accounting systems to ensure:
0
0

o

timeliness of data;
reports tailored to the management needs of courts; and
control of expenditures.

The use of a backup system will require the addition of
accounting personnel, perhaps software linked with the payroll sytem
and perhaps consultant support, if the basic state accounting system
is not to be fully adopted. The additional costs, both one-time and
ongoing, must be weighed against the benefits gained in control.
TI1e ultimate system is a totally in-house system with the court
assumiD.g full responsibility for appropriations accotmting. This
obviously requires high-quality staff and (probably) contractor
support for basic system design and autanation, and IJl.ay be too much
to take on imnediately in terms of costs and risk.
A possible
altern<ltive is to build a backup system with a view to latet" assUJ!ing
full responsibility for accounting.
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4.

Cash Accounting and

~bney

Control

The advent of state financing often involves a shift in the
allocation of coutt-generated revenues, with the state receiving a
higher portion and local governments a reduced portion. There may
be, in fact, a major restructuring of the system of fines, costs and
fees. Almost inevitably, the state court administrator is given ~e
authority and responsibility for the collection and distribution of
these court-generated revenues.
The money collected at the local level takes certain basic

fo~:

0

fines assessed against defendants in criminal and traffic cases;

0

costs and fees collected from criminal defendants and civil
litigants;

0

restitution, support, alirony, and proceeds from other civil
judgments paid through the court for speedy disbutsenent to
beneficiaries of a judgment;

0

cash bail; and

0

money paid into holding accounts (e.g.. trusts or condsnnation
money) to be held for a period of ttme before distribution.

The first two categories of money flow involve distribution to
governments and are, in a sense, revenues. The other money flows do
not inure to the benefit of governments, but rather go to individuals
or various non-government organizations.
These monies are typically collected at the local level by
clerks, occasionally by probation offices or sheriffs.
Usually,
state auditors exercise some com:ol over the accounting for these
monies, but a great deal of latitude is permitted in types of cash
accounting systems,
use of business machines and choice of
depositoties. Due to the complexity of the money flows and the local
politics involved in choice of banks, state court administrators may
defer an attempt to h~se controls on the system. This is. in most
situations, unwise, since if p-roblems or scandals occur, they will be
attributed to the unified system, once it is state-financed.
A state court administrative office should:
(1) identify the
principal money flryNs; (2) establish a cash accounting systeml6
that is a general ledger, double entry system with a uniform chart of
16Fiduciary accounting can usually he deferred a while.
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manuals;
(1-~o)
upgrade
de?Qsitories are wisely
the state reaches the state

accounts ;17
(3)
develop
bookkeeping practices; (S)
chosen; and (6) ensure that
treasury without delay.

This undertaking usually involves use of consultants, assistance
frcm state auditors, and a majot' training and orientation program.
Ideally, the state court administrative office should have a staff
adequate to monitor the system (including auditors), to provide
training, and to account for and report on revenue collection, in
particular that part of revenue destined for the state treasury.
Revenue projection is, in fact, part of the budgetary process, as
well as a means of detecting possible problems in specific cout"ts
when actual revenues deviate significantly from projected revenues.
5.

Property Control

States generally tr.aintain inventot'ies of state-owned equipment
and furnishings.
Even in a court system funded largely by local
governments, the state-funded segment of the court system (i.e., the
appellate courts, state court administrative office, state law
library) will have property purchased with state funds and therefore
included in the inventory of state property. Property used by trial
courts is normally reflected in county or city inventories of
property.
Al.l inventories nonnally carry a separate section for
property purchased from federal funds.
A state court administrative office must be prepared to assu:ne
control of all court-used property. If title to court propet'ty is to
be switched to the state, this means that:
o

all court property must be inventoried;

o

the inventory must be cleared with local governn1ent officials,
so that no misunderstandings arise;

o

the judicial branch must make arrangffilents to add the
inventoried property to the state inventory or to set up a
separilte judie
branch inventory, (which means developing the
identifiers to be carried on each type of property and
automating this inventory); and

l7variations are usu:Jlly permitted
few transactions.
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small rural counties with

..
0

there must
a system
property through a central point, so
IY,?dated .18

inventory is

If the state does not assume title to property purchased for
courts by local governments, the first two steps in the above process
are unnec~ssary. It is only necessary to build an inventory as the
state starts to purchase property. While this seems easier, it
creates problems for local courts if the locally-owned property has
to be serviced or maintained. Problems also arise where equipnent
has been rented.

6.

Personnel

The personnel system designed during the transition period is
not self-operating. It requires an ongoing administration at the
state level, even though basic functions of recruitment, hiring.
supervision, and dismissal may be handled at the local level. At the
state level at least one person, maybe several in a large system, are
required to:
0

o

monitor trial courts to ensure compliance wth personnel policy;
record changes in employee status (Le., changes in compensation
level, job classification, terminations, etc.);

0

keep track of leave or other data affecting employee benefits of
compensation;

0

oversee employee evaluations and maintain evaluation records;

o

provide information to trial courts in personnel matters and
assist them in recruitment;

o

review job classifications and descriptions; and

0

where necessary,
handle collective bargaining problems.
grievances and enforcement of equal opportunity programs.

Thus on D-day a personnel office must be ready to enforce the
court rules, keep the job and pay plan current and generally to
process all transactions affecting the status of individual employees.

18. Small purchases, which do not qualify as equipment, could be
handled locally through revolving funds.
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7.

Budgeti:ng_

Budgeting systems in their early stages of develop:nent at:e not
usually viewed as year-round opet:ations with ongoing management use.
They are generally focused entirely upon the routine of budget
preparation and become active only in the months Unnediately
proceeding budget sub:nission. Even at this minimal level, a state
court administrative office must be ready for its second budget cycle
under state financing only a few months after D-day. If the second
cycle is to be more sophisticated and management-oriented, the period
between budget cycles must be used to upgrade the system and its
procedures. At least one person must be devoted to this task at the
state level.
Tr.e
must be
state of
D-day by

8.

budget system is not a D-day system in the sense that it
ready to function on D-day.
It should, however, be in a
improvement to ready it for the budget cycle which follows
a few months.

Conclusion

Sane states rr.ay be able to have very sophisticated systems in
place by D-day. Most states won't have this luxury. Their goal must
be to have the mintmally required rnangagement controls in place.
E.

Refining and Augmenting Basic Management SystEmS
Eventually, a state administrative office of Courts will pass
beyond the point where the principal objective of the office is to
have simple control over key management functions. Once control is
established, management focus can switch to efficiency, productivity,
improved allocation of revenues and establishment of various systa:n
linkages. Gradually, a network of financial and personnel management
systems t·rill emerge.
The scope and depth of the network and the
extent of its decentralization will differ markedly among states.
However different the eventual network may be, it should be the
product of a planned evolution, rather than a random development.
Table 2, which follows, provides a schematic means of looking at
the evolution of w.anagement systems.
It is unlikely that it would
apply exactly to any state, but it is sufficiently representative to
serve the following purposes:
0

o

a check-off 1 ist to consider the planned develorment of
systems; and
a conceptual
systems.

fra~

of reference for considering management
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TABLE 2

Network of Financial and
Personnel Management Systems
LATER
DEVELOPMENT

LINKAGES WITII
ornER. SYSTEM

Effectuating court In early stages,
policy on person- concentration
nel; updating
on system
job and compensa- maintenance,
ation plan;
keeping
recording person- records, ennel tra~sactions- forcing proceleave, promotions, dures, and
disciplinary
troubleaction, tetminashooting.
tions; labor
relations; assistance to trial courts
in recruitment,
training, other
personnel matters.

Concentration
on vacancy
savings; upgrading quality and productivity of
employees;
training and
career develop:nent; technical assistance to trial
courts in personnel matters.

Can be Iinkecl to

Budget

Formulation,
review and presentation of court
budget; budget
monitoring to
ensure compliance
with appropr i ations limits.

Management
control of
budget by
linkage to
measures of
productivity
and efficiency; multi-year
planning;
analysis and
control of
budget in
individual
courts.

Payroll

Preparation or
verification of
~1yroll; updating.

BASIC

cHARACIERisrrcs
Personnel

EARLY
DEVELOPMENr

Enforcing
budget pl"'ocedures; concentration on
adequacy of
appropriations; simple
budget rnontoring at
gross object
of exp::!nditure
level.

pay-roll systems
so that both
systems can be
simultaneously
updated by a
change in
employee status
that affects pay
or payroll data;
can also be
linked to budgetary and
appropriations
accounting fot"
vacancy savings.
and data on
authorized
positions.
Linked to appropriations
accounting
in sense
that appropriations pl"Ovide
opening balances
(also quarterly
balances in
allotment
system).

Can be linked to
appropriations
accounting,
personnelsystems.
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TABLE 2

Network of Financial and
Personnel Management Systems

BASIC

EARLY

LAIEk

CHARACTERISTICS

DEVEI.DPMENT

DEVELOPMENr

Appropnations Accounting
(alternately
called Fund
Accounting)

Reco~:dmg of
expenditures
against appropriations; feedback
on expenditures.

Expenditure
control and
reporting in
broad budget
categories.

Reports and
control at
lower level of
detail - by
program and
by object of
expenditure
within court
and judicial
district;
ability to
identify funds
for reallocation and aberrations fran
normal expenditure patterns
(i.e. • exception reports).

Purchasing/
Inventory

Procedures for
acquiring goods
and services;
running record
of property under
court control.

wrrn

Lil'i'KAGF.S
or'dER. SYSTEM

Possible linkage
to pay-t"oll, purchasing/inventory
systems. Provides base data
for budget
preparation, ineluding forecasting of expenditures by
time periods
and by categories

Basice procure- Control pur- Can be tied to
appropriations
chasing by
ment proceaccounting; can
du-res (often
judicial
branch; deve- be tied to
linked to
budget process
lopt-nent and
state execuin form of
maintenance
tive branch
special capital
of property
purchasing
equipnent
replacement
system but
budget.
schedules;
occasionally
entirely under develop:nent of
capital expendjudicial
itures section
branch
of budget.
control);
aLKlit to ascertain fund availability in broad
object of expenditure
categories; simple
system of
inventory update
(may be part of
gene-cal state
inventory).
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TABLE 2

Network of Financial and
Personnel Management Systems
BASIC

EARLY

CHARACTERISI'ICS

DEVELOPMEf-11

Cash
Accounting/
Auditing

System for
controlling the
receipt, deposit
and disbursement
of money received
by courts.

Federal
Ftinds

Monitoring all
federal progrcm
ftiOding, whether
by grant, reimbursement, or
revenue sharing
allocation; keeping financial
records as required by federal
and state
regulations.

~1anagernen t

Introduction
of unifonn

cash accounting procedures into
trial courts
with some
state-level
support and
supervision.

Simple compliance with
federal regulations; preparation of
reports and
financial segments of
applications.
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LATER
DEVELDPMENT

LINKAGES WITH
OTHER SYSTEM

Revenue pro- Revenue projecjections and
tions tied to
reporting;
budget process; .
improved
may be linked to
investments
facilities manand money flow agernent if some
management;
revenues are
use of audit- earmarked for
ors; better
for facility
enforcement of rental or money j udgrenovation.
ments payable
through courts.
Planning use

Linked to budget
process for purfunds as part poses of ascerof financial
taining budget
planning;
impact of
special
changes in
analysis,
federal funding
leve 1 or need
reports on
federal fund- for matching
funds.
ing as a
factor in
financing
court
operations.

of federal

TABLE 2

Network of
Personnel ~.anagement Syste:ns
MANAGEMENT
SfSTEM

Fiduciary
Accounting

Facilities
Management

BASIC

EARLY

LATER

CHARACTERISfiCS

IEVELOPMENT

DEVELOPMENT

~.aintaining

and
supervising individual trust
accounts and
accounts to hold
condemnation and
other funds
temporarily held
by the CO\.!'Lt;
includes investment responsibi-

Usually
involves
establishment
of fiduciary
accounting
and investment
p-cOCedll't'eS
to
CO\.!'Lt officials
with repon-

~.ay

lity.

funds.

System goes
beyond finance,
but financial
segment includes
maintaining
facility inventory; liaison and
negotiation with
local governments
on facilit
planning and
carrying out
facility rental,
renovation, or
construction.

Setting and
enforcing
slfl:"vey
facility
cou-ct facilistandards;
and an
assessment
long-term
these against
capital
improverrent
sane standard
is a prerequi- programning.
site. At
simplest level
facility management
includes maintenance of this
invento-ry, negotiation of space
arrangements
th
local gove~~nt
o icials and
private rente-rs,
with basic renovations as
required.

LINKAGES WITii
ai'HER SYSTEM

involve
establishment
of central state
depository to
enhance investment incane and
orderly administration.

•

ty

A detailed

- <::!-

-182-

Linked to operating budget. and
perhaps to state
capital budget.

EXHIBIT I
8100

THE CALIFORNIA JUDICIAL SYSTEM*
The Constitution of the State of California vests the judicial power of the state in a Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, Superior
Courts, Municipal Courts and Justice Courts (Const., Art. VI, i 1).

The

Superior Courts, Municipal Courts and Justice Courts are the trial
courts of the California judicial system; the Supreme Court and Courts
of Appeal are appellate courts that primarily review trial court decisions.
The Constitution also
cial administration:

provide~

for agencies dealing with judi-

the Judicial Council, whose principal function is

to improve and expedite the administration of justice (Canst., Art. VI,
§

6); the

Comm~ssion

on Judicial Appointments, which must confirm all

gubernatorial appointees to fill appellate court vacancies (Const., Art.
VI, §§ 7, 16); and the Commission on Judicial Performance, which deals
with/the admonishment,

censur~,

removal or retirement of judges for

misconduct or disability (Const.) Art. VI, §§ 8, 18).
The California judicial system had a total of 247 courts
and 1,246 judges as of April I. 1980.

The names of all judges of

the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal and superior courts are listed in
the Official California Reports, which also contain decisions of the
appellate courts (commonly referred to as "court opinions").

About 8

million cases, exclusive of traffic parking violations, are filed each
year.

Parking violations annually result in another 10 million cases

Over 14 million case3 arc disposed of each year by the courts.

The

annual cost of the judicial system exclusive of capital outlay for
facilities is about $4/.5 million, of which about $55 million is paid
by the state and the re111ai:1der by local counties.

fines, forfeitures, penalties and
million

annua:~y

~ourt

Court revenues from

fees are approximately $280

and are distributed to the state, counties and cities.

SUPREME COURT
The Supreme Court is California's highest court and its decisions are binding on all other courts of this state.
~I

This summary was prepared by the Administrative Office of the
Courts, which is the staff agency of the Judicial Council of
Californiu, 601 McAllister Str0.et~ San Francisco. California 94102.
-183-
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The Supreme Court
ciate Justices.
special writs:

a

Asso-

It has original jurisdiction

involving

mandamus, certiorari,

habeas corpus.

also exercises re.viewing power under its

It

to

transfer to itself for decision, appeals taken to

Courts of Appeal

either before or after the Courts of Appeal have handed down final
decisions in these appeals (Const., Art. VI, §§ 10 and 12).
viewing power enables the Supreme Court to

This re-

on important legal

questions and to maintain uniformity in the law.

Any

for a hearing in the Supreme Court after

by a Court of Appeal,

and if the hearing is granted the decision
comes a nullity.

the Court

may petition
Appeal be-

All Supreme Court decisions are published

the

Official California Reports.
Members of the Supreme Court are appointed by the Governor and
must be confirmed by the Commission on Judicial Appointments.

To be

qualified for such an appointment, a person must

an

admitted

to the practice of law in California or have

as a judge of a

court of record in this state for 10 years immediately preceding his
appointment (Const.

~

Art. VI,

§

15).

After

~onfirmation,

the juoge

serves until the next gubernatorial election when he must run unopposed
for election on a nonpartisan ballot

., Art. Vl, § 16).

The Su-

preme Court judges are elected for 12-year terms.
Regular sessions are held by the Court in San Francisco, Los
Angeles and Sacramento.
where.

The Court may also hold special sessions else-

Over 3,500 matters are filed in the

Court each year, of

which about 2, 900 are pet:i.tions for hearing in cases previously decided
by the Courts of Appeal.
In addition to its

o~her

responsibilities, the Supreme Court

.

reviews the recommendations of the Commission on Judicial Performance
and the State Bar of California concerning, respectively, the disciplining of judges and attorneys.
COL"RTS OF APPEAL

The Courts of Appeal, established pursuant to a constitutional
amendment in 1904, are C:1llfornia's intermediate courts of review and
ca~ry

the main load of review work.

They have appellate jurisdiction
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(

when superior courts have original
~

prescribed

statute.

, they also have

the
aw~c~~,

original jurisdiction in habeas corpus,

hihition proeeedings (Const., Art. VI, I

certiorari and pro-

Over 13,000 appeals and

original proceedings are filed and heard

The state is divided into five appellate districts, each
having a Court of Appeal composed of one or more divisions.

Each divi-

sion is composed of three or more judges appointed by the Governor and

confirmed by the Commission on Judicial

qualifica-

tions. election and term of office are
~udges.

same as for Supreme Court

The Legislature has the constitutional authority to create new

appellate districts and divisions of the Courts
VI, I 3).

Appeal (Canst., Art.

Currently, the five appellate districts have 13 divisions and

59 judges.

The headquarters for the five appellate

are:

First District. San Francisco; Second District, Los Angeles; Third
District, Sacramento; Fourth District, San Diego and San Bernardino; and
Fifth District, Fresno.
Cases are decided by three-judge panels of
Appeal.

Courts of

Their decisions, or opinions, are published in the Official

California AppellaLe Reports if they (1) establish a new rule of law or
alter or modify an existing rule, (2) involve a legal issue of continuing public interest, or (3) criticize existing law (Const., Art. VI,

f 14; Cal. Rules of CouYt, Rule 976).

About 18 percent of Court of

Appeal opinions are anuuc..lly certified as meeting the standard for
publication.

SUPERIOR COURTS
The superior

~ourt

is the trial court of general jurisdiction

in the California juG1cial system.

It is sometimes called the trial

court of residual jurisdiction; that is, it has original trial jurisdiction in all causes except those given by statute to other trial courts
(Code Civ. Proc. § 82).

Tne superior

cou~c

aisc sits as a probate

court, juvenile court and conciliation court.

(See Prob. Code § 301 et

seq .• ; Welf. and Inst. Code§ 500 et seq.; Code Civ. Proc. § 1730 et
qeq.)

In addition, the superior court has trial jurisdiction of all

felony cases.

The superior court tries all civil and criminal matters

-1853

above the

., Art.

of

VI I 10; Code Civ. Proc. f
There is a superior court 1n
number of judges is fixed by the
The n\l'Ober of

J 4).

t

in each court

counties to 196 in Los Angeles County,
state.

(See Gov. Code § 69580 et

.)

cases are

and about 600,000 cases are
eluding some 49,

courts, in-

criminal matters

dispositionB.

Superior court judges serve

terms and are

the general election on a nonpartisan
(Const., Art. VI, § 6(b) and

filled by appointment of the Governor.
must be an

voters

county

)

are

Code f

; Elect

A

to the

have served as a judge of a court

at

.

the

court

in

or

in this state

at
• , Art. VI,

10 years immediately preceding election or
§ 15).

The superior courL also hears
nicipal and justice courts

mu-

t., Art. VI, § 1

except

in small claims cases are heard by a
each county.

department 1n

Appeals to the superior court are

by the Judicial Council

t.,

117.10, 901; Pen. Code§ 1468).

Art.

,

rules adopted

6

§

. Proc.

§§

Appeals

from

the superior court to the Courts of Appeal

• Rules

, Rules

61-69).
COURTS
Th£:

municipal cou-.ct is one of two

of trial courts

the superior court; the other is the justice court.
are 83 municipal courts and 4 72 judges.

State

each county board of super-visors to
tricts.

Currently, there
authorizes

the county into judicial dis-

When the population of a judicial

exceeds 40,000, a

municipal court is established in that district (Const., Art. VI,

§

5).

Municipal courts have original trial jurisdiction in criminal
misdemeanor and infraction cases (Pen. Code

§

1462), and in all civil

cases arising within the municipal court district in which the amount

-186-
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.,......
(

(

involved is $15,000 or

courts

also exercise a simplified .. ..,..........

in cases not exceeding

$750 (Code Civ. Proc., i 116.2).

trates

to conduct preU.min.aiy hearings

cues to

reasonable and probable cause to hold a
trial in

SUOP'~"ior

About

~-··~-"~ whether there is

,.,.e.~.c~.uu:~.u

proceedings or

court:.

6.~

million cases or over 90 percent o£

nonparking cases are handled by the

state's

courts

, including

some 5.2 million
traffic
year total another 10-million cases.
court

each

are

terms on a

nonpartisan ballot by voters of the
courts are located (Gov. Code

§

7

municipal court judge are filled by the Governor
Municipal court judges are required to

§ 71

attorneys

to

practice of law in California for at least five years immediately pre-

ceding election or appointment (Const., Art. VI, § 15}.
COURTS

Justice courts are established in

judicial

having a population of 40,000 or less (Const., Art. VI,

dist~icts

§

.100, justice courts and 101 judges,. and they handle about a

5).

There are
600,000 non-

parking and 200,000 parking cases each year.
Since Januart 1, 1977 the justice courts have

the same
civil and criminal jm.::i&dic.t:ion as municipal courts (Code Civ. Proc. I 86;
Pen Code § 1462).

Justice couYt judges are elected for six-year terms and vacancies are filled by lot::''--'~ county boards of supervisors, which also set
the number and hounda:d. es of justice court districts in their respectivecounties.

Prior to

Febr~ary

18s 1975 the judges could either be attor-

neys admitted to the California State Bar or have passed a qualifying

examination given by the Judicial Council.
of California Justice

Cou~t

Judges:

(See Hennessy, Qualification

A Dual System, 3 Pacific L.J.

439 (1972).)

Under legicl£.tion (Chapter 1493 of the 1974 Statutes)
which became effective '' i.::·a the denial of a writ of certiorari in
Gordon v. JuE.E}ce Court

11-971•)

12 Cal.3d 323, justice court vacancies
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5

must be filled by attorneys (Gov. Code f 71701). ·The Gordon case ~stab
lished a right for a defendant facing charges that carry the possibility
of incarceration to have his case heard by an attorney judge.
Many justice courts have only a part-time,caseload, and the
judges supplement their judicial compensation
tice.

a private law prac-

However, under legislation adopted subsequent to the Gordon case

the Chief Justice baa designated 11 incumbent judges as circuit justice
court judges.

These circuit judges are required to devote their full

time to judicial duties and receive salaries fixed by statute and paid
through a state appropriation.
Judges of the Supreme Court, Courts of Appeal, superior courts
and municipal courts may not practice law and are ineligible for other
public employment and public office.

A superior or municipal court

judge may, however, become eligible for election to another public
office by taking a leave of absence without pay before filing his declaration of candidacy for that office.

Acceptance of that office is a

resignation as a judge (Canst., Art. VI, § 17).

A justice court judge

who is an attorney may practice law, but not before any justice court in
his own county (Gov. Code§§ 68082-83).
No judge or judicial officer may receive a court fine or fee
for his own use.

-1886
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SUPREME COURT
J~sticea

One Chief Justice and Six Associate
.,....
I
I

•
COURTS OF
(13 Divisions
District-San Francisco
4 Divisions with
4 Ju~es ~n ~ch division

Firs~

APPEAL

judges)

Second District-los Angeles
5 Divisions with
4 judges in each division

Fourth District
2 Divisions with
5 judges in San Diego
5 judges in San Bernard~no

Ir-------~-----------Third District-sacramento
1 Division with
1 judges

Fifth District-Fresno
1 Div;lsion with
6 judges

I[\ .

i

1

1'

I

COURTS

I
I

I!
I
I
tI

SUPERIOR COURTS
58 (onf! for each county)
with total of -69+ judges.
f., ::t g

I

I
f
I

Jt::risdiction

'
f

I
I

Civil-.Over $15,000
Criminal-Original jurisC.i.ction iu all causes except those
given by statute to municipal or justice courts.
Appeals-To Court of Appeal of the district.

I
I
I
I

I
I

I

I
I

II
I
I

r-----~--------------~----~--------~
MUNICIPAL r.OURTS
--8-3- with total of -4-Tl:- judges.

?f

JUSTICE COURTS
i-&(Twith total of -1-fTt judges.

9'.3

'lfi

Jurisdiction
Civil- $15,000 or less.
Small Claims--$750 ox less.
Cricinal--Misdemeanors & infractions.
Appeals--To ~ppellate Department of
Su~erior Court.

_

Ci~il--$15,000 or

I
.•

_,...._ __.,._

·--·---~-

'-.

lesa.

Small Clatms--$750 or less.
Criminal-Mis4emq.nora .& infractions.
Appeals--To A~pellate Depar~ent of
Superior Court.

LINE OF APPEAL
LINE OF DISCRETIONARY REVIEW
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Jurisdiction

I
I

i

JUDICIAL COUNCIL

a.

Powers of Judicial Council
The Judicial Council is the

California judicial system.

body of the

The Constitution

the Council to

improve the administration of justice by

judicial business and

making recommendations to the courts, making recommendations annually to
the Governor and the Legislature, and adopting rules

court adminis-

tration, practice and procedure not inconsistent with statute.

The

Council also exercises other functions provided by law (Const., Art. VI,

I 6).

The staff agency of the Council is the Administrative Office of

the California

Courts~

which assists the Couucil and

Chairperson in

carrying out their duties under the Constitution and laws of this state
(Cal. Rules of Court, Rule 991).
b.

Chairperson of the Judicial C~!::>ncil ·
The Chief Justice of California is Chairperson of the Judicial

Council.

The Constitution imposes on her the duty to expedite judicial

business and equalize the work of the judges and to provide for the
assignment of any judge to another court,

only

consent if the court is of lower jurisdiction.
assigned with their consent to any court.

the judge's

Retired judges may be

Judges must report to the

Chairp..er_son aa she directs conc:_erning the condition of judtc:.ial business
in their courts, must cooperate with the Council and must hold court as
assigned.

(Const., Art. VI, f 6.)

Assignment of judges from courts with

light caseloads to those with crowded calendars has helped greatly to
reduce congestion and delay in the courts.

More than

2~000

judicial

assignments are issued by the U,;.irperson annually.
c.

Hemhership of Council
A Judicial Council of 11 judges was established pursuant to a

1926 constitutional amendment.

The Constitution was amended in 1960 to

provide for a Council of 18 members and in 1966 the number was increased
to 21 members.

The Council now consists of the Chief Justice of California,

one associate justice of the Supreme Court, three judges of Courts of
Appeal, five judges of superior courts, three judges of municipal courts,
two judges of justice courts, four attorneys, and one member of each

bouse of the Legislature.

The Chief Justice is Chairperson and_appoints
-1908

terms.

the

one

to serve on
incurred
Courts is

Administrative Director of
~les

of

Court~

Rule

d.
for an

Courts.

The

is the staff agency

to

carry out Council

assists

the Council
procedural rules and constitutional
lation staff that assists
menting the Council's
measures affecting the

that

develops programs directed toward

management

problems of the courts on a statewide

to court

use of proven business and

a sta-

tistical research staff

jul.l•·'-'.&..<::~.1.

statistics.

trative Office

Legislature on the need

prepares

to the
state funds

additional judges;

educefor all courts
admir.lstraticu.
e.

c~~

local

f0r state

(S~e

and serves as a liaison

for

tion 3nd court manag€ment

judicial

Cal. Rules of Court, Rules

.)

California Rules of Court
The Judicial Council has adopted rules of court administration.

practice and procedure for
California Rules of Court.
Supr~e

th~

various courts which are published as the

They consist of the Rules on Appeal to the

Court and Courts of Appeal; Rules on Appeal to the Superior

Court; Rules for the Superior Courts; Rules for
Rules for the Justice Couzts; Rules for

Censure~
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Municipal Courts;
Removal, Retirement or

Judicial

Rules
cases,
uniform
broadcasting in
bas also
Judicial

AUJJu.t<J.

siding j
trial court adminis

the use of
rity;

examination

ceasing of civil and
management
under
~onvictions

on a verdict or
Rules of Court,
prehensive set
use in

Council has
all family law

also many other

and criminal

court

Cal. Rules

needed

forms has been of

uniformity in local court
cantly in the development

From time to time these
to further simplify court

state.

automated court

are revised
to

of justice.

f.
courts are compiled by the Judicial Council

which

courts are
Council in

the

n.u.m.L.u..o..~:~

contain a

system.
g.
a survey

resulted in

re-

qui ring

Biennial
Pursuant
made a

ment vas
was reduced

courts

some

of them
municipal

au-

thority by statute to divide
change the
§

71040). ·The Judicial Council is

Code
of

submitting ita
consolidation and
creating a greater

the work of the

the

tice
t:eenth

autothe

mobile accident
such cases
handling
results of this study

were
Biennial

reported to the 1961
Report (1961) 17-80).
More recently, the

has

General

the
of numerous

Revision of the Judicial Article
made comprehensive
court jurisdiction

as state

the

Courts of

It has

Constitution.
of the

an

to the 1972 Legislature the

tt'ial court

system and an area adminis

structure

re-

search included projects to maximize

by the

courts; to determine the

solution to
to test

the problems of

for
, s ct'imin.al pro-

handling minor traffic offenses; to compare
cedures with

recommended by the American Bar

; to

provide experienced representation

to

improve.California 1 s

criteria for

determining branch court loc.s.tions; to
porters in

to using re-

courLs; to

impu.ct of billE a·•J.::tit:
for measuring

to measure

judicial

:.slative co11.sideration; to este:,

and to

s

&.

basis

a method

for assessing a court 1 '-' n"'eds fo:c judicial manpower.
Far a complete review of all Judicial Council studies, see the
Judicial Council biennial and annual reports, beginning with the first
report in 1927, and the A.O.C. Newsletter published bimonthly by the

Administrative Office of the Courts.
h.

Council-Sponsored Institutes, Seminars and Workshops for Judges
The Legislature in 1961 enacted a completely revised juvenile

court law Which provided that the
ences for juvenile

com~e- j

Council

and referees
-194-

12

hold confer&

Inst. Code

§

569).

.,.,....
t

(

The first

was

.)

June 1962.
Several
of the proceedings
tributed to all juvenile court
Code, enacted pursuant to

the
seminars

Council also
orientating judges to new j

of

new developments in the law and
dure.

.................... "- proce-

Statewide sentencing institutes

under

1965 and

the Judicial Council's

1973 and Judicial Council institutes

court

judges concerned with traffic and

ects were

between 1964
2.
published and distributed to
Workshops for judges in

were
courts.
courts as well as

for presiding judges of superior and

w~•"~~-·

for Court of
of calendar

Appeal judges are usually held each

Drug Abuse

management and court administration.
Institute and a s
tration were conducted in
In 1973, the

in court adminis-

workshop on data
2 with

funds.

Council

a

grant to

establish a Center for Judicial Education and Research.
now governed by a board

The Center is

members are jointly chosen by the Cali-

fornia Judgea P..esociat.i.on and the Judicial Council.

In the same year,

the Judicial Council assigned responsibility

organization of

judicial education pr:ograms to the Center 11 and since then. the Center
has organized several sentencing institutes, and institutes for juvenile
court

j~dges

and for municipal and justice court judges.

The Center

also is developing benchbooks for judges of the various trial courts and
is presenting orientation programs for newly appointed judges.

The

Center also presents an annual college session.
The Judicial Council will continue to organize workshops for
judg~s

on topics relating to court administration.
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a
on

re-

moval, retirement or

or
mie-

conduct

duties,

habitual
justice that
of a permanent

may

• , Art. VI

of his duties
hearings and

admonish or recommend to

which has

Court,

be removed

office or

he be censured.

complaints,

Tne

of

by the

to the Supreme Court

review of the

's

court were adopted by the Judicial

by that
Court,

1

Rules 901-922).
Tne Commission consists of
preme Court, two lawyers

two public members

the
Senate.

(Conat., Art. VI, § 8.)

the State Building,

tete

and

are not lawyers or j

nor and approved by

years.

Su-

Sat~

the Gover-

The terms of all me:mn:ers are four

The Commission

Francisco,

an office in

an

officer.

COMMISSION ON JUDICIAL APPOINTM.E:f:.."'TS

Following a 1934 amendment to Article VI of the Constitution,
all appointees of the Governor to the
must be confirmed by a commission now
Appointments.

Court

Courts of Appeal

Commission on Judicial

The Commission consists of the Chief Justice, the Attorney

General, and the senior presiding justice of the Court of Appeal of the
appellate district affected (Const., Art. VI, § 7).
Court

appoint~e

When a Supreme

is being considered, the senior presiding justice,

statewide, of the <;curta of Appeal becomes the third member.

The Commission convenes when

Governor nominates or ap-

points a person to fill a Supreme Court or Court of Appeal vacancy.
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Before confirmation the Commission, which holds veto power over the
nomination or appointment, conducts one or more public hearings to
review the person's qualifications.

The Commission may also ask the

State Bar to make a formal investigation.

No appellate appointment is

final until the Commission has filed its approval with the Secretary of
State (Const., Art. VI, § 16).
Other California Organizations in Judicial Administration
CALIFORNIA JUDGES ASSOCIATION
The California Judges Association is the professional organization of judges of courts of record in this state.

It formulates prin-

ciples of ethical conduct for judges that are set forth in the Code of
Judicial Conduct (see Cal. Rules of Court, Appendix).

Additionally,

the Association conducts educational workshops for judges and sponsors
and reviews legislation affecting the judiciary.
fice is located at:

The Association's of-

Suite 416, Fox Plaza, 1390 Market Street, San

Francisco, California 94102.
STATE BAR

OF CALIFORNIA

The State Bar of California is a public corporation in the
judicial branch of government.

All attorneys licensed to practice law

in California must be members of and pay annual fees to the State Bar
(Canst., Art. VI, § 9; Bus. & Prof. Code§§ 6008, 6008.2, 6140 et seq.).
The State Bar examines all candidates for admission to the
practice of law and certifies to the Supreme Court those who meet the
admission requirements.

The State Bar also formulates and enforces

rules of professional conduct that, upon approval by the Supreme Court,
become binding upon lawyers.

Additionally, it investigates allegations

of misconduct by attorneys.

The State Bar may impose private or public

reprovals and may recommend to the Supreme Court that an attorney be disciplined by suspension or disbarment.

These penalties can only be imposed

by the Supreme Court.
The State Bar administers programs for certification of law
specialists, law corporations, and lawyer referral services, and it

15
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enforces the law prohibiting legal practice by unauthorized persons.
The State Bar aids in the administration of justice and at
each legislative session the State Bar sponsors measures to improve laws
and the justice system.

It also investigates and reports to the Governor

on the qualifications of persons being considered by the Governor for
appointment to judicial office.
The State Bar, through University of California Extension,
sponsors California Continuing Education of the Bar, a self-supporting
educational program for practicing attorneys.
Headquarters of the State Bar are located at:
Street, San Francisco, California 94102.
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555 Franklin

EXHIBIT J

STATE Of CAliFORNIA

COMMISSION ON G

RNMENT

EFORM

(916) 445-8582

Sute Capitol, Room ~1-45
~cumento, CA SS614

IFA'{Sd!JIAL OF TASK FORCE POOJECI FJ,FDRT
Date:

October 4, 1978

TO:

Committee on: _1_ Proposition 13
_Tax System

C.

FR011:

Comnission Staff

SUBJECT:

Report on Project No.-

___ Expenditures
_Organization

I-11
---------------------------

Attached {s the report on the above noted project as received from
the Task Force. Copies of the report have also been provided to
members of the Task Force and to the State library for public
reference.
lhe Conmission Staff wishes to offer the following comments on this
repor·t:

cc:

Ot~er Con~ission

Menbers

Stoff {3). files (2), State library (3), Task Force Nembers (7)
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EDMUND G. IIIOWN Jlt., Governor

rAn: OF CMII'OitNIA

~EPARTMENT

OF fiNANCE

~et.AMENTO

October 2, 1978

Mr. A. Alan Post, Chairman
Commission on Government Reform
State Capitol, Room 1145
Sacramento, CA 95814
Dear Mr. Chairman:
The task force group for Project I-11, "Transfer of Program Responsibility

from Local Government to the State--Courts," is pleased to submit its final
report.
We have endeavored to provide you with a concise and objective report on the
fiscal alternatives and implications of the State•s assumption or financing of
all or selected elements related to the existing trial court system.
We are available to answer any questions you or your Commission members may
have concerning this study.

Re~~ecyu

lly:{t}/•

/MC( -,

~harles

~r---__.

~~per, Chairpe~

Program Budget Manager
Department of Finance
445-5332

64238
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TRANSFER OF PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITY
FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT TO THE STATE--COURTS
(PROJECT I-ll)

THIS REPORT HAS BEEN PREPftRED BY A TASK FORCE OF KNOWLEDGEABLE INDIVIDUALS
REPRESENTING DIVERSE INTERESTS AND POINTS OF VIEW FOR DISCUSSION AND USE BY
THE CO~iiSSION ON GOVERNMENT REFORM. THE REPORT DOES NOT REPRESENT THE VIEWS
OR OFFICIAL POSITION OF THE COMMISSION, ITS COMMITTEES, OR INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS.
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I

TRANSFER OF PROGRAM
GOVERNMENT TO

Aros
Western C

Rudo

on law

Ra 1ph Gampe l1

Administrative Director
Cal ornia Courts
Judicial Council
Charles C. Harper, Chairperson
Department of Finance

Warren Marsden, Retired
Admin
ative Office of the Courts
J icial Counc 1
Richard T
Chief Counsel
.
Senate Judiciary Committee
Steven Zehner
County Supervisors Association of California
y·

Note: The i ividual
ers of this Task Force
not necessarily support
.all of the various proposals contained herein and do
purport to represent
the views of the organizations by whom they are employed.
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tria 1

INTRODUCTION
on

1s
~

·-

transferri

several feasible
exist

res pons i bi1 i
the State. The S

cons

-tri

Court

in this

A

are funded

report si nee

is examini

existing and alternative court

be reporti

on potential economies

proposed would

procedures, and wi11

efficiencies.
the current

i

Although this report is pr
system could be

force

options

nancia1ly supported

, and

ire changes in

options

accounting procedures of the courts. To
suggested the need for change in t

exi

task force

cou

i

ive of ensur

considered such changes from the pers

icient program

management and control under various levels of State

i

sible in a

To gain as broad an input as

short time,

Y.-

force meetinas were held in Sacramento and San Francisco.
"'

broad base of knowledge and experience provided
outside i ntere

parties

ir

offered

t

by

In addition to the

the task force members,
and expertise to assist the

task force were invited to attend so that their ideas could

considered.

Participants included representatives from the California Judges 1 Association,
iation of California.

the Assembly Office of Research, and

financial data was provided from several sources and considerable
time was devoted to reconciling· differences to arrive at an acceptable level
of accuracy.

Sources of

d~ta

1nc1uded a Judicial Council telephone survey

conducted in June 1978; the 1976-77 •Annual Report, financial Transactions
Concerning Counties of California," prepared

by

the Controller's Office; and

numerous telephone calls to the counties to verify information.
Appendix A.)
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(See

OPTION 2

of the 1977-78 actual exRenditures.

4

accounting, budgeting 2 and

reporti~

OPTION 5
puy-out Superior. Municipal and Justice Court judges' salaries.

-206-

IA

SYSTEM

Introduction

The California Judicial

cons sts of

Supreme Court, five

Courts of Appeal, 58 Superior Courts, 89 Municipal Courts, and 107 Justice
Courts.

The Superior. Municipal, and Justice Courts are trial courts. while

the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal are appellate courts that primarily

review trial court decisions.

The system is comprised of 260 courts and 1,178

authorized judgeships.
About 7.6 million cases, exclusive of traffic parking violations,
are filed each year.

Parki

violations annua 1y resu

cases. Over 14.6 million cases are disposed
annual cost of this system, exclusive of capi
over $400 million.

t

in another 9 million

each year by the courts.

The

outlay for facilities, is

Approximately $50 million is paid by the State and the

remainder by counties.

Appellate Courts
The Supreme Court is California's highest court) and its decisions
are binding on all other courts of this State.
Justice and six Associate Justices.

It is made up of the Chief

The only cases the Supreme Court must

hear are death penalty cases. The other cases are chosen by it for hearing
depending mainly on the importance of the matter presented, and whether there
is a conflict of decisions at some lower level.
comprise the bulk of the courts• workload.
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Nondeath penalty cases

Members of

Supreme

by

are

be confirmed by the

• and must
confi

ic

a justice serves until

next

on

e

i

ion

runs

for election on a nonpartisan ball
Regular sessions are

ld by

sco,

in

Angeles,

and Sacramento. The Court may also hold special sessions elsewhere.
In addition to its other responsibilities, the
the recommend

ons of

Court reviews

Commission on Judicial P

Bar of Californ a concerning, respectively,

dis

the State
judges and

plini

attorneys.
The Courts of Appeal are C ifornia s i
1

i

courts of review.

They have appellate jurisdiction when Superior Courts have original
jurisdiction, and in certain other cases prescribed by statute. like the
Supreme Court, they also have original jurisdi
proceedings.

,.-

The State is divided into five appe11

Court of Appeal with one or more divisions.
appoi

e1ec

n

Cou

on in various writ

stri

having a

of Appeal Justices are

same way as Supreme Court

ices.

The five

appellate districts have a total of 13 divisions and 56 authorized judgeships .

.. s.
-?OR-

rt s

The Superior

i

statute

original jurisdiction in all causes,
al courts {California

on

on

appeals from the Municipal and Justice

in

)

.

so hears

concu

t

Supreme Court and Courts

It

other

divis on

1

(California Constitution Article VI, Section 11).
jurisdiction with

i

1 in habeas corpus

proceedings and in those proceedings for

reli

mandamus, certiorari, and prohibition (California

i

in

re of

on Art ic 1e VI ,

Section 10).
There is a Superior Court in each

ies and

58

of·judges is fixed by the Legislature. There are

number

ed Superior

Court judgeships. These judges are e ec
nonpartisan ballot by voters of

ies are filled by

the~ounty.

appointment of the Governor.
The Superior Court generates revenue by means of

civil branch, and by means of fines, penalties and
in the criminal division.

ling

in its

i forfeitures assessed

All such revenues are transmitted to the county

treasurer for disposition according to statute (Penal Code Sections 1203.1 and
1307; Government Code Sections 24350, 24353, and 69994.6).
The primary expenditure of the Superior Court is salaries of court
personnel. The salary of judges is paid largely from State funds, with the
portion paid by the State dependent on the population of the county in which
the judge sits (Government Code Section 68206).

The salaries of all other

Superior Court personnel are paid by the counties.
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c1

ior

z

judgeships,

ce

Since January 1,

jurisdiction. The juri

i cti on

1y

controversy is
criminal

1

of Civil Procedure Sec

on

).

1 c aims

in

cases

Sections 116

)

1 11

.
ce

ici

t

t

ony cases

pre 1imi nary hearings in

e

and probable cause to hold a

i

or

i

in

Superior Court {Penal Code

ce

Revenue is
from bail forfei

from fees

performed and

l

n

s

i nes,

ces
i

vil

the county treasury and s

revenue s

i

d1

districts, the county
Code Sections 1463,

71006).

Counties are

ce Court

s ble

ar es.

judges and support personnel, incl

costs

The State pays the employer's contri

for Municipal Cou

judges.

Ju

ice

by the counties.
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j

i

are paid

The pOHers

r·.
'f.,

boards of

expressly granted by the California Consti

isors are l

ted to those

on or by statute, toget

with

powers that arise by implication from those expressly granted. These powers
include authority to divide the Superior Court into not more than 11 judicial
districts (Government Code Sections

and 69645).

also include the

authority to divide the Municipal and Justice Courts into as many distric
public convenience requires (Government Code Section 71040}.

as

Boards of

supervisors must provide the trial courts with suitable rooms and facilities
for.their operation {Government Code Sections 68073, 71002, and 25351.3(a)).
When the population exceeds 40,000, a Municipal Court is established in that
district.

Justice Courts are established in a11 judicial districts having a

population of 40,000 or less {California Constitution, Article VI,
Section 5).

Superior, Municipal, and Justice Court judges are elected on a

nonpartisan ballot by voters of the judicial districts in which their courts
are located.

Vacancies in the Office of Superior and Municipal Court Judges
y·

are filled, between elections, by the Governor.

Vacancies in the Offices of

Justice Court judges are filled by county boards of supervisors or by vote at
a special election (Government Code Sections 71180.3 and 71600).
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the task

costs rel
:aspects of cou

i

fiscal, st
costs (see Appendix A

co

1.

2.
3•

.

5.
6.

,""~

The task force con

sev

arriving at the
that the most
financi

i

ic

and then discuss

on (
ariou

with the major issues
deals

th sever a p

selection.

s

ec

In addition, 1t

own propos a1 with

e

a1

its

11

s

i

data

options meet with Coornission

preferred methods of fi nanc i a1 p
advantages the other a1

ir

s as

le

icipation (

atives

)t it

2 2

seems

have

that the fiscal realities

1

approach. This is

t

primary reason that the task force did not select one option as the "best or
11

,..,-

only way to go.
I. Methods of Financial Participation
A. Buy-Out
•suy-Out" is defined as the permanent transfer of the local court
costs of the county to the

Stat~,

with a resulting increase in the

State's authority to supervise court operations.
The major considerations in dealing with the buy-out proposal are:

1. Buy-Out would permanently shift these costs from the property
tax to State revenues, and would permit both the counties and
the State to plan ahead.
2. Would impose major new supervisorial duties upon the Judicial
Council and other State agencies.
3. Would reduce counties' overhead costs and would add some
comparable amount

{g~ter

or lesser) to the Judicial Council's

-

budget for additional management costs.
4. Would ensure equality of services statewide, but probably at an
additional cost.
5. Would open the way to reforms in court organization and
procedures.
6. Would create a more uniform system--court procedures,
accounting systems, reporting methods, etc., should vary less
from county to county.
7. Could create a more flexible system in which emp1_oyees, even
judges, could be freely shifted to meet work demands.
'
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I

8.

ce

d

would

un

with li

le or no increase in

The major cons
1.

ions in

are:

Ba l-Out would

varyi
demonstrated needs

1

i
the cou

could impede county f seal

es

owever

anni

is

ause of the

resulting uncertainty
2.

Could be based on a simple

of 1977-78 cos

la

exibility

as a

ven

3.

Would require a

n

over

1

court programs.

4.

Would require,

thus

d

aniz

,. court

with respect

on and

res,

employees.

5.

Would continue disparities in the levels of services
counties.

6.

Would retain the present degrees

loca 1

1

responsiveness.

C. Reimbursement
This approach involves
determined

be

payment in arrears for costs
nanci

eligible for

p

ion bas

ic

on c 1aims submit ted to the State. '
All of the points discussed under the bail-out
apply to the reimbursement method

()

th

counties wou 1d face a cast¥ flow prob i em.

ternative would
itiona1 problem
is,

expenditures for the programs, submit claims and
rather than being provided funds as or

would
paid in arrears

expenditures are

The task force does not favor this method for fiscal participation
by the State. Reimbursement offers no positive advantages over the
bail-out method, would contribu

to the

ies 1 cash

ow

problems, and would be more costly to imp ement due to the
complexity of the claims process.
D.

Shared Revenue
This would involve providing funds to counties on a block grant
basis with strings attached to require a given level of service in
the court system.
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The task force

d

s potenti

i

method of

nancing.

If

ss on

isl
on a shared

that local governmental
revenue basis, there appears

maki

requirements for- the court system.

county board of supervisors

should have reasonable authority to
a priority basis.

special

locate

revenue funds on

In addition, Government

provides a mechanism to assure

on 68073
a reasonable level of

funding.
II.

E1ements of the System
A.

Superior

r

J

)

The Superior Courts are funded by the counties except for the major
·portion of judges• salaries, an

,000

State for each Superior Court

ock grant from the
after January 1,

ip

1973, and the employer cohtribution to the Judges 1 Retirement Fund

(8 percent of salary).
Bu1-0ut Issues

1.

Enhancing the author ty of the Judici
channel of supervision

communi

and the Legislature to the courts in

Council

serve as a

ion from the Admini
various counties.

Council could enforce efficient management

ion

The

actices, and could

also assume new duties. such as the preparation of each court
budget for submission to the Department of Finance.
2.

Determining the bas1s for compensating counties for the use of
their courthouse facilities.
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3.

s

i

id

State

:'f

comni

oners,

Comment:
This

1

the Superior

_.

B.

Munici

The Munici

es

except for

F

which is provided
Buy-Out Issues
1.

Sh

i

the au

i t

boundaries from
Counc i1

sors

th, as an

, some

1 is

ici a1
ve

confirmation.

()

-s1on
.

State

2.

Enhanci

3.

Determining a formula

cou

ies

Determining which of

'

if

become State employees.
Comnent:
The task force recommends

out

1nc 1

Municipal and Superior Cou

c.

t

i1 t es.

use of courthouse
4.

i1.

Justice Courts (108 Judges)
Justice courts are presently
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t

cou

ies.

s

d

Buy-Out Issues
1. Shifting the power

appoi

Justice Court

county boards of supervisors
2.

from the

Governor.

Shifting the authority to draw justice court ~r~~rfct boundaries
from

3.

jt;D:;'J!.'S

county boards of supervisors

J~icia1 Council.

Enhancing State supervision by the Judicial Co';~.cil..

4. Determining a formula for the compensation of the counties for
the use of courthouse facilities.
5.

Determini
State

which of the supporting employees should become

loyees--i.e., clerks, constables, etc.

Co!1111ent:

fll

Since Justice Courts are more significantly a creation of loca1
government than the other trial courts, the task force believes that
a usefu1 buy-out proposal could exclude them. How~ver, if the money
is available, the task force recommends that the entire court system
be part of any buy-out propQsa1 •
.D.

District Attorneys
District attorneys are presently funded enti
~ux-Out

1.

b)' the counties.

Issues

Determining how effective State supen~s~:;:'l, ~tssitated by the
State

nding, could be imposed upon t"'e :ist···~~ &!torneys who

are local elected officials.
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2.

.

lee
would

:s-·
1

s

Cl

3.

and, in

s of

ies

county counsels,

nue

serv

paid by

4.

Decid

whether

siveness

str

s

responsiveness

if so,

1t could or

IFj

........:

5.

Dec

ing

employees would b
they would

a.

a

ec
t

i

attorney or

e1ec

b• Cou 1d a 1oc a
supervise

ectively

s

ties

are S

1oyees?

Corrrnent:

Because District Attorneys are ocal elected officials, and
because of the problems connec
recommends that they not be part
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therewith, this task force
buy-out proposal.

E.

i

1.

or

•

2.

3.

ld

1d

s

add

4.

t

re

This

force

inc 1

ld

in

are

aware th
and di

1ct

ons

icy

F.

Prob

on
ion

County

rely

es.
various

investi

sian

Buy-Out Issues
1..

on of

Decidi
be

nanced

on

ions should

the S
ons are an i

sentencing process,

1 part of

to felony

sentencesj shou d

igations be

dered a p

funded

State if the court for

i

such invest

by

the

ions are

completed is so
b.

If this function of

State-funded,
2.

ion

is

>'-

State-funded?

sho~ld

1d become State

Deciding whether any probation
.employees, or whether the State

ld

wi

the

counties to provide investigatory or other services.
Corrrnent:
This task force recommends
of the county prob

on

presentence inve igations

ion department be part

any buy-out proposal,

that a11 probation employees remain county_emp1oyees, and that the
State funding be handled

by

means of contracting for services with

the county departments.
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III.
X

cons
1

)

Th

.
ons

an

ict

Oi
ec

i c reason

spec

s

discussion
defender,

on

ve

n

the el

pub 1i c

on is direc

funding

the dis

recorrrnend

ion wou 1d

i cia 1

1 c

i
11.

tant sp 1it

concern over

this

The task force is aware

the

exity of standardizing employment on

a statewide basis. Appendix C, regarding current retirement systems as

well as

necessity to

wi

varying salary levels serves to

illustrate that the employment issue will not be an easy one to solve.
The ~obey Reportl1 dealt briefly wi this issue but also did not
solve this problem.

It will undoubtedly be necessary to provide for a

phase-in approach to resolving the employment problem.
OPTION 2
Bux-Out the Superior, Municipal, and Justice Courts including transfer
of employees to the State system ($375.8 million transfer from county to
State).
If sufficient funds are not available for Option 1, the task force
recommends that a buy-out include these elements. This option would
en~ure

that all personnel immediately associated with the operation of

the trial courts would be funded by the State.
not cover all three levels

o~trial

If available funds would

courts, Justice Courts could be

omitted because of their inherently local nature.
OPi!ON 3
Bail-Out (as a temporary expedient} the cost of Superior, Municipal and
Justice Courts; District Attorney; Public Defender (presentencing
probation costs}, or any combination thereof, based on a percentage of
the 1977-78 actual expenditures (up to $673.1 million transfer from
county to State).
This is a flexible option which can be adjusted to accommodate the
availability of any level of funding.

By adjusting the percentage of

1977-78 costs that are to be assumed by the State, any dollar figure can
lf"Report of the Advisory Commission to the Joint Committee on the Structure
of the Judiciary,• October 18, 1975.
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I

Cost

X

.8

(

or $5

i

A.

.2 mi 11 ion

transfer from
al involves

is

courts, but the cou

ass

es wou d

the

option

s.

State
overs

i nvo 1vement 1

propos

)

bi ity for the

s

isms

bai -out

differs

li

se

es. The

s more permanent

nature.
y·

OPTION 5

excess

($29.9 million

State's

).

This option

1

Comn iss ion's consi

avail

cu

le

on i

one of

from the standpoint

substant1ve program changes.
does not recommend t

t

t

Judges' Retirement System.

t

ice

so

desi

1e

as 1t involves no

easy

In consi

are not

ci

ev

ous
be

for the

is

nanc

this option the task force

i
j

be transferred to the

That system currently has a substantial

unfunded liability and such a transfer would increase the unfunded
liability.
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JUSTICE SYSTEM COSTS

4r·

RESOURCES

Justice System Costs
The total estimated 1978-79 Justice System Costs 21 of $790.9 million
includes both the counties' costs of the Trial Courts, County Public Defender,
District.Attorney and Probation (Presentencing), as well as the State's share

of ·trial

court costs.

A complete summary of Justice System Costs appear in

Appendix A.
The estimated counties' operational costs of the trial courts for
1978-79 are as follows:

Superior Courts

$136.9 million

Municipal Courts

224.5 million

Justice Courts

14.4 million

Total

$375.8 million

State contributions for the operation of the Courts for 1978-79 are as
follows:

y·

Superior Court Judges• Salaries
Judges' Retirement Contributions

$22.5 million

8.0 million

.3 million

Assigned Judges
Block Grants

3.8 million

Supreme Court

3.3 million

Court of Appeals

12.3 million

Court Appointed Counsel

.8 million

Justice Courts Temporary Judgeships
Total

~million

$51.6 million

Grand Total, State and County

$427.4 million

l7Inc1udes Superior, Municipal and Justice Courts as we11 as court-related
services of county clerks, bai1iffing, ancilliary court services, county
public defender, district attorney, and probation (presentencing).
-22-225-

Trial Court Revenues
Three major sources of revenue were identified in the State
Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report--Financial Transactions Concerning
Counties of Ca1ifornia (1) fines, forfeitures, and penalties, (2) civil
11

process service fees, and (3) court fees and costs.
The combined estimated total trial court revenues for 1978-79 is $279.0
million.

Approximately $139.6 million is

r~tained

by counties, $96.6 million

goes to cities, and $42.8 million goes to the State.
Of the $139.6 million that goes to counties, approximately $30.9
million is restricted as to use per Vehicle Code Section 42201 and
approximately $68.6 million of the $96.6 million for cities is restricted as
to use per Vehicle Code Section 42200.

The State's portion of $42.8 million

is largely earmarked for driver education, road improvements, peace officer
training and fish and game conservation.
In addition to the major revenue sources identified in the State
Controller•s
Counties,~~

11

1976-77 Annual ReportYof Financial Transactions Concerning

there are additional revenues (Federal/State grants,

reimbursements, etc.) collected by the Public Defender, District Attorney and
Probation; however, due to the lack of readily available fiscal data for these
sources of funds, these estimates have been omitted from this study.

A major factor to be considered with

~y

proposed State financing

option would be the possible reallocation of existing trial court revenues
(see Appendix B).
ln view of the limited time that the Task Force had to deal with this
entire report, there was not sufficient time to deal in depth with the
extremely sensitive and complex issues associated with the reallocation of
revenue.
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The task force concurs with the observations contained in the 1971
Booz-Allen & Hamilton report "California lower Court Study" which stated:
The value or priority o{ such programs as driver education,
road improvements, peace officer training, and fish and
game conservation may change but their funds from court
revenues continue unless the distribution formula is
altered. Therefore, these programs are not subject to the
same scrutiny as those governmental programs which must
compete for general funds at the State, county, or city
level and do not have special earm~rked revenues which can
be used to help defray their costs.
The court revenue distribution system in its present form
allows all governmental units who share in these revenues
to profit, to some extent, from the volume of court
business. This condition conflicts somewhat with accepted
court financing objectives, which seek to divorce court and
related criminal justice or other program expenditures
completely from the revenues generated by the courts.
The questionnaire survey recommended in Appendix A should also include
the collection trial court revenues so that current and accurate revenue data
can be obtained.

-24-227-

APPENDIX A

SUMMARY OF ESTIMATED 1978-79
LOCAL GOVERNMENT COURT COSTSl/

Superior
Court
1976-77 Actual Cos~/
Estimated IndirjCt Costs
(20 percent )l
Estimated Total 1976-77
Actual
Estimated 1977-78
(15 percent growth)
Estimated 1978-79
(10 percent growth)
Estimated 1978-79
Bailiffing Costs
Total Estimated 1978-79

Municipa 1
Court

Justice
Court

Total Court
Costs

$80,593,242

$139,994,149

$11,334,581

$231,921,972

16,118,648

27,998,829

2,266,916

46,384.393

$96,711,890

$167,992,978

$13,601,497

$278,306,365

111,218,673

193,191,924

122,340,540

212,511,116

13,601, 497!/
41
13,601,497

14 1 510 1 034

12 1 008 1 304

7901020

27 J 308 1 ~.5!;i_

$13628502574

$22425191420

$1413912517

$375 1761 J 5Jl

318,012,094
348,453,153

y-

!!Includes direct and indirect costs of Superior, Municipal and Justice Courts,
court related services of county clerks, bailiffs (to the extent that counties
reflected these costs under the courts) and ancillary court services. Excludes
grand jury costs (1976-77. actual $2.0 million) as task force felt the majority
of these costs were not related to court activities, and fixed assets
(miscellaneous furnishings and equipment) 1976-77 actual $718,000. Also not
reflected is approximately $930,000 (1976-77 actual) for jury commissioners that
was not included under the respective courts in the State Controller's "1976-77
Annual Report, Financial Transactions Concerning Counties."
£/source--State Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report, Financial Transactions
Concerning Counties." Since 11 Staff Benefits" are not reflected under the
respective budget units, (i.e •• they are reported under "Other General .. ), a
derived basis was used to determine and allocate these costs.
3/Represents Countywide Support Services costs allocated to budget units.
!IGrowth factors were not app 1i ed to "Just ice Courts" which have experienced a
decline in numbers and filings due to conversions and conso11dations in recent
years.

6427B
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SUMMARY OF COMBINED (STATE AND COUNTIES'}
COURT SYSTEM COSTS!/
Estimated
1978-79

Counties' Share:
Superior Court

$136,850,574

Municipal Court .

224,519,420
14,391,517

Justice Court
Subtota 1

$375,761,511

State's Share:
Superior Court Judges' Salaries $22,471,546

()

Judges' Retirement Contribu~ipns
Assigned Judges

8,036,461 b/
300,000

Block Grants

3,840,000

Supreme Court

3,260,625

Courts of Appeal

12,280,845

Court Appointed Counsel

775,000

Justice Courts Temporary
563,700

$51.528,177

Total Estimated 1978-79 Court System Costs

$427,289,688

Judgeships

a7£xclusive of Capita1 Outlay Expenditures.
b/lncludes $3,488,052 to cover the estimated deficiency between receipts and
- disbursements in 1978-79.

A-2
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ESTIMATED 1978-79 COUNTY COSTS
FOR PUBLIC DEFENDER, DISTRICT ATTORNEY
~~D PROBATION (PRESENTENCING ONLY)

PUBLIC DEFENDER
Total 1976-77 Actuall/ Amount

$45,945,444

Estimated Staff Benefits (13 percent)

5,972,907

Estimated Indir~ct Costs
(20 percent)Y

8,537,026

Total Estimated 1976-77 Costs

$60,455,377

Total Estimated 1977-78 (15 percent growth)

-

Total Estimated 1978-79 (10 percent growth)
Less State Reimbursements1/

69,523,683
76,476,051
7751000

Net Estimated 1978-79 Costs4/

$75,701,051

1/source--State Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report of Financial Transactions
Concerning Counties." Excludes court appointed counsel which is reflected
under the respe~tive court budgets.
£/Indirect cost estimate based on budgeted expenditures of 24 counties with
Public Defenders' offices. The remaining counties generally rely on
contract services for court-appointed counsel and may not have a budget
unit to which countywide administrative costs could be allocated.
3/As provided by Penal Code Section 987.6.
~Excludes State reimbursement for the cost of investigations associated with
the defense of capital cases as provided by Penal Code Section 987.9. At
the tim~ Chapter 1048/77 was enacted, the annual cost was estimated to be
Sl million. However, since actual cost data was not available, and
because of the uncertainty as to the magnitude of total costs, the figures
in this report do not include an amount for this purpose.

64278
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•

DISTRICT ATTORNEY!/
.· .

1976-77 Actual Cost~

$129,146,304

Estimated Staff Benefits
(13 percent )11

16~789,019

Estimated Indir;ct Costs
(20 percent).i

25,829,260

Total Estimated 1976-77 Costs

$171 '764, 583

Estimated 1977-78 Costs
(15 percent growth)

197,529,270

Estimated 1978-79 Costs
(10 percent growth)

$217,282,197

l7Represents all D.A. costs includi~- Criminal Investigation and Prosecution;
Public Administration and Family Support. Does not include any city
attorneys' costs.
~Source--State Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report, Financial Transactions
Concerning Counties."
1/staff benefit rate derived from sample of county budgets and based on
total budget expenditures. See explanation under cost methodology.
!!Represents countywide support services costs allocated to budget units.
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PROBATION {PRESENTENCING ONLY)
1976-77 Actual Costs (Total Probation)l/

$258,611,524

Estimated Staff Benefits (15 percent)fl

38,791,728

Estimated Indirect Costs (20 percent}~

51,722,304

Total Estimated 1976-77 Costs

$349,

Estimated 1977-78 Costs (15 percent growth)

401,494,389

Estimated 1978-79 Costs (10 P.ercent growth)

441,643,827

Estimated 1978-79 Presentencing Costs~
(Estimated 16 percent of total
probation costs).

$70,663,012

1/source--State Controller's "1976-77 Annual Report, Financial Transactions
Concerning Counties.
Y ·
1/Staff benefit rate was derived from ·sample of county budgets and is b
on
total budget expenditures. See explanation under costing methodol
~/Represents Countywide Support Services costs allocated to budget uni s.
~?resentencing ratio of total probation costs was based on information
provided by ve county probation departments.
11

64278
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COSTING METHODOLOGY

The State Controller's •1976-77 Annual Report on Financial
Transactions Concerning Counties of California," served as the starting point
· ·estimating the 1978-79 cost of Superior, Municipal, and Justice courts,
County Clerks (court-related activities), District Attorney, Public Defender,
Probation (presentencing). The ba11iffing costs were estimated on the
s of budget year staff1 ng projections.
The Task Force group estimates that 70 percent of the County Clerks'
costs are court related. After making adjustments to the 1976-77 actual costs
staff benefits and countywide indirect costs and applying growth factors
15 percent and 10 percent respectively for 1977-78 and 1978-79, the

estimated 70 percent portion related to the courts was allocated on the basis
of the number of actual filings in 1976-77.
.

y·

The cost for bailiffing servfces is usually included 1n the Sheriff's
budget. However, some counties account for these costs under the respective
court receiving the service. Since the expenditure data reflected in the
ller's •1976-77 Annual Report of Financial Transactions Concerning
does not identify bail1ffing in either case,

s~aff

developed an

imate of statewide bailiff1ng cost for 1978-79, using the number of
ips and the average salary of a Deputy Constable, Deputy Sheriff I and
11 I. The bailiffing costs for justice courts reflects the frequency of
court sessions. To the extent that counties reported bail1ffing costs
courts, our estimate would be overstated.

A-6
-233-

und~r

Countywide Indirect Costs
order
the

reflect the total

costs

the justice

located central services costs of county government based on 1

actual costs was used to develop an average overhead rate of 20 percent whi
was then .applied to 1976-77 total actual direct expenditures.
overhead rate is derived by using salaries
since

Normal

wages as the base; however,

is data was not readily available an equivalent rate

ed on

expenditures was used.
Although counties direct charge some countywi

central service

s

to varying degrees, the majority of these costs are not direct-charged
would not therefore be reflected in the State Controller's "Annual Report
Financial Transactions Concerning Counties.••
The Countywide Central Service Plans typically include the cost

Purchasing and Clerical

,. . Equipment

Office Machine Maintenance

liability and Bonding Insurance

Stores

Budget Preparation and Execution

Accounting

Personnel

Auditing

Ccmnunications

Disbursements

Parking Lot Maintenance

Payroll

Record Retention

The

Service

Controller•s Annual Report

Financial Trans

consequently, staff used a sample of 1977

est

ntenance

Building Rent, Security and

Grant Coordination

staff

it rate for each

budgets

on.

A-7
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to·

on

ive an

respective rates were

lied to the 1976-77 actual costs for each function. As with the
irect costs rate the staff benefit rate was derived by using total budget
un

expenditures as the base as opposed to using Salaries and Wages as the
Staff benefits typically reflect the employer's contribution for
rement Benefits, Health Benefits, Social Security (OASDI) and Workers'

Compensation.
Growth Factor
After adjusting the 1976-77 actual expenditures for staff benefits and
countywide indirect co.sts, a growth factor of 15 percent was applied for
1977-78 and 10 percent for 1978-79. The 15 percent growth rate was felt to

represent a reasonable average increase in the total justice area. Staff
reduced this factor to 10 percent for 1978-79 in order to reflect the probable
impact Proposition 13 will have on county budgets in the judicial area.
1976-77 Actual Expenditures

,.-

It should be noted that although the State Controller provides each
with reporting forms and guidelines for reporting expenditures there
are numerous differences in how counties account for and therefore report
expenditure data. Consequently the total cost data reported for any
unit function may not accurately reflect the statewide cost of that
tion.

for example, some counties reflect the cost of bai1iffing under the
• a few report these costs separately while most include these costs in
Sheriff's budget unit. The aggregate summary classifications used in the

A-8
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Controller's Report precluded the isolation and identification of baili
costs reflected under the courts.

i

While this is considered to be a minor

amount, to the extent that counties reported these costs under the

st our

total estimated costs would be inflated.
·Given the limited time frame for completing this study, staff was
compelled to rely on readily available cost data, which did not
itself to verification and reconciliation.

ways 1

In some cases, staff relied

the expert judgment of Judicial Council staff, county auditors
administrative staff to estimate selected items of costs.

In those i

where more than one cost estimate was available, staff always favored
higher estimates.
Comprehensive Cost Survey
T.he general consensus of the task force group is that 1978-79
data contained in this report should be viewed as reflecting a reasonable
•ball park" estimate of the actual _posts that would be assumed by the

in

the event of a 11 bail-out" or ."buy-out." If it is the Comnission's intent
recommend an increase in the level of State funding, staff recomnends that a
comprehensive cost survey be made by Judicial Council.

is antic

more uniform and consistent reporting of revenue and cost data by
activity would be obtained from this survey.

Since counties will be

actual 1977-78 revenue and expenditures to
Government Fiscai

irs Division by October l

revenue and expenditure data would be available.

State Contro11er's

1978, more
Judici

Council

estimates that 60-90 days would be required to gather, summarize,
survey findi

s.
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al

on for justice court judges and nonjudicial

1es'

personnel.

so exc 1udes f i 1i ng fees a11 oca ted to Superior and

Municipal Judges' Retirement fund.
2. Health Benefits--Excludes State's contribution for Superior

Court judges and Municipal Court judges enrolled in a State
Health plan.
3. OASOI--Social Security--Reflects counties' share of OASDI for
judicial and nonjudicial employees.
4. Workers' Compensation--Since some counties are self-insured.

reflects· only those premiums paid by counties carrying Workers'
Compensation Insurance.
C. Service and Supplies:
The following items of costs are typically reflected in county
.budgets: communications, data processing, expert witness fees, jury
expense/jury commissioner, court reporter, transcripts, professional
services (appointed psychfitrists), transportation services,
conciliation court, witness fees, facilities--rent, maintenance and
uti·lities. and court-appointed counsel.

D. fixed Assets:
Includes expenditures for office machines, office fixtures (desks,
chairs, etc.). Excludes capital outlay expenditures.
II. County Clerks

A. Full-time and part-time salaries and wages, overtime and premium pay.

B. Staff Benefits:
Including counties' contribution to employee retirement, FICA,
health insurance, OASOI, and workers• compensation insurance.
A-ll
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DESCRIPTION OF JUSTICE SYSTEM COSTS

·The following description of costs. typically reflected in
budgets, is intended to provide Commission members with a general overview
the cost structure of the various justice system components included in

is

It is by no means an exhaustive or definitive listing as there is

study.

considerable variation among the counties in terms of the classification
accounting treatment of expenditures.
I.

Superior. Municipal, and Justice Courts
A.

Sal aries and Wages:
~ull-time

and part-time salaries and wages of judicial and

nonjudicial employees.
Court judges salaries.)

(Does not include State share of Superior
I~ludes

salaries and wages of judges,

judges• secretaries, court reporters, commis.sioners and
clerk administrators (law requires each municipal court

one

deputy clerk administrators such as supervisor staff, courtroom
clerks, working deputies, counter clerks, acting personnel, O.P.
personnel, microfilming personnel, etc.

B. Staff
Includes the counties': contribution

ic a

ic

employees not otherwise paid by the State.
1. Retirement and Death Benefits--Excludes the State's share
(8 percent) of Superior

Municipal
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judges.

1 ec

ice and supplies:
1. Communications/telephone services

2. Maintenance--equipment

3. Office expense
. 4. Postage

5. Data Processing Services
6. Rents--equipment

7. Microfilm supplies
8. Printing and binding
9. Transportation
10. Facilities rent (when applicable)

Fixed Assets--Includes equipment purchases and office furnishings

(desks, chairs, etc.). Excludes capital outlay.
b He Defender

Full-time and part-time salaries and wages, overtime and premium pay.
Staff Benefits:
Including counties' contr.ibution to employee retirement, FICA,
health insurance, OASDI, and workers' compensation.
Service and Supplies:

1. C001nunications
2. Insurance and Surety Bonds

Jury expense

4. Travel
5. Equipment maintenance

6. Office expense

7. Postage
8. Professional services

A·l2
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9. Data Processing

10. Rents--equipment
11. Rents--structures (when applicable)

12. Printing/binding
~~.

Transportation

D. ·Fixed Assets--Includes equipment and office furnishings
IV. District Attorney
A. Full-time and part-time salaries and wages, overtime and

urn

B. Staff Benefits:
Including counties' contribution to employee retirement, FICA,
health insurance, OASDI, and workers' compensation.

c.

•

Service and supplies:

1. Comnunications
2. Equipment--Maintenance
:

0

3. Office expenses
y·

4. Jury Expense

5. Transportation
6. Travel

7. Membership/Educational Expense
8. Reporter fees
9. Professional and Specialized Services

10. Rents and leases--Equipment
11. Rents·-Building (when applicable)

D. Fixed Assets--Includes equipment purchases and furnishings
cha1rs, etc.).

Excludes capital outlay expenditures.

A-13
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(

s,

Probation

ne)

A. full-time and part-time salaries and wages, overtime and premium pay.

B. Staff Benefits:
Including counties• contribution to employee retirement, FICA,
health insurance, OASOI, and workers• compensation.

C. Service and supplies:
1. Communications/telephone services
2. Maintenance·-Equipment
3. Medical-Dental-Lab Supplies

4. Office Expense
5. Postage

6. Professional and specialized services
7. Rents--equipment

8. Transportation

9. Rents--Building (when aQpl1cable}
>"

10. Auto mileage
11. Clothing and personal supplies/juvenile
12 •. Educationa1 expense

13. Printing and binding
0. Other Charges
1. Supply and care of persons

2. State Institutions

E. Fixed Assets--Includes office equipment and office furnishings.
Does not include capital outlay.

A-14
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TRIAl COURT REVENUES
ACTUAL 1976-77
ESTIMATED 1977-78
ESTIMATED 1978-79
1976-77
Actual

coonns!1
Fines, Forfeitures. Penalties
Vehtcle Code Ftnes
Other Court ftnes
Forfe1tures and Penalttes
Charges for Current Servtces
Clv 0 Process Services
Court fees and Costs
TOTAl

.

1978-79
Estimated

1977-78
Estimated

S61,665,137~/

$54,881,753
24,704,321
6,870,904

$58,174.658
26,186,580
7,283,159

6,747,104
31,048,739
1124,252,921

7,151,930
32,911,663
1131,107,9911.

$61,052,108
~,761,167

140,339
'SB5,953,6U

$64,715,234
26,246,837
148,759
S91,110,830

S68, 598,148!!/
27,821,647
157,684
196,571,479

$25,908,529
8,018,736
3,780,521
403,980
$3B.1I1 .765

$27,463,040
8,499,860
4,007,352
428,218
140,39S,'17U

$29,110,823
9,009,851 •
4.247,793
453,911
S4 2. 822. JllJ!./

$124,252,821
85,953,614
38,111,766

$131,707,990
91,110,830
40,398,470
S263,211,29t1

27,757,775
7,720,147

7,581,046
34,886,363
'Sl39,610,46!J

-ttnt:s!/
..

liP

"
I

N

·""'N·
I

F1nes and 'enalttes
Vehicle Code Fines
Other fines
Other Penalties
TOTAL

I

STATE OF' CAt lfO'RHIA~/

Penalttes on Trafftc Yiolattons
Orher Training
Peace Off1cers Training
Penalties on Cr1m1na1 Conv1et1ons
fish and Game Violation ftnes
TOTAL

•

~y

Counttes
C't1es
State

TOTAl

l?ll8,318,20I

$139,610,468
96,577,479
42,822,378
1219,010,325

~
"0

.,:s

a..

)(

~&Ge

State Controller's R~ts--Ftnanctal Transacttons Concerntng Counties and Cities. (Adjustment

to reflect San Francisco County under ~counties• instead of •cities.•
lclb1 Council.
percent Vehicle Code F~nes restr1cted as to use
Vehicle Code Section 42201.
1 Yehlcle Code floes restricted as to use per
le Code Section 42200.
1 St~te Trial Court Revenues restricted as to use by the statute oertainlnq to the resoecti~e funds
credited
these revenues.
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EXHIBIT K

OFFI E F THE LERK- ECOR E
County of Sacramento

J. A. SIMPSON, CLERK-RECORDER
November 10, 1981

ClERK'S OFIFICE
ROOM !01, l:I:CISTH STREET
SACfiAMIENTO, CA 1151114

441HHI22

JOYCE SMrTH
BOB UVEYAMA
SUPERVISING SUPERIOR
COURT CLERKS

RECORDER'S OFFICE
1!01 G STREET
SACRAMENTO, C:A 8!1814
44G-6334

HEIDI TSCHIRKY
ASST. COUNTY RECORDER

Mr. Ray leBov, Counsel
Assembly Judiciary Committee
State Capitol
Sacramento, California 95814
Dear Ray:
Thanks for the invitation to appear at the November 18th
hearing in San Francisco regarding "State Funding of the
Courts 11 •
As I mentioned previously, ~he County Clerks' Assoc1at1on has
conducted a survey of the current shortfall being made up from
local general funds. It looks to be in the neighborhood of
$190 million. In addition, I have tried to lay out costs
relative to court consolidation. Therefore, the attached
report deals with status quo funding and a hypothetical
version of court consolidation.
I will represent our association at the hearing and will be
accompanied by Carl Olsen, San Francisco County Clerk. Our
association takes no position on "State Funding of the Courts",
but rather we would provide information which we believe is
critical, should AB 1820 be amended and state funding become
a reality.

Sincerely,

Of.cp~~

~~~unty Clerk-Recorder
JAS:deh
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INTRODUCTION:
The County Clerks 1 Association appreciates the opportunity to provi
input regarding possible state funding of California trial courts.

The

Association has long recognized the fiscal problems facing the court system
and the obvious disparity between revenues and costs.

Based upon this

concern, the Association sponsored AB 2361 during the 1980 session which
became Chapter 1372.

The increase in fees helped somewhat to a11eviate

the shortfall between the cost of processing civil and probate cases and
the filing fee.
(Chapter

1049~

The deficit will grow after January 1, 1982, when SB 1152
1980 Stats.) goes into effect.

This legislation exempts

most subsequent probate, and some civil documents, from the $12.00 filing
fee.

As a result, the shortfall will widen next year and local government

will be required to subsidize this workload to a greater extent.
DISCUSSION:
In your counsel's October 13, 198i letter, inviting our association to
appear, three questions were posed regarding state funding:
1.

What costs ought to be included within the trial court budgets
if state funding is to occur?

2.

How should the fines and forfeitures collected by the courts be
distributed?

3.

How much authority should the state assume over job classifications,
salary levels, and workload standards of trial court personnel?

The County Clerks' Association takes no position on the desirability
of state funding for trial courts.

However, it wi11 provide fiscal data

to be considered if the committee wishes to proceed with state funding.

-1-
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Therefore, our input addresses two options:

(1) the situation remains

status quo, i.e •• funding of separate superior, municipal, justice courts

and county c1erks, and (2} the situation changes and courts are consolidated.

CURRENT FUNDING SITUATION:
The data presented below assumes that the state would leave the
current orgdnization as is and only pick up the shortfall.

It does not

address the question of what to do with fines and forfeitures, other than
continue the present distribution.
Since it is difficult to obtain fiscal information regarding cost
and revenue from any one source, the County Clerks' Association conducted
a survey of the 58 counties and asked for the following information from •
the FY 1980-81 budget:
1.

County cost of County Clerk, Superior, Municipal and Justice Courts.

2.

Total income generated.

3.

Net cost to the county.

Based upon a 69% response rate,

representing approximately 85% of

the population (40 counties reporting), the following results were obtained:

TOTAL COUNTY COST
$315,829,043

TOTAL COUNTY INCOME

NET COUNTY COST
$162,726,865

$153,102,178

The shortfall currently being subsidized by local government general
funds for these 40 counties is $163 million.

That is a "business as usual''

budget and does not consider additional and justified needs that have not
'

been funded.

No attempt was made to cost out any new judicial positions

and support staff that become effective January 1, 1982.
For the missing 18 counties, an attempt was made to project net cost
-2-245-

by comparing them to counties similar in population and total case filings.
This projection of net costs shows that another $26.4 million is being
subsidized in these 18 counties.

If the state desires to fund the trial

courts and leave the current organization and fines and forfeiture distribution as is, then it would cost an additional $190 million.
POTENTIAL FUNDING SITUATION - CONSOLIDATED COURTS:
Currently, there are two measures pet1ding in the legislature to
consolidate trial courts, and the POST Commission report of 1978
recommended some form of consolidation.

The Association believes that

the Assembly Judiciary Committee should not only consider "status quo"
funding, but also costs that would be associated with consolidation.

It~

is assumed that the question regarding the state's authority over job
classifications, salary levels and workload standards of trial court
personnel deals with possible consolidation.

Therefore, the Association

developed the hypothesis that all trial courts would be consolidated
into one state-wide system.

We did not consider the district attorney,

public defender or probation functions as part of

consolid~tion.

Our

cost estimates deal with those common features that would have to be
funded to successfully consolidate the trial courts.
Increase

l

$ 4.5 million

1.

One superior court - all judges elevated to
~ superior court judge status with a
boost in salary to that level

2.

Current court employees to become state employees
under a uniform salary and benefit schedule

30.0 million

3.

-Central indexing to merge superior, municipal
and justice court indicies

20.0 million

4.

Evening court schedule for selected counties
(1 night per week)

1.0million

S.

Increase in grand and trial court jurors pay,
plus boost in mileage allowance

3.0 million
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6.

Increase in witness fees in criminal cases

3.0 mi11ion

7.

Ongoing overhead and implementation costs
for the judicial council to manage unified
court system

10.0 mill iom

8.

Additional court reporters for courts with
upgraded judges now handling cases requiring.
a reporter

1 0. 0 mi 11 ion

9.

Miscellaneous items, such as consolidating court
file facilities, revising court forms, personnel
training and new procedures development

15 . 0 mi 11 ion

Total estimated additional costs to
consolidate

96.5 million

Current estimated shortfall subsidized
by local government
Increases include both start-up and ongoing costs

189.2 million
$285.7 million

One item not covered by the Association's analysis is the problem of
what happens to court facilities.

Currently, they are maintained by

counties, but if courts are to become the state's responsibility, what
arrangements for their use would be made?

Purchase?

Lease?

Left for

counties to provide as a local expense? The problem of real estate is
very significant and must be considered if the state decides to fund
a consolidated court system.

(No information was available to the

Association to make a cost estimate on

r~al

estate.)

CONCLUSION:
From the data presented, it is apparent that the state would assume
a new and costly burden if it decides to fund the trial courts.

It would

assume an even greater burden if it decides to fund a consolidated court.
It does not appear that the state is in a position, at this time, to
as~ume

this responsibility, since the budget surplus is gone and a deficit

is occurring.

Although local government has been extremely frugal when

dealing with courts' budgets, by and large courts are managing to
accomplish the workload.
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It may very well be true, as the Judicial Council points out thdt
" ••. in view of fiscal pressures being exerted by boards of supervisors on
the courts ••• ", it is necessary for the state to fund trial courts.

It

may also be true that funding would be adequate to include money to offset
the current shortfall.

However, it is also quite possible that with

state funding, a resultant bureacracy would develop that would be less
efficient than under the current system.
Respectfully,

tj. __J;~tn~

A

. A. Simpson
hairman, Legislative Committee
County Clerks' Association, and
County Clerk-Recorder
Sacramento County
JS:dh
cc:

Peter Meyer, President, County Clerks' Association
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COUNTIES RESPONDING

COUNTIES NOT RESPONDING

Alameda
Colusa
Cant ra Costa
Del Norte
El Dorado
Fresno
Glenn
Humboldt
Kern
Kings

Alpine
Amador
Butte
Cal ava ras
lmperi a 1
In yo
Madera

Mendocino
Modoc
Napa
Nevada
Placer

Lake

Lassen
Los Angeles
i IMa r in
Mariposa
Merced
Mono
Monterey
Orange
Riverside
Sar.ramento
San Benito
San Diego
San Francisco
San Joaquin
San Luis Obispo
San Mateo
Santa Barbara
Santa Cruz
Siskiyou
Solano
Sonoma
Stanislaus
Sutter
Tehama
Trinity
Tulare
Tuolumne
Ventura

Plumas
San Bernardino
Santa Clara
Sierra
Shasta

Yuba

Yolo_
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EXHIBIT L

STATEMENT OF SENATOR OMER L. RAINS BEFORE
ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COW1ITTEE
November 18, 1981

Throughout most of our history, English common law systems have
been self-supporting through court fees, fines, and forfeitures.
While this has certain shortcomings in that it contributes to

t

public's suspicion of judicial bias in criminal matters, a
critical feature in our form of government--judicial independence-is strengthened when there is no reliance on other branches of
government for essential funding.

•
In California we have a particularly complex and unwieldy system
of trial court financial support.

Very little of court revenue

(fees, fines, and forfeitures) actually goes to court operation.
The lower courts, municipal and justice, are largely funded out
of the general fund of each county, while the superior courts
receive a greater share of state funding, and, finally, the
appellate courts are wholly state funded.

This rather convoluted funding equation raises certain basic
questions:

Does the need of lower court systems, and to an extent

superior court systems, to appear before parochial Boards of
Supervisors for the
judicial independence?

funds affect the quality of justice or
The same question may be asked as to

appellate courts, including the Supreme Court, whi

ir
e

must depend

on two branches of government, the executive and the legi 1ativc,
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A recent report preliminarily submitted to the National Institute
for Law Enforcement and Criminal Justice of the LEAA now undergoing revision has concluded that among the examined nations, the
United States, and in particular California, has dramatically
fewer judges per population and yet strikingly greater numbers of
lawyers per judge.
workload.

Both factors obviously increase judicial

Also, as might be expected, California has a far

greater number of both civil dispositions and filings per judge
than other sampled countries, which included the U.S., England,
Germany, and Sweden.
judicial

budge~

Finally, the survey notes that California's

is about .20% of state income, while

West Germany's for example, is nearly .30%.

Moreover, other studies have illustrated that California is the
lowest state in the union with respect to state funding of the
court system, at 11.5% of the combined state-local expenditures
for courts.

It is no secret that in my opinion a unified trial court system is
a fundamental step toward improving our delivery of justice
services effectively and economically.
uni

(By that, I mean a

rmly administered single trial court in each county.)

In

assessing the scope of court unification nationally, four or five
factors are generally considered.
relate to money:

Two of them (sometimes combined)

First, state funding (with fines and fees paid

to the state treasury), and, Second, statewide unitary budgeting
(that is, a judicial budget prepared centrally without executive
branch review and oversight).
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In this study the authors combined unitary budgeting and state
financing as one factor; California received a score of 2, whi
with the exception of Texas, was the lowest in the U.S. in
connection with state funding of trial courts.

Even so, we

achieved a unification ratio of .38; that is, we are classified as
38% unified.

Incidentally, we also received a mid-range score

the category of trial court consolidation, the result of our 1950
elimination of police and city courts.

I strongly favor state funding of our trial court system for two
reasons:
(1)

The trial court system should be free from localized
bureaucratic in-fighting in order to insure adequate
funding of its operations.

The judiciary can hardly

be an independent, co-equal branch of government if
it is beholden to 58 Boards of Supervisors.
(2)

Secondly, I believe the funding issue is inextricably
linked to a truly unified court system.

How can we

ask counties to pay for courts if they are to be
centrally administered and organized?

Conversely,

how can a properly unified trial court function if
separately funded by 58 separate Boards of Supervisors?

In conclusion, irrespective of the progress of my trial court
reform measure, I will examine carefully the testimony presented
toJav

plcJgc a full scale study of the disposition of court
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revenues as set forth in Penal Code section 14b3 and other
statutory provisions toward finding appropriate formulas to fund
a truly independent judiciary while, at the same time, providing
for fair support of those various objects of judicial bounty
existent under the present system.

I am aware of the great volume of research, negotiation, inting and debate involved in the 1953 struggles to apportion
in

rior court fines and forfeitures after the 1950 court

reorganization plan.

I expect that many of the points made then

w 11 be made again today, and properly should be heard.

It would

seem to me, at the very least, that the current formulas,
admittedly political compromises, are complicated and difficult to
administer.

Indeed, I suspect that no one fully understands how

the courts or other recipients are really financed.

If my

suspicions are correct and if, indeed, we do not understand the
subject matter fully, I would propose that a major survey and study
undertaken once again to insure that it is fully understood.

SOURCES:
B ar, Carl. Separate but Subservient: Court Budgeting in the
American States. National Center for State Courts.
Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1975.
Johnson, Earl, Jr. and Ann Barthelmes Drew, "This Nation Has
Money for Everything--Except Courts," The Judges Journal 8
(1981).

Torr, G. Alan. ''Court Unification and Court Performance: A
Preliminary Assessment,'' 64 Judicature 356 (March 1981).
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EXHIBIT M

TESTIMONY OF THE COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO
INTERIM HEARING ON STATE FUNDING OF TRIAL COURTS
ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
NOVEMBER 18, 1981
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA

Your Committee's hearing is focused on three specific questions
which relate to the main issue before you:
of trial courts?

Should the State assume funding

Our testimony today will provide the County of San Diego's

response to each of these questions from two perspectives--first, from
the perspective that the State does assume funding of trial courts and
secondly, from the perspective that court funding remains primarily a
county responsibility.
Before outlining our response to each of the specific questions,
v.Je would like to provide some comments on the central issue:
of trial courts.

State funding

As indicated in your hearing notice, AB 1820 (Berman)

and this hearing have been prompted by concerns of the State Judicial
Council.

Specifically, the Judicial Council advocates State funding of

trial courts ''in view of fiscal pressure exerted by boards of supervisors
on the courts ... (which) threaten ... the ability of the court system, as a
separate branch of government, to carry out its constitutionally mandated
responsibilities."
We would agree, counties are exerting fiscal pressures on the courts.
But this fiscal pressure is no more, and actually considerably less, than
the fiscal pressures that are of necessity being exerted on all levels of
county funded programs and services.
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The fact of life is that we in

•

government, at all levels and in all branches, do not have the abundance
of revenue we have had in years past.

And, at least on the local level,

the situation has gone beyond cutting out the services and programs whicl1
are not essential.

It has progressed to the point that we must streamline,

and deliver essential services and programs more economically.
Why then should the courts be exempted from the real fiscal pressures that the rest of the government is experiencing? More importantly,
can they be exempted? We think the answer is NO, whether the courts are
funded by the State or by the counties.

It is somewhat shortsighted to

believe that changing the source of funding will remove the courts from
fiscal pressure.

The courts, and the criminal justice system as a whole,

must share in the fiscal pressures all of us in government face and share
in our responsibility to streamline and economize our systems of government.
We would point out to your Committee, that the courts in San Diego
County have acknowledged the fiscal problems of the County and have accepted
responsibility for streamlining and economizing their operations to the
extent possible under existing law in response to these fiscal problems.
For example, our four Municipal Court districts have been successfully
working together, and with the County, to standardize forms and procedures.
and personnel policies.

Moreover, they have participated, also quite suc-

cessfully, in an experiment by which the Municipal Court judges sit as
Superior Court judges for certain types of cases.

This experiment has

assisted significantly in reducing the backlog of our Superior Court.
Finally,

as Judicial Council statistics will show, the judges in our

County have one of the highest case1oad per judge in the entire State.

Our

courts are to be congratulated for these efforts.
In concluding on this central issue, it is the San Diego County
Board of Supervisors 1 position that the operation of the judiciary and the
riminal justice system has been traditionally a matter of statewide
-255-
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J.

concern.
of

the

The

Statt~

judicial

for the most part 111andates

system and

even

th(~

procr:dut·c":;

the lcve·l oF stJffin~J.

and opr'tdl ion

Until UH· pct•;•_,.i(J(' o

SB 90, counties had little or no control over the courts.

Our sole role

vJas to come up with the money. , SB 90 gave counties some control over the
growth in the courts• budgets.

As a result of Proposition 13, we have had

to use that control, and have exercised it in a responsible fashion, mindful of the need to protect the judicial system as a constitutional right
for all our

citize~s.

Nonetheless, the San Diego County Board of Supervisors does support
the transfer of responsibility for funding the trial court system from the
counties to the State.

California presently provides the lowest percen

of State aid to the trial court

syste~

of any state.

Because the tri

courts are subdivisions of the State judicial system, State financing is
entirely appropriate and will serve to provide greater uniformity in the
delivery of justice v1ithin the State.
With that we will now respond to the three specific questions posed
by your Committee.

State funding is to occur?
Appended to our testimony is an outline of San Diego County's
net costs for the operation of the criminal justice system in
1980-81.

This outline also generally details the judicial re-

lated programs you ought to consider in answeri

on:

the

What costs should be included if State funding occurs?

If

State is to assume funding on the premise that the process
justice is of statewide concern, then by necessity you s

ld
t

process.

It is not just the trie1 courts judges

provision of defense counsel for indigents; tho
-256-

t
provi~;ion of

people's prosecutors (DA); the provision of pre-sentencing investigation sel'Vices by

~wob,1tion l'ffil:,•r'~~

th,, pl'llvi-.it'll (d

facilities to house persons found to be a threat to our society.
2.

How should fines and forfeitures collected

by

the courts

be

distributed?
If the State assumes responsibility for funding the trial court
system,

'i/e

V/ould support distribution of a port·ion of the

and forfeitures to the State.

fine:~

But, you should be aware, that

the revenues now derived from fines and forfeitures do not go
solely into support of the trial court system.
the largest percentage of
funds of cities.

~hese

To the contrary,

revenues go into the general

For example, in San Diego County, the cities

receive approximately 79% of all the fines and forfeitures collected and individual cities get up to 94% of the fines and
forfeitures collected within their boundaries.

In addition, the

County uses a portion of its small percentage in support of the
law enforcement programs of the Sheriff as well as the trial
courts.
Therefore, if the State assumes trial court funding we \vould
support transfer to the State of that portion of the County's
share of fines and forfeitures that is used to suport the courts
and in addition a portion of the cities' share of these revenues.
If the State does not assume trial court funding, we would also
argue that the distribution of fines and forfeitures should be
changed so that counties get a greater share more properly reflecting our court costs in processing the fines and forfeitures.
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3.

}jolt/_Jl~u_c_b_autho~j_i~y_

sh.oul_i_the State assume ___r_jSJh cl il

tion, salary 1eve1s, and \'/Orkload standards of trial

fie.~

•,

_c~_urt

personnel?
If the State assumes. trial court costs, then you should also
assume (retain) total authorityand responsibility for court
personnel.

We wholehearted1y believe that financial responsi-

bility and budgetary control must go hand in hand.
That

hc~s

not been the historical situation with r·ega

tu

trial courts wherein, prior to SB 90, you, the State, d eta
the budget in effect and we, the counties, had the financial
responsibility.

SB 90 changed that situation by requir·ing

t

the State pay the costs of"any new or additional mandates on
local government.

As a result of SB 90, we now go through a

process each year in which the courts plead their needs to you
and you extract SB 90 waivers from us.

We can only warn you

that because of Proposition 13 and our total fiscal and servi
responsibilities to our taxpayers, the waivers will beg
lc•ss and lc)ss frequently.

If the tr'iLI-1 cout"ts

n:~:1~1in

County's financial responsibility, we will and must exert
budgetary control prerogative \ve now have

as a

result of SB 90.

Moreover, we will propose and support legislation that gives
counties tota1 control over court staffing.
/1,s stated earlier in this testimony, the courts and the cri
justice system as a whole must share in the fiscal pressures all 1
cJOVl'l'llllll'nt

face.

na1
s of

The ci'iminal justice system as \\fell as our systems for
ice and
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re protection, water

and sewer, must find and accomplish ways to streamline and economize.
s challenge reaches all l('Ve1s and

brM\ChPS

should be exempted.
Thank you.
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EXl!TBT'l' N

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY JUDICIARY COMMITTEE
November

• 1981

I am John McCamman, Administrative Analyst for Sonoma County. I am
here today representing the County Supervisors Association of Cali
a
(CSAC). As a representative of the unit of government wi '1 the
responsibility for funding the operation of the trial co1Jrts, CSAC has
a long history of interest in the three specific questions posed in your
counsel's letter inviting testimony.
Some general remarks are in order before addressing the specific
questions. The level of funding necessary to adequately operate the
trial courts has been a matter of on-going debate in California's 58
counties. The courts are but a single budget area. t1any counties report
that court budgets have been growing at a faster rate than any other budget
item. The causes of this cost increase are multi-fold, but one contributing
factor has been the traditional failure of judges to recognize the need
to operate efficiently.
The budget restrictions and revenue reductions of recent years have
resulted in funding limits for all county departments and agencies. The
courts, like other departments, have been pressured by boards of supervisors to
d the line. The courts need to acknowledge the fiscal
problems that
beset all levels of government and to undertake
efforts to operate more
ciently. More efficient operation will
probably not result in reduced levels of
ng, but it could provide
a basis for avoiding future cost increases and could provide an opportun
to direct existing funds at the more critical areas within the courts.

EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE President QUENTIN L. KQPP, C1ty & County oi San FranCISCO
filS! V1ce P•es1dent, THERESA COOK, Placer
~-''\'"llh':lt JAMFS fDDlF. Mf'fllhK1no
JIM BATES, San Diego
!LLA COLLIN. Sacrar:1ento Coun!y
ANN KL\NGFR Meru~t1
McPEAK, Contra Costa County
HOWARD D \AANK..\NS
\

\'\ 1

•'h

( \ \ 1N·\Il\ 1 H,

SWEI\.lOIMAN.

,,, '\ :,\ 'r,':. \. -,,u,,h Adll'!lW>il;o(IVe 0111<--'t'l, HARFiY L
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Washington Office

I
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915144'1-4011
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As you know, the issue of state financing of the trial courts presents
~yriad of complex issues and problems.
The courts are a constitutionally
separate branch of government. They are primarily funded by the counties.
1he current staffing levels are dictated by the Legislature. The interplay
between the different branches and different levels of government ensures
that there is no simple solution to the issues being addressed today.
CSAC favors a court system that is funded by the sta '"" and administered
by the counties. Such a system would be less expensive than a stateadministered system, which would include uniform salu.ry levels statewide,
nd its cost would be equitably distributed through the state general fund.
A st<Jte financed system would probably result in closer scrutiny of judicidl
budgets and would probably result in increased efforts to streamline the
operation and practices of courts.
I would now like to address the specific questions that were posed in
your counsel's letter. I will not present cost figures, since costs have
been outlined by the Legislative Analyst, the Judicial Council, and the
County, Clerks Association.
CSAC feels that, at a minimum, those costs related to the immediate
support of the courts should be included in a state funding effort. Such
costs would include salaries and benefits of judges, clerks, and bailiffs,
as we11 as facilities costs. In addition, such costs should probably
nclude probation pre-sentence responsibilities. These costs are directly
and mmediately related to the operation of the trial courts.
Other costs that have been suggested as potential state costs include
:Jrosecution and public defense costs. Since these are currently services
funded by the counties, the counties would certainly welcome having the
tate relieve them of this financial portion as well. We recognize that
~urrent finances would likely preclude such costs from being included
in a state financing effort.
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Earlier discussions of the issues before this committee today have
resulted in the suggestion that state financing be limited to judicial
salaries. In our view, such an approach would do little to put a brake on
the escalating cost of operating the courts. The courts are a system and
the state should recognize that the personnel needed to support judges are
an integral part of the system.
The question of distribution of fines and forfeiture' monies is
difficult. Although CSAC's membership has not been polled on this issue,
it is likely that, if the counties were relieved of t:1e burden of funding
the immediate court support operation, they would gladly give up their
portion of the fines and forfeitures. However, there are other points that
must be considered in this area. First, the fine and forfeiture money has
traditionally not been earmarked for court support. It has been directed
toward law enforcement and road maintenance. Second, cities receive more
in fine and forfeiture money than counties, although the courts are funded
by the counties.
It is unlikely that cities would willingly give up their
portion of such monies. Third, if the state elects to take the fine and
forfeiture monies, it should not limit the level of state funding to that
amount recaptured through fines and forfeitures. Such a limitation would
me~ly be a shell game and would not address the issue of escalating court
costs. Fourth, taking the fines and forfeitures for court support raises
the issue of jeopardizing the impartiality of the judiciary.
The authority to control job classifications, salary levels and workload
s:ructure should be a function of which services the state finances. If the
s:;te is willing to pick up all the costs of operating the courts, then it
s~:~ld have complete control over staffing levels and practices.
If the
st~te does not assume financial responsibility for all court personnel, it
sr.:J1d give the responsibility to the counties. To do otherwise would
es:ablish a potential for having different staffing and workload standards
fc.·· court employees than for other employees in a similar classification.
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my prepared remarks.

I •..rish to thank the Cornittee

to appear today. and I will be happy to respond to any
that you may have.
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EXHIBIT 0

LOS ANGELES, CALIF"ORNIA 90012
F"RANK S. ZOI..IN, EXECUTIVE OFFICER
TELEPHONE

12131 97 4-5401

November 17, 1981

Hon. Elihu M. Harris
Chairman, Assembly Cormnittee on Judiciary
California State Legislature
State Capitol
Sacramento, CA 95814
STATE FUNDING OF TRIAL COURTS
Dear Assemblyman Harris:
Thank you for inviting my testimony at your interim hearing
on State financing of trial courts. This is a timely issue
because present constraints on county revenues have severely
limited the capability of co~nties to finance minimal levels
of mandatory trial court services.
These financial constraints are also likely to prevent the
funding of anticipated and necessary expansion of California's
trial courts during the 1980's because costs are increasing
faster than revenues.
Present State Financial Support is Minimal
Increased State financial support of trial court operations
is required to insure public access to the courts. As you
know, State financial support of superior court operations
is presently limited to:
A.

Funding all but $9,500 of a superior court judge's salary
which is presently $62,670;

B.

Funding judges' retirement (8% of salary);

C.

Provision of a $60,000 block grant for each superior
court judge authorized after passage of SB 90.
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All other superior court costs are funded by county government.
State financial support of municipal courts is limited to
funding judges' retirement (8% of salary).
The last definitive studies of trial court costs were
contained in Task Force Reports No. I-ll and III-18 submitted
to the Post Commission on Government Reform established after
passa?e of Proposition 13. Those reports indicated that the
State s share of trial court operational costs in 1978-79
was only $35.2 million or about 8.6% as compared to the
counties' share of $375.8 million or 91.4%.
Presumably, trial court operational costs now exceed
$500 million and the State and county shares have remained
approximately the same.
The task force reports indicate that during 1978-79,trial
court revenues collected-by counties totaled about $139.6
million. Thus, net county costs (total county expenditures
less revenue) equalled approximately $236.2 million. The
State collected a total of $42.8 million from trial court
revenues in 1978-79 which resulted in a surplus of $7.6
million over the $35.2 million contributed to trial court
operations.
A study conducted by the National Center for State Courts in
80 determined that 35 of the 50 states fund 25% or more of
court operational costs. California is among the lowest of
the 15 states which provide less than 25% of the total
operational costs of the state court system.
Future Growth Requires Additional Funding
Caseload projections for the Los Angeles Superior Court
indicate that a total of 300 judicial officers will be
required in 1990. This represents an increase during the
next nine years of 39 judges or about 15% over the Court's
present authorized complement of 261 judicial officers.
Based on past experience,this projected increase-- which
averages less than 2% per year -- may be conservative.
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Presumably, superior and municipal courts in California
are experiencing similar growth patterns. Consequently,
plans must be developed to finance State-wide trial court
expansion in the neighborhood of 15%. The latest information
available to me indicates that
number of judicial o
authorized for California's trial courts totals 1, 3.
total is broken down as follows:
Judges
Superior Court
Municipal
Justice Court

t

Commissioners

Referees

628

74

24

726

488

71

9

568

99

99

Grand Total

l '

3

A 15% increase
trial court judicial officers would
necessitate the provision of~about 210 additional judges
by 1990 at a cost of roughly $52.5
llion.
A State Subsidy or Block Grant Program with a Built-in
Cost-of-Living Increase is Recommended
The Post Commission reviewed five
ions for transferring
program responsibi
and/or
respons
lity
the trial court system from
s to the State. Although
the Post Commiss
generally
the State should
provide financial support to
partially or totally
relieve counties of their current responsibilities to fund
trial courts, no specific program was recommended.
After reviewing
options considered by the Post Commission
I recommend that
Committee consider provision of a twotier block grant
a
ltliving
increase to support trial court
000 per year for each
A block grant program providing
generate approximate
superior court judicial officer
$145.2 million revenue for counties. A formula, such as
to provide cost-o
Consumer Price Index, should
ticn.
1
increases to keep

-270-

Hon. Elihu M. Harris
November 17, 1981
Page Four

A block grant of $100,000 per year for every municipal and
justice court judicial officer, with the same cost-of-living
adjustment formula, would generate an additional $66.7 million.
A two-tier block grant program -- $200,000 and $100,000 for
superior and municipal/justice court judicial officers
respectively -- is recommended in lieu of a uniform block
grant because municipal and justice courts produce
substantially more revenue, particularly from traffic fines
and forfeitures. Provision of a single block grant would
either underfinance superior courts which have historically
been more dependent upon property tax financing through county
general funds or overfinance municipal courts which are now
largely supported by fines and forfeitures.
The data provided in the Post Commission reports summarized
above indicate that net county costs for trial courts in
California totaled about $236.2 million in 1978-79. Assuming
net county costs now approach $300 million the recommended
block grant program would produce a total of $211.9 million
and fund about two-thirds o~the costs now borne by the
county general fund.
It is recommended that counties retain financial responsibility
to fund about one-third of the net operational costs for trial
courts because:
a.

It provides a financial incentive to keep costs down;

b.

It provides incentives to generate additional user fees
to establish a more appropriate balance between tax
financing and user financing of court operations;

c.

It establishes a more equitable financial partnership
between the State and counties than the present cost
distribution. Under this proposal counties will retain
financial responsibility to provide and maintain court
facilities, and provide administrative support services
(such as personnel, accounting, computer, purchasing,
communications, etc.) which are not fully reflected in
the estimated operational costs of trial courts.
Considering total direct and indirect costs this block
grant proposal approximates a roughly equal division of
costs between the State and the county -- not considering
county costs for prosecution, defense, probation, prisoner
transportation, etc.
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Administrative Advantages of the Block Grant Program
I strongly recommend a program of block grants in favor of
other options previously considered for the following reasons:
1.

A block grant program maintains home rule and respons
to community needs;

2.

A block grant program retains theeffective and effi
t
coordination of fiscal and operational planning by all
justice agencies -- courts, prosecution, defense,
probation, law enforcement. A state "buy out" would
disrupt these relationships and adversely affect operations;

3.

A block grant program is easily administered by the state
because it merely represents an expansion of the block
grant provided superior courts since the passage of SB 90;

4.

A block grant program does not impose any organization or
administrative changes. Current personnel and retirement
systerr will remain in p1.ace. Existing revenue distribution
will be unchanged;

5.

A block grant program imposes less cost on the state than a
total buy out. Based on the rough calculationsin this
report a total state buy out would cost about $300 million
as compared with $211.9 million. The state would also
incur additional costs resulting from the equalizat
of court employees' salaries and their inclusion in
state retirement system;

6.

The concept of state financing of trial court operations
through subvention or block grants was endorsed by the
California Judges Association in December, 1978;

7.

The concept of state financing of trial court operations
through subvention block grants was endorsed by the
Superior Court Administrations Association of Cali
a
in November, 1978;

8.

The County Clerks' Association of California endorsed
concept of a state subvention or block grants in December,
1978;

9.

The Los Angeles County Judicial Procedures Commission
endorsed the concept in May, 1976.
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In summary, I recommend adoption of a block grant program as
the most cost-effective and easily administered method of
providing state financing for trial court operations.
Admittedly, the calculations in this report are rough and
require refinement, but I believe they are basically correct
and demonstrate the greater utility and effectiveness of a
block grant program compared with alternative methods of
state financing.
Committee Questions
You requested responses to the following three questions.
1.

What costs ought to be included within trial court budgets
if state funding is to occur.
I believe costs elements should be approached incrementally,
beginning with courtroom staff and expanding to cover
direct support services and then indirect services that
are provided uniformly by all trial courts. For example:
Courtroom costs include:
judicial officer salaries
courtroom clerk salaries
court reporter salaries
bailiff salaries
supplies
libraries and equipment
Direct support includes:
court clerk filing and record keeping operations
judicial secretaries and other clerical support
jury staff, jury fees and mileage
court interpreter costs
law clerks
Indirect support includes:
-- administrative personnel
-- psychiatric fees
The cost elements listed above are not intended to represent
a complete listing of all costs that fall within these
categories. They are illustrative, however, of costs
that can be appropriately funded by the state.
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Special programs such as Conciliation Court and Own
Recognizance release should be excluded because they are
not uniformly provided by all trial courts.
2.

How should the fines and forfeitures collected by courts
be distributed?
This is an extremely complex question which can only be
answered in relation to the level of state funding to be
provided. If the state opts to fully finance trial court
operations, all fines and forfeitures now collected by
counties should revert to the state. If a block grant
program is provided as recommended in this letter the
distribution of revenues would remain unchanged. Other
alternatives may justify a redistribution of revenues.

3.

How much authority should the state assume over job
classifications, salar levels and workload standards of
trial court personne ?
Once again, the answer tb this question depends upon
level of state financial assistance. Under a complete
state "buy out" it would probably be necessary for
1
court employees to become state employees. This would
require the establishment of a state-administered court
personnel system. Under such a plan a uniform system of
classification and pay would have to be established. This
would probably increase salary expenditures because
tendency would be to establish uniform salaries close to
or at the highest levels now paid to most classifications.
This would probably require the inclusion of court
employees in the state retirement system.
In addition, a mechanism must be established to negotiate
with court employee unions and establish workload standards,
conditions of employment, etc.
The block grant program I recommend would leave present
personnel systems in place without change.
Obviously, there are several alternatives to the two
options I discussed regarding state responsibility to
court personnel administration.
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Conclusion
In conclusion, I wish to thank you for the opportunity to
~estify before your Committee.
I hope my recommendation to
establish a block grant program to finance trial court
operations will assist your Committee in its deliberations.
If I can provide additional information or be of further
assistance, please do not hesitate to call upon me.
Very truly yours,

ftMaiL~

.·

Frank Zol n
Executive Officer

FZ:ls
cc:

Presiding Judge David N. Eagleson
Assistant Presiding Judge Harry V. Peetris
Each Supervisor
Chief Administrative Officer Harry L. Hufford
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Statement by Ralph N. Kleps

~/

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Committee:
1 appreciate the invitation to appear here today.
This is not, l might say, the first time I have appeared before
a committee of the California Legislature although I have not done
so recently.

During a long career in state service I may have

made hundreds of such appearances, dating back to my days in
the drafting of the California Administrative Procedure Act, to my
service .as Legislative Counsel and to my 16 years as the first
Administrative Director of the California Courts.
first for me!

Yet, this is a

It is the first time I have appeared in a California

legislative hearing as a private citizen.

I wondered, in fact,

whether a personal point of view could have any bearing on the
kind of topic you have laid out for yourselves here today.

But

your counsel and I finally agreed that, at least as to the background of the problem, a brief stateme·nt might be helpful and l
hope that proves to be true.
I.

The questions posed by this hearing would not have
been asked during the first 120 years of California's history.
We have a trial court system that grew· out of the needs of people
in their own localities.

*I

Both by history and by tradition, a conviction

Summary of qualifications attached.
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that trial courts should be instruments of local government is deeply
rooted in the fabric of our society.

It is true, of courSt', HHtt

you can find many authoritative pronouncements to the· effect that
we have a "state judicial system."

For example, it has always

been apparent that both the structure of the trial courts and their
basic operating procedures come from state law.

The Constitution

has always prescribed the system's fundamentals, and state
statutes have always regulated trial court procedure, to a greater
degree in fact than in most states.

Anyone who leafs through

the Code of Civil Procedure, the Probate Code, the Evidence Code
or Title 8 of the Government Code will have no difficulty in agreeing
that state government plays a deteriminative role in establishing
our trial court system.
I

But that is the extent to which what we

have can be called a "state trial court system."
And, after one gets past the fundamentals and the
generalities, the situation looks far different.
as the starting point:

Taking judges

it is true that they a're state officers, but

upon occasion they have also been classified as local officials for
particular purposes.

So long, in fact, as they depend upon local

elections for their teilure in office, local concerns will continue to
outweigh state policies in their thinking.

But beyond the judges,

the support staffs upon which they depend and the facilities that
are necessary for their success are, and always have been, the
responsibility of local governments.

In their daily operations,

in fact, the trial courts· are subjected to the budget forces and
processes that apply to county government generally.

II.
So, when we come to the area of today's inquiry, that
is, to iiwestigating the state's financial interest in the operation
of the trial courts, we have a pretty clear picture.

Although

the state's share in financing has been rising modestly in recent
years, it still remains a minor element in the equation.

I note

that the 1975 Cobey Commission reported that California's state
share ·in financing the trial courts was the lowest among the
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among the 50 states at that time.

contribution has· been rated

for many years at abot;tt 11 percent of the. total operating costs
for the trial courts.

Historically, the state has limited its

financial support for trial courts to the provision of some (but
not all) judicial salaries, to financing a 1udicial retirement system
for most (but not all) judges, and to appropriating funds for programs
of special state interest almost on a case-by-case basis.

For

example, when it was necessary in 1974 to create a travelling
"circuit judge" program at the justice court level, the state
picked up the costs.

In 1975, when an educational program

for

trial court judges was needed, the state assumed the cost.
Similarly, the state has accepted a portion of the cost of establishing new superior courts under its program for reimbursing local
governments for "state mandated costs" imposed upon them by new
legislation.
To the extent that the state's sharing in trial court
costs goes beyond judicial salaries and judicial retirement contributions,
the increases have taken place within the past 10 years or so,
for the most part.

And it cannot be said that

have made

any significant change in the level of state funding for the trial
courts.

All of these factors illustrate why I say that today' s

q_\Jestions about the appropriate level of state funding for trial
courts would not even have been asked prior to 1970 or so.
California's history in this regard is not dissimilar
from that of most states.

A new and different approach was taken,

however, when Alaska and Hawaii became the 49th and 50th states
of the Union.

As part of statehood planning, it was determined

in both instances that the entire judicial system should be a
responsibility of state government, and thus both systems were
set up to be funded and administered by the state.

Since then

states, led by Illinois, Colorado and Idaho, have been
influenced by this approach and have taken major steps in that
direction.

lt should be remembered, of course, that the two nf'w
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states worked with, a clean slate and came out of a background
in which before statehood the Federal Government had
all of the judicial services.

providt~d

The new state-administered judicial

systems were small and a relatively simple takeover of what had
previously existed was all that was involved.
During the 1970 •s, as a result of these new developments,
a nationwide momentum developed for the "unification" of state court
systems, a movement in which a major element was full state
funding of the trial courts.

The Cobey Commission Report, for

example, notPd that virtually all recent court improV{'ment studi0s
throughout the nation had endorsed "court unification" of one sort
or another.

An excellent summary of the unification movement

(Berkson and Carbon) states that state funding is almost always
included in unification proposals and is usually accompanied by
increased state supervision and administration of the trial courts.
In fact, relief for the local taxpayers furnished what was perhaps
the major incentive behind unification proposals in a number of
states.

So we should not be surprised that any inquiry into increased

funding for trial courts leads inevitably into a consideration of
how such an increase can be combined with better administration
of th<· courts.

(See, my column:

"State Funding as the Moving

Force for the Consolidation of Trial Court Districts,"

L.A. Daily

Mar. 26, 1979, attached.)
California has not ignored these questions during the
st decade, but it certainly has been unable to come up with
acceptable answers.

Judiciary cor:nmittees of both the Senate

and the Assembly have had these issues before them continuously
since 1972.

ln that year the Legislature was confronted with three

major ptoposals in this field, all of which were referred for
further study.

This is the background that l would like to review

for you in some detail because l think it illustrates the intractable
nature of the problem.
o.l;!lc

lt was intractable, incidentally, when the

had a substantial surplus, and i't will be even more so
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now that state fiscal experts are projecting a $750 million or so
deficit in the state's 1981-82 budget.

III.
In 1969 I was responsible for securing a Federal
Highway Safety Administration grant

some $200,000 that funded

a two year consultant study of the structure and operation of California's municipal and justice courts.

The Highway Safety Admin-

istration was only interested in the traffic court aspect of our
problem, of course, but that fit nicely into the priorities of· the
judicial leadership of that day.

We wanted to pursue and obtain

further reductions in the 300-plus judicial districts that still
remained after the· sustained attack that had been mounted in the
1950's on the 700-p lus than then existed.

The Booz, Allen and

Hamilton Lower Court Study was due in late 1971, and it came to
us with a recommendation for a 58 unit, county-based lower court
system.

Insofar as state assumption of lower court costs was

concerned, it contemplated only a state pickup of the s
for all judges, commissioners and administrators.

costs

The

Council of that day accepted the recommendation and, in the 1972
legislative session,

bills that would have carried out the substance

of the proposal were introduced on its behalf by Senator Donald
Grunsky, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary Committee and the Senate
member of the Judicial Council.
the meantime,

Assemblyman James Hayes who was

Chairman of the Assembly Judiciary Committee and the Assembly
member of the Judicial Council, has already committed himself in
1971 to the concept of a fully-unified, state-funded
court."

single trial

He was, needless to say, disappointed with the Council's

opposition to his 1971 bill (on the ground that it was premature
in the face of a pending study) and with the limited nature of
the Council's 1972 lower court proposal.
riv;d plans n'Ct'

v~'d

In each house the

favorable recommr·nclation'3 from both the
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and fiscal committees, but in both instances the proposals were
defeated on the floor.
But that doesn't complete the story.

In early 1971

Governor Reagan suggested to then-Chief Justice Donald Wright that
an intensive study should
in California.

b~

made of the causes of trial delay

This resulted in the appointment of a Select Committee

on Trial Court Delay, representing the Governor, the Chief Justice
and the State Bar
the committee.

- each of whom designated three members of

It made a number of operational recommendations

in its 1972 report and spent a major part of its effort on the
question of whether a "unified trial court" was possible in California.
It obtained a $38,900 LEAA Federal grant through the GoVernor's

Office and undertook a study of the problem.

Relying on the

expertise that Booz, Allen and Hamilton had acquired in its two
year examination of the lower courts of the state, it hired the
consulting firm to do a four month study of the feasibility of
creating a unified trial court in this state.

The consultant

recommended such action and the Select Committee approved the
proposal.

Bills were introduced in the Senate on behalf of the

committee but, after the failure of the Council-proposed lower court
reorganization and the Hayes single trial court proposal, the Select
Committee's recommendation went to interim study also.
This complicated background of nine years ago laid
foundation for a still-continuing interest in the dual problems
of trial court reorganization and state funding.

The Judicial

Council considered the matter in depth in late 1973 and prepared
a 1974 proposal that would have created a two-level, unified trial
court system.

In that proposal state financing ·would have been

limited to the payment of the salaries of jL:dges and commissioners,
consistently with the Council's earlier lower court proposal.

By

March of 1974, however, after intensive discussions with the judges
and lawyers of the state, it was decided that there was no point
in pur:suing the matter at that time.
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The Council was unable,

in fact, to secure ·the support of a majority of either the judges
or lawyers of the state with whom the matter was discussed.
Senator Alfred Song, Chairman of the Senate Judiciary. Committee,
continued his interest in the matter, however, by sponsoring the

1974 resolution under which the Cobey Commission was organized
and under which it prepared its 1975 report.

IV.
The later chapters of this story were written almost
entirely within the legislative environment.

The 1975 Legisla-

ture did not deal kindly with the Cobey Commission's proposals;
n0r did the 1976 Legislature show much interest in a proposal for
a two-level, unified trial court with state funding of judicial salaries
that the Judicial Council and the State Bar were agreed upon.
A similar result followed in 1979-80 with respect to unification bills
offered in the Senate, and as I read the newspaper comment on
the current proposal offered by Senator Omar Rains, the opposition
seems to be following a familiar pattern.
At this point, after some ten years of continuing
debate on the issue, it seems to me that most knowledgeable observers
will agree that there is simply insufficient support for the concept
of trial court unification to make it a feasible option for California.
On the positive side, however, it should be noted that during the

1974-1975 p~ricxi,when all of this unification discussion

was at its

height, California did manage to accomplish a complete reorganization
of the justice court system, with state

for those justice

courts whose judges were designated to serve as "circuit riders."
The 1978 passage of Proposition 13 raised the funding
issue from a somewhat different point of view.

Within four days

after the June primary election at which the proposition was
the Judicial Council met to urge that the state take over from the
counties the funding of trial courts at a cost of some $300. million.
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So far as 1 can ~certain,

this funding shift was not accompanit'd

by any proposals for ctJ.ange in the structure or administration
of the trial courts.

lt was simply designed to highlight one of

the possible options that could be used in the crisis-like effort
to "bail out" local governments in the aftermath of the revenue
loss that was certain to hit them under Proposition 13.
This particular option for shifting governmental costs
was adopted by the Post Commission, an advisory body set up by
Governor Brown to devise possible ways to meetthe revenue problems
inherent in Proposition 13.

The commission suggested a "transfer

to the state of full financial responsibility for the superior, municipal
and justice courts but [with] retention of administration at the
local level."

The Post Commission calculated a $375 millicm cost for

this· shift which, although it sounds substantial, constituted only
about nine percent of the $4.1 billion that the commission was dealing
with.

In the end,

neither the Governor nor the Legislature paid

much attention to the commission's recommendation in this respect.
"Bail-out" legislation was passed in that, and succeeding sessions 1
that dealt primarily with educational and welfare costs of the counties
and had no concern for the problem that concerns us here today.

v.
Coming to the present, it is my understanding that the
1981 Judicial Council requested that Mr. Berman introduce A. B.
1820 in the form of what we used to call a "spot bill."

Its

purpose, I assume, was to trigger a further inquiry into the issues
of trial court organization and funding which have been studied
so intensively in the past.

In the light of the background I

have sketched for you, you can understand why I could not recommend
an ambitious program of court unification and state funding to
you.

I do not believe that there is much support for trial court

unification in the bench or bar of the· state, and I believe that
a sirnplP switch in funding without a plan for improved administration would be a waste of state funds.
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And yet! there is action that you could take . in this
field that would offer tangible improvement in trial court
operations, albeit of a ·modest nature.

You will note that, at

least until Proposition 13 came along, most of the recommendations
in this area had a consistent theme.

That theme was that all

salaries should be paid by the state, and H continues to be my
conviction on the subject for reasons that I will develop further
in a moment.
If it were thought desirable for some reason to make

a $375 million (or perhaps by now a $450 million) shift in local
court costs to the state, it should be done as the Post Commission
recommended and not by trying to establish a state administrative
structure to operate the trial courts.

In my native state of New

York something like that was attempted within the past few years,
and the personnel classification and

Salary schedule problems that

were involved in moving court support staff to the state payroll
converted the State Administrative Office into a glorified personnel
office.

The problem in California would be worse!

If such a

purely monetary shift is attempted, California trial court employees
should be left on local payrolls and the trial courts should be
reimbursed by the state for the cost of their salaries.

Such a

program would have nothing to do with improved judicial administration, the issue which I believe to be of primary concern here, and
its justification would be fiscal rather than judicial.
To my way of thinking,
this issue is to follow the

proper way to approach
that have worked in the pa

The state should put its money into

system changes only

when a program that offers improvement in judicial administration
is the rrason for doing it.

In respect to

salaries, there

is a substantive benefit to be achieved and such a step would
not create any state-level administrative problem.
a major portion of superior court
furnished by the state, which also
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As you know

al salaries is already
the salaries.

But in

But in the municipal courts, even though the state establishes the
salaries, the county governments pay them.

And with justice courts,

except for the "circuit judges," salaries are both established and
paid by local governments.

The .cost of picking· up all of these

judicial salar>s at the state level would be modest;

a 197!, cal-

culation by the Cobey Commission put the figure at about $20 million
and I doubt that the current figure would be unreasonable.
Why is it, one might ask, tha,t the state's payment of
judicial salaries would accomplish an improvement in the system.
The reason is that judges throughout the state would be taken off
local payrolls where the cost accounting system becomes outrageous
when a judge is moved from one county to another to help out.
A system of local 'cost cross-bi_lling. has been created to make sure
that each county is fully reimbursed for any services rendered
I

by one of "its" judges to another county, and the consequences
of this system have to be seen to be believed.

Fiscal considerations

have affected the question of whether a particular court can accept
assistance when it is available.

Freedom from such accounting

and operational problems would increase flexibility in the use of
judgepower throughout the state, and it would also increase the
judges' sense of responsibility to the judicial system as a whole.
Beyond the issue of flexibility in the use of judges, it is also
clear that salary uniformity could be obtained at the justice court
1evl'l (as has been done elsewhere in the system), a step which
would be consistent with their having jurisdictional equality with
the muncipal courts.

And, since the administration of judicial

salaries has been carried on for years by the State Controller's
Office, no problems in administration would be created,
The step I have proposed has been a consistent goal
of those who have studied this problem over the past decade.

This

comittee will accomplish a long-awaited reform if it successfully
sponsors such a program at the 1982 session of the Legislature.
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STATE FUNDING AS THE: MOVING FORCE
FOR THE CONSOLIDATION OF TRIAL COURT DIST-RICTS
Court unification has been the favorite goal of court reformers for over
70 vcars. F'rom 1906 to todav, from Hoscoe Pound to the American Bar
Association's latest Standards of Court Organization, experts have agreed
that it is necessary to umfy state court systems if they are to operate efficiently. All national conferences on state court reform. including the most
recent one, have repeated thai call.
Two s.cholars, however. have warned that. in the light of a wealth of
business experience, centralization of administrative ana management
decisions could be a serious mistake. (See, David J. Saari and Goeff
Gallas. <1976) 2 Justice Svstem Journal, 19·33 and 33-35. J
California's drive to\vard a more organizect judicial system has continued for some 50 years. if measured from the 1926 creation of its constitutional Judicial Council. Progress has been slow, and during some periods
non-existent, wiJich is not surprising in light of the state's powerful tradition of local autonomy. The state recently was ranked 40th when compared
to the most unified of tlle 50 states; One could say that the degree of
unification is about 20 percent oi what California reasonably could have
been expected to experience over the 50 year periOd. <See, Berkson< 1978) 3
Justice System Journal264-280.!
"Uni'fication," of course, has proved to be a slippery concept. To some
it means an authoritarian central administration. To others it means a
single-level trial court system. And to still others it means full state funding of the judicial system. The situation reminds one of the classic story
of the blind Hindu scholars whose efforts to describe an elephant from sensations received by touching different parts of the animal left their
students thoroughly confused.
The four factors most frequently used in measuring unification in state
court systems are: simplicity in court structure, central rult·making, central administration and state funding. Aithough it was nflt adequately
assessed in thro comparative study referred to above, California has a
highly-regarded judicial rulemaking process. and ils organization for central judicial administration is sufficient to do what needs to be done in the
. state. In both h1stances. the Judicial Council is the constitutional agency
created to carry out those functions.
If one uses court structure and state funding as the t...,o remaining
bases for assessing the California court system. it would be easy to conclude that more unification would be helpful to the state. lt is obvious that
California has more judicial districts than it needs. with 250 Superior and
lower court districts. It is widely conceded that the state's support of its
judicial system is too meager. In fact. California's 11 percent proportion of
state contribution is rated last among the 50 states.
If increased court unification can be described as providing a simpler
court structure with more state funding, a strong case can be made for
more of that kind of unification in California.
'
In
the experience of other states. it is significant that inadequate local property tax revenues have been the incentive for increased
state funding, and for significant court reorganization, in many instances.
F'rom Colorado's 1969
response to its local governments' needs, to
New York's answer to its
fiscal disaster, a financial squeeze has produced a more unified court
in state after state.
·As rvcryone in California
now discovered, Proposition 13 has produced the same governmental pressure at the local !eve! that other states
previously have experienced. As a result. increased state ftinding of the
Califomia court systf·m has been recommended by many agencies, including {;overnor Brown's Commission Oll r;ovenune'll Reform.
Thb commission has targeted ~ome S375 million in state funds for the
annual support of the Califon]ia triai courts, thus intending to relieve local
governments of that portion of the property tax burden. The 1979
Legislature will have this issue
beforP it during the next several
months and the futu;·p of the
judicial svstem can be affected
significantly by i1ow ll deals with the problem.
A big question which remains unanswered in California: If the state
moves toward full funding of its trial court system, will any court
reorganizJtion accompany the shift in funding? Or willlhe iever that has
proved effective in securing better court organization in other state be ignored here?
,
.. .
. J
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RIOG~APHJCAL

INFORMATION - RALPH N. KLEPS

Ralph N. Kleps is a native of Batavia, N.Y. He
received his preparatory education in Rochester, N.Y. and
at Deep Springs College in California.
He received an
A.D. and L.L.B. at Cornell University, Ithaca, N.Y., where
he was elected to Phi Beta Kappa and was an editor of the
Cornell Law Quarterly.
Kleps practiced law in San Francisco with the
law firms of Pillsbury, Madison and Sutro and Landels and
Weigel. In 1943 he directed the Judicial Council's survey
of administrative law and procedure,, and was instrumental
in the drafting of the California Administrative Procedure
Act.
From 1945 to 1950 he served as the first director
of the California Office of Administrative Hearings.
He was Legislative Counsel of California from
1950 to 1961. As the legal adviser to the California Legislature he supervised the completion of the recodification
of California statutes (1953) and served on the California
Law Revision Commission (1953-1961). He acted as secretary
to the California Commission on Uniform State Laws ( 19501961), and is a past president of the National Legislative
Conference (1954-55).
Kleps was the first Admini~trative Director
of the California Courts (1961-1977) and was also secretary
of the California Judicial Council. He is a past chairman
of the Conference of State Court Administrators (1967-1968)
and was a member of the judiciary and drafting committees
of the California Constitution Revision Commission ( 19641967).
He participated in organizifl!~ the Institute for
Court Management and has lectured there and at the National
Judicial College.
He received the Institute's Warren E.
Burger Award in 1978 and the American Judicature Society's
Herbert Harley Award in 1980 for his contributions to judicial administration in the u.s.
Since 1977 Mr. Kleps has served as a consultant
for
court management projects of the Conference of
Chief Justices, the National Center for State Courts, the
National Academy of Sciences and other research organizations. He is an adviser on court management to Baron Data
of· San Leandro, California, the developer and principal
supplier of micro-processors for the computer transcription
of court reporters' stenotype notes.
He has published articles on administrative
law, legislation and court management in a number of professional journals, and writes a monthly column on court
reform for the Los Angeles Daily Journal. In 1978 he wrote
a "Survey Report on Federal Assistance to State Courts,
1969-1978" for the U.S. Department of Justice.
(September 1980)
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EXHIBIT Q

TESTIMONY BEFORE THE ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON JUDICIARY
REGARDING STATE FUNDING OF CALIFORNIA'S TRIAL COURTS

18; 1981

NOVEMBER

MY NAME IS ALEXANDER AIKMAN;

l AM SENIOR STAFF ATTORNEY IN

THE WESTERN REGIONAL OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL CENTER FOR STATE
IN CASE YOU ARE UNFAMILIAR WITH OUR ORGANIZATION; THE NATIONAL
CENTER IS A RESEARCH AND CONSULTING ORGANIZATION SERVING THE NATI
STATE COURTS,

's

IN OUR TEN YEARS IN EXISTENCE; WE HAVE WORKED Wl

SEVERAL STATES AS THEY HAVE MOVED FROM LOCAL TO STATE FINANCI
OR CONSIDERED SUCH A MOVE -- AND RECENTLY COMPLETED A PROJECT OF
NATIONAL SCOPE ON STATE FINANCING OF THE COURTS,

THIS SPRING I

COMPLETED AN ANALYSIS OF THE IMPACT OF POSSIBLE STATE FINANCING OF
THE SUPERIOR AND JUSTICE OF THE PEACE COURTS IN ARIZONA,

MY REMARKS

TODAY ARE BASED ON MY OWN WORK IN ARIZONA AND THE OTHER WORK DONE
THE NATIONAL CENTER STAFF IN THIS AREA OVER THE YEARS.
IN HIS LETTER TO THE NATIONAL CENTER ANNOUNCING THIS HEARl
MR. RAY LEBOV 1 COUNSEL TO THIS COMMITTEE; ASKED THREE QUESTI

1)

WHAT COSTS OUGHT TO BE INCLUDED WITHIN THE

)

S:

I

COURT BUDGETS IF STATE FUNDING IS TO OCCUR?

2)

HOW SHOULD THE BONDS AND FORFEITURES COLLECTED BY
~,

E STATE B~ DISTRIBUTED?

3)

HOW MUCH AUTHORITY SHOULD THE STATE ASSUME OVER J
CLASSIFICATIONS; SALARY LEVELS AND WORK LOAD
TRIAL PERSONNEL?

IT WOULD BE INAPPROPRIATE AT THIS POINT FOR THE NATIONAL C
IONS
WHAT

STATES HAVE DONE

CALI

I

BUT I WI

INDICATE ISSUES
-290-
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2
A CALIFORNIA CONSIDERS WHETHER THE STATE WILL ASSUME A GREATER
COURTS.

OF ITS TRI

E OF THE
ltl£LUD£U COSTS

WITH RESPECTS TO THE COSTS FOR WHICH THE STATE MIGHT
ON THE

ICATES THOSE ELEMENTS OF EXP

E

FOR BY TWENTY

SURVEYED IN

1980,

PAY~

E BEl

IN GENERAL1 MOST OF

STATES HAVE ASSUMED ALL OF THE PERSONNEL AND OPERATING COSTS OF
E JUDICIAL SYSTEM EXCEPT FACILITIES,

ONLY TEN OF THE TWENTY STATES

ICH INFORMATION IS AVAILABLE FUND JUVENILE PROBATION SERVICES
SEVEN PAY FOR ADULT PROBATION.
ENI

IN

CALIFORNIA~

BOTH ADULT AND

PROBATION TRADITIONALLY HAS BEEN REGARDED AS PART OF
IVE BRANCH'S RESPONSIBILITY AND THUS MIGHT APPROPRIATELY BE

EXCLUDED FROM STATE FUNDING OF THE COURTS HERE,

PERSONNEL INCLUDED

IN STATE FUNDING USUALLY INCLUDES ALL STAFF SERVING THE

JUDGES~

ING CLERKS~ ALTHOUGH THE CLERK'S OFFICE IS NOT FUNDED IN

NC
VE

AND WEST VIRGINIA.
THE QUESTION OF PAYING FOR FACILITIES HAS BEEN A PROBLEM FOR
S

HAVE MOVED TO STATE FINANCING.

ONLY SEVEN OF THE

S RECENTLY SURVEYED INCLUDE THE COST OF FACILITIES,
STATES~

LOCAL JURISDICTIONS MUST RETAIN THE FULL COST OF

INING THE

FACILITY~

EI

WITH NO COMPENSATION FROM THE STATE

WITH THE STATE PAYING RENT FOR SPACE USED,
FACILITIES GOES BEYOND EXISTING

FACILITIES~

THE QUESTION OF

HOWEVER,

LEGISLATION

HOULD INDICATE WHO MUST BEAR THE COST OF REFURBISHING OR
R

IRI

EXISTING SPACE AND

E.

E QUESTION OF WHO WILL PAY FOR

U

BE

IN

E COST OF ADDITIONS TO EXISTING

SED.
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FACILITIES ALSO

TABLE 1
(BAS
ALL OF

ELEMENTS OF EXPENSE PAID
OF 20 STATES INDENTIFI
FINANCING OF THE JUDICIAL

)

20
20

PERSONNEL
TRAVEL
COURT-APPOINTED COUNSEL
CAPITAL OUTLAY
OPERATING EXPENSES
JURY FEES
WITNESS FEES
INDIGENT TRANSCRIPTS
SANITY EXAMINATIONS
DATA PROCESSING
LAW LIBRARY
JUVENILE PROBATION PERSONNEL
SERVICE OF PROCESS
FAC I UTI
ADULT PROBATION PERSONNEL
DOM
IC RE
IONS COUNSELORS
J
I
D
ION PERSONNEL
PR
IAL R
E

IJ

.

NO, OF STATES FUNDING

fLEMENT OF EXPENSE

S

BY THE STATES
IDI

16
15
15
15
15
9
7
7
3
1

1

I I IN HARRY 0,

)

J
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E

3

IF LOCALITI
AS

ARE SUPPOS

TO

SUME THE

OF

EXISTING FACILITIES; BUT EVERYTHING ELSE IN THE

a.n

E

A

ICl

IS FUNDED BY THE STATE) THERE WILL BE LITTLE REASON FOR THE
TO EXP
AGENCY,

SCARCE RESOURCES TO BUILD A NEW FACILITY FOR A
THE

MIGHT WANT TO PAY FOR NEW COURT FACILITIES

IF IT CHOOSES TO REQUIRE LOCALITIES TO PAY FOR EXISTING
FACILITIES,
NEW FURNITURE AND EQUIPMENT NORMALLY ARE REGARDED AS OPERATI
COSTS OF THE STATE-FINANCED SYSTEM,
S

BUT) IN ADDITION) LEGISLATION

ADDRESS WHAT HAPPENS TO EXISTING EQUIPMENT AND FURNITURE.

IF

E STATE APPROPRIATES THAT EQUIPMENT AND FURNITURE--WHICH NORHALLY

IS

E WITHOUT COMPENSATION TO THE COUNTIES--THE BILL PROVIDING FOR

STATE FINANCING ALSO SHOULD PROVIDE FUNDS FOR THE INVENTORYING OF
SUCH EQUIPMENT AND FURNITURE PRIOR TO THE STATE'S ASSUMING TITLE,
JURY AND WITNESS FEES ARE MANDATED COSTS OF THE JUDICIAL
AND ARE UNCONTROLLABLE IN SONE DEGREE.

SOME STATES HAVE LEFT

J

AND WITNESS FEES AS LOCAL RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN EFFORT TO

R

E THE TOTAL BILL ASSUMED BY THE STATE.

THE DECISION REGARDING

WILL PAY JURY AND WITNESS FEES CARRIES WITH IT SEVERAL IMPORTANT
EMENT COSTS; EITHER FOR THE LOCALITIES OR THE STATE1 WHICH ALSO
E CONSIDERED,

THE PRINCIPLE ONES ARE THE COST OF STAFF

NE

TO ASSURE PAYMENT AND THE NEED FOR UNIFORMITY IN APPROACH IN

A

-FUNDED SYSTEM,
FEES FOR ATTORNEYS APPOINTED TO REPRESENT INDIGENTS AND FOR
L PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICES ALSO MUST BE ADDRESSED,

AGAIN 1 MOST

ALL OF THE STATES HAVE ASSUMED THE COST OF COURT-APPOINTED
CO

SEL,
HER AR

NON

LESSJ IF A STATE'S FUNDS ARE LIMITED1 THIS IS
THAT MIGHT BE LEFT FOR LOCAL FUNDING.
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PAGE

4

E

I BUT ION

DI

0

J

ICI

E

R

LOCALITIES:

1)

REVENUE
VIDI

I

2)

s

R

p

F

0

E

I

EE

E

IDI

us

1)

IN

I

L1

I

p

F E F
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TABLE 2
PERCENTAGE DISTRIBUTION OF FINES AND FEES
TO STATE AND LOCAL FUNDS
BY STATE FUNDED JUDICIAL SYSTEl-1S

8
Alaska
Colorado

ssouri

Ne\v York

North Carolina
South Dakota
W:;st-

Virginia

Sic

"

20%
%

90
100%

0

100

0

100%

0

100%

0

100%

0

0

0

0

9

9

0

0

0

0

0%

100%

0

0

0

0

100%

0

0

0

100%

0

100%

0

0

0

d

d

100%

0

0

0

80

20%

0

0

0

0

0

100%

40%

60%

0

100%

f

f

f

f

f

f

49.89

50.11

49.89

50 .11.

0

0

o9

100%

o9

100%

0

0

0

100%

40%h

60%

0

0

100% of all fees are paid to the state.
0% of the D.U.I. fines
side the city limits) are
to the
State Highway Users Fund; the municipalities receive the o
0

Interest collected by the Court of Chancery in New Castle County
spl
50/50 between the state and county.
00% of all
nes are paid to the state, while 100%
the counties;
depend upon the type of
Circuit fees are
80/20 rat ,

go

between the state and counties on a 5
on the type of case involved.

100% of all fees go to the state, and 100% of the fines
loeal governments by the
, limited, and special
courts.
The justice of the peace courts, which were not
s table·,
100% of their fees to local government
the rnajori
s,
for violations of spec
l
statutes, such as the Environmental Conservation Law,
able to the state, with the local governments receiving a
of five dollars.

5% of municipal

fines are paid to the state.

00% of a 1 fines are pa

to local governments.
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PAGE

5
2)
3)

STATE REIMBURSES COUNTI

FOR DOC

EXP

ES.

THE STATE PAYS EACH COUNTY A BLOCK GRANT; BAS
NUMBER OF JUDGES} POPULATION; OR FILINGS,

THE SIZE OF CALIFORNIA'S TRIAL COURT SYSTEMS AND THE DIVERSI
AMONG THE COUNTIES MAKES THE CHOICE AMONG
DIFFICULT,

E VARIOUS METHODS

NO METHOD IS WITHOUT PROBLEMS.

MOST STATES THAT FINANCE TRIAL COURTS USE
APPROACH,

FIRST 1 LI

TRIAL COURT STAFF ARE TRANSFERRED FROM COUNTY TO

EMPLOYMENT AND THE PERSONNEL SYSTEM IS ADMINISTERED AT THE
LEVEL.

THERE ARE SOUND REASONS FOR THIS APPROACH,

TWO OF THE MOST

IMPORTANT ARE LEGISLATIVE REVIEW AND CONTROL OF THE ALLOCATI
STATE MONIES AND ASSURANCE OF A MINIMUM LEVEL OF FUNDING AND S

ICE

THROUGHOUT THE STATEJ UNAFFECTED BY THE EXIGENCIES OF LOCAL FI
ING

THIS APPROACH} HOWEVER} NECESSARILY IMPOSES SIGNIFI

ISTRATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR THE OFFICE OF

E STATE COURT

ISTRATOR AND AFFECTS THE ADMINISTRATIVE FREEDOM ENJOYED BY
COURTS,

IT CANNOT BE KNOWN TODAY WHETHER

E ADMINISTRATI

NEEDED AT THE STATE LEVEL TO ADMINISTER A STATE JUDICIAL
SY

IN CALIFORNIA WOULD BE SUBSTANTIALLY GREATER THAN THE

P SONNEL ADMINISTRATION STRUCTURE
WOU

REQUIRE A

ADMINISTRATI

THE LOCAL COURTS,

IT

F OF PERSONNEL EXPERTS NOT NOW AVAILABLE IN

E

FICE OF THE COURTS 1 HOWEVER,

THE SECOND APPROACH; COST

REIMBURSEMENT~

IS PREFERAB

TO

LINE-ITEM BUDGET APPROACH FOR SOME BECAUSE FISCAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE
CONTROL REMAIN LARGELY AT THE LOCAL LEVEL AND PERSONNEL DO NOT HAVE
TO BE SHIFTED TO A STATE PERSONNEL SYSTEM,
ASSOCIATED WITH THIS APPROACH} HOWEVER,
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THERE ARE SEVERAL PROBLEMS

FOR ONEJ IF

E STATE

E

E 6

Fl

COSTS

SE

REI

YEAR.~

COSTS INCURRED,

IF COSTS 1

E

OF COSTS TO THE STATE CANNOT BE

TO YEAR,.. A F

F

PAYMENTS

MIGHT BE RELUCTANT

SINCE

BUDGETS.~

ON THE BASIS OF COUNTIES'

IATI

ESS THIS

ENDITURES MAY NOT BE AS GR

E

TO SUBSIDIZE SOME OTHER ASPECT

BUDGETS CAUSING THE

AS

E

THE

' OPERATIONS,
PERHAPS MORE

.J

COSTS

FOR EXAMPLE; ONE COUNTY MIGHT PAY A CLERK

BE REIMBURS

WI

ERE IS THE PROBLEM OF

CRITICALLY.~

WHILE ANOTHER COUNTY PAYS A CLERK PERFORMING ESSENTIALLY
SAME DUTIES $18.~000.

OR.~ ONE COUNTY MIGHT CHARGE THE STATE

5 AN HOUR FOR A COMPUTER PROGRAMM
HOUR,

WILL

SUBMITTED.~

OF ALLOWED COSTS OR MAXIMUM ALLOWED

OR WILL A

IF

IF

R.~

E

ENT

ER TO ISOLATE

CE.

ING

THE SAME

SERVICE.~

SOME COUNTIES

lNG SYSTEM FOR THE JUDICIAL SYST

E

REIMBURS

BY THE STATE,

THEY MAY OR

BURDEN IN ORDER TO RECEIVE THE

ASSUr1E

THE COUNT ES ALSO MIGHT HAVE TO EMPLOY ADDITIONAL STAFF

TO ASSURE DOCUMENTATI
IE COST

STANDARDIZE CATEGORIES OF
PROBLEM OF DIFFERENT AMOUNTS BEl

MINIM

CREATE A NEW

S I

LITTLE OR NO CONTROL OVER

E ATTEMPTS

IN

w

THE STATE MAY NOT BE REIMBURSING

E

F

BY DIFF

ANOTHER CHARGES ONLY

E STATE BE WILLING TO PAY THE COUNTIES' BILLS

COSTS BE REQUIRED?
;

WHI

OF THESE ADDITI

OF

EIR COSTS,

WOULD THE STATE

P

IF SO.~ WOULD THE STATE BE

ONNEL?

ASSUME

R OFF ADMINISTRATING A LINE-ITEM BUDGET AT THE STATE LEVEL AND
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PAGE 7

DI

E

0

E

AND

ONE

I ON,~ BLOCK G

?

IR

TO

E S

INVOLVES THE L

IS APPROACH

HAS INHERENT

TOO,~

E

E PROB

IN ARIZONA,

CALCU

MIGHT BEST BE I
IES'

ING THE

E COUNTY THAT SPENDS
$700.~000 MORE THAN

BUDG

I

}

E MOST PER-J

ARI

E COUNTY THAT SPENT

S ON A POP

ION BASIS THE DI

B

COUNTY THAT SPENT THE MOST ON ITS COURTS ON A POPULATION BASIS
WAS SPENDING

7 TIMES THE AMOUNT SPENT BY THE COUNTY SPENDI

LEAST AMOUNT.

ANY BLOCK GRANT THAT COVERED THE COST OF THE

THAT SPENT THE LEAST WOULD BE UNFAIR TO

OTHER COURTS.

BASING A BLOCK GRANT ON THE COSTS OF

YET

MOST EXPENSIVE

WOULD RESULT IN A SIGNIFICANT WINDFALL TO OTH
E

TYPE OF DISPARITY RESULTED

IES

COUNT!

STS WERE CALC

ON A

PER-FILING BASIS,
R HOW EXI

IT WAS APPARENT IN ARIZONA THAT NO
WERE

COMPARED.~

IT WAS VERY HARD

FIND A SINGLE BLOCK-GRANT FIG
EXPE

THAT \'IOU LD C SELY APPROXI
IF

CO

WERE PROVI

WI

E SI

LICI

EXPENSES)
PROGRAM IS LOST AND

I

A

KG

IN

INI

E PROG

COM

BENEFIT

B

ITURES IN

ST

E
1 ES,

FOR
JON

OF A B

LIKE A

REIMBURSEMENT PROGRAM.
THE
NriES
OTHER COUNTI
AB

A SIGNIFICANTLY LOWER LEVEL THAN

FUND COURTS

WILL HAVE AN INCENTI

THE BLOCK-GRANT

MAY,~

IN E

ECT,~
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MAKE MORE RESOURCES AVAILPROVI

A F

ON

PAGE 8
RESOURCES AVAILABLE IN EACH COUNTY TO THE JUDICIAL BRANCH,

l!IL

DISPARITY AMONG COUNTIES WILL BE LESSENED AND THE QUALITY OF JUSTICE
IN SOME COUNTIES IMPROVED.
AS CAN BE SEENJ THE QUESTION ABOUT THE DEGREE OF CONTROL OVER
TRIAL COURT PERSONNEL IS TIED DIRECTLY TO THE METHOD OF FINANCE,
THE ISSUE WILL BE DIFFICULT TO RESOLVE IN CALIFORNIA,

THE CHOICE

DEPENDS UPON THE RELATIVE WEIGHT OF SEVERAL FACTORS:

1)

THE DEGREE OF LEGISLATIVE OVERSIGHT AND CONTROL DESIRED
FOR JUDICIAL BRANCH EXPENDITURES,

2)

THE LEVEL OF CONCERN REGARDING THE SIZE AND INFLUENCE
OF THE SUPREME COURTJ JUDICIAL COUNCILJ AND THE OFFICE
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE DIRECTOR OF THE COURTS.

3)

THE INTEREST IN MAINTAINING LOCAL DETERMINATION OF
JUDICIAL BUDGETS,

4)

THE VALUE OF LOCAL TRIAL JUDGES NEGOTIATING FOR THEIR
BUDGETS WITH COUNTY GOVERNMENTS VERSUS NEGOTIATING FOR
BUDGETS WITH THE SUPREME COURT (OR JUDICIAL COUNCIL)
AND LEGISLATURE,

5)

THE VALUE OF HAVING ALL JUDICIAL BRANCH EMPLOYEES IN A
STATE JUDICIAL-BRANCH PERSONNEL SYSTEMJ THEREBY PROVIDING SIMILAR COMPENSATION FOR SIMILAR WORK,

6)

THE RISK ASSOCIATED WITH ALLOWING COUNTIES TO SPEND
MONEY PROVIDED BY THE STATE AS THEY CHOOSE,

7)

COUNTIES' WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT SOME RESTRICTIONS ON
THE USE OF OR ACCOUNTING FOR STATE FUNDS IN RETURN
FOR THOSE FUNDS.

8)

THE MANAGEMENT ADVANTAGES AND PROBLEMS IN A SYSTEM AS
LARGE AS CALIFORNIA'S,
-299-
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E
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s

CONS

ss

IN

ICI

w

ESS

FI

I

R

ssu

IN

E

E

WI

s

BE

FI

s

E

E

E

c

0

s ES
E
F

E

DIF

R

T IS

N

IN
E

A

E

ING FOR

ss

TO
E

T WI

E

ICES

E

L

E

A NUMBER OF COURTS IN CALIFORNIA USE DATA PROCESSING,
CASES

E SUPPORT FOR THE DATA PROCESSING SYSTEM IS PROVIDED BY

PERSONNEL.
S

IF THE STATE ASSUMES RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL THESE

COSTS COULD BE ENORMOUS,
SERVICE CONTRACTS WI

CO

IN

IF THE STATE ATTEMPTS TO ENTER

LOCALITIES FOR THESE SERVICES; THE

MAY CHARGE THE STATE FOR COSTS THAT THE COUNTIES DO NOT
EGARD AS JUDICIAL-BRANCH COSTS.

FURTHERJ THE COURTS MAY

E PROBLEMS GETTING NEEDED DATA PROCESSING SUPPORT BECAUSE THEY
LONGER ARE PART OF COUNTY GOVERNMENT,

IN A WORLD INCREASINGLY

NT OF DATA PROCESSINGJ THE QUESTIONS OF CONTROL OVER AND
RIOR

ON A COMPUTER ARE VERY IMPORTANT.
REGARDLESS OF THE SCOPE AND METHOD OF FINANCING CHOSENJ ANY

ADDITIONAL STATE FINANCING WILL HAVE SOME IMPACT ON THE ADMINISTRATIVE
F

E OF THE COURTS.

THE COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH THE NEW ROLE FOR

NISTRATIVE OFFICE MAY BE MORE APPARENT THAN REALJ IN THAT
RE MAY BE NO MORE THAN A SHIFT OF PERSONNEL FROM LOCAL GOVERNMENT
E
E

INI

I

OFFICEJ BUT IN A SYSTEM AS LARGE AS CALIFORNIA'S

OF A MAJOR INCREASE IN STAFFING AT THE STATE LEVEL IS

EV

THEN AGAIN; THERE MAY NEED TO BE A REAL INCREASE IN
IVE STAFF SIMPLY BECAUSE OF THE SIZE OF THE NEW SYSTEM
E

AT

INISTERED.

NOT ALL THE INCREASE WILL BE LIMITED TO THE

LEVELJ EITHERJ AS LOCAL COURTS MAY NEED TO HAVE STAFF TO PERFORM

SE

CES NOW PROVIDED BY OTHER COUNTY DEPARTMENTS OR TO RESPOND TO

R

R ENTS OF THE NEW STATE SYSTEM.
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PAGE

E
SHARE

IONS ASSOCIATED WI

ASSUMING A GR

THE COSTS OF TRIAL COURTS

E NUMEROUS

ER

COMP

E

CHOICES THAT MUST BE MADE CANNOT ADEQUATELY BE MADE NOW B

E

MUCH OF

INFORMATION NEEDED TO MAKE REASONABLE JUDGMENTS IS

AVAILABLE.

THIS COMMITTEE MIGHT CONSIDER

CREATING A SPECIAL STUDY COMMI

E ADVISABILITY OF

AND/OR OBTAINING SPECIAL

SULTANT SERVICES TO ADDRESS THESE AND
WI

STATE FINANCING,

COS

IF

OTHER ISSUES ASSOC

STATE CHOOSES TO ASSUME MORE

OF THE OPERATION OF TRIAL COURTS; IT SHOU

OF

THOSE COSTS WI

BE.

HAVE SOME ID

; EVEN IF THIS COMMITTEE

ISLATURE BELIEVE THAT STATE FINANCING OF THE TRIAL
LY IS DESIRAB

ULTI
RAMIFI

IT

WI

AP

lATE THIS
PPY TO

E FU

TAKE A

OR

TIME WELL SP

TWO TO OBTAIN THAT INFORMATI
I

S

, MORE INFORMATION IS NEEDED BEFORE

IONS OF THAT CHOICE CAN

•

THE

B

0

POND

I
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MAY
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EXHIBIT R

STATEMENT TO THE CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
NOVEivlliER 18, 1981, HASTINGS SCHOOL OF LAW,
SAN FRANCISCO, CALIFORNIA
BY BEATRICE HOFFMAN,
COURT RESEARCH ASSOCIATES,
2145 Jackson Street, San Francisco, CA

94115

Thank you for allowing me to testify today. My name is
Beatrice Hoffman.
I represent no organization, only myself,
a California resident interested in the preservation of a
strong and independent judiciary, which I believe is critical
to the maintenance of the separation of powers concept so
intrinsic to our form of government.
I own and operate a small consulting firm, and have provided
research or technical assistance to individual courts or
state court administrative offices in the states of California,
Colorado, Indiana, Idaho, Louisiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Missouri, Maine, New Hampshire, and Oregon.
Prior to opening my firm, I was Director of Research and
Development for the Colorado State Judicial Department. I
started there in 1970, at the time state funding was first
implemented. Over a seven year period, my responsibilities
have included data collection and analysis, planning for
courts and probation departments, data processing services,
records management, and budget.
From 1978 to 1981, I was a member of a two-person evaluation
team which semi-annually reviewed and evaluated the progress
of the State Courts Administrator's office in implementing
Missouri's new unified state court system.
The other member of that team, Professor Harry 0. Lawson,
of the Denver University School of Law and former Colorado
State Court Administrator, completed a study in 1979 of 20
state funded judicial systems.l He found so much variation
among the systems that it was virtually impossible to construct
meaningful models for comparison purposes.

1

Lawson, Harry 0. et al, State Funding of Court Systems,
An Initial Examination7 'Washington, D.C., American
Univers~ty Law Inst~tute, June 1979.
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HOFFMAN

I suggest that proposed legislation for state funding specify
clearly that certain revenues be kept by local governments
for their general fund, to cover, among other purposes, court
facility and maintenance costs.
I do not have a specific amount in mind, but suggest two
possibilities. New York sends 100 percent of all fees to the
state and 100 percent of all fines to local government, from
both general and limited jurisdiction courts. Another option
would be to make an 80/20, state/local, split in all fines
and fees from general and limited jurisdiction courts, with
100 percent of municipal ordinance fines going to the local
municipality.
I am aware that there are a number of state statutes
already specifying various formulas for fine and fee distribution,
and I realize my suggestion poses problems.
There is an
increasing proliferation of these laws, and they are getting
bu.t:densome for the courts. A more uniform distribution, if
one could be achieved with a minimum of exceptions, would be
highly desirable.
Another matter I wish to address is that of personnel. I
believe strongly in a separate judicial personnel system. The
American Bar Association and the National Advisory Commission
on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals have stressed the need
for a separate, independent judicial personnel system in order
that the judiciary maintains itself as an independent and
respected branch of government, on par with the executive and
legislative branches, and in order to take responsibility for
administering its own affairs effectively, efficiently, and
fairly.
There are other advantages to installing a state judicial
personnel system. It allows for equalization of pay scales
for like duties, permitting accountability to the legislature.
It provides a career ladder for judicial system employees,
allowing them to transfer within the system, from one court to
another, one district to another.
It fosters professional
pride and loyalty and encourages cost-effective training
programs.
In most states where the court system has been state funded,
state-wide personnel rules have been adopted by the Supreme
Court.
This transition from local to state classifications
takes substantial time and work, with much review by judges
and non-judicial personnel. Most states have taken a minimum
of two years for the task, and it might take longer in
California.
In Colorado, the transition was administered by
the Supreme Court; in Missouri, it was administered by a
Personnel Committee composed of presiding circuit judges.
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I think it is critical, for such a system to work well,
that local jurisdictions be allowed to hire locally and
administer the system locally, within the regulations of the
state system. The state office should do reclassifications,
have an appeals board composed of judges and clerks, and
assist and monitor the local jurisdictions in complying with
the rules.2
If California decides to fund operating expenses and
capital outlay as well as personnel and travel, then local
involvement should be high in fiscal administration and
budget preparation, as well as in personnel matters. I think
this is a structural necessity in making a state system work
with a minimum of red tape.
In Lawson's study of 20 states,
Colorado is the only one where judicial districts handle their
own operating funds.
It is one of a very few states that
allows local purchasing.
One other point: when state funding is proposed, neither
the legislature nor the judiciary recognizes the need for
additional qualified administrative staff to help
operate the system and provide accountability. The fact is
that, just as in the executive branch, a state judicial system
needs administrative staff to make the transition smooth and
the system operate efficiently.
As you are aware, in the past decade there has been a
dramatic increase in the number of court systems which are
state funded, either totally or substantially. Eleven states
were state-funded in 1972; as of this date, 27 states have
state-funded
courts or have legislation that provides
for gradual implementation of state funding.
State funding can work ... but careful planni~g, cooperation
between various levels of government, ample transition time,
and sufficient staff are all required.
Thank you very much for allowing me to testify.

2 Lawson, Harry 0., H.R. Ackerman, Jr. and Donald E. Fuller,
Personnel Administration in the Courts. Washington, D.C.,
American university Institute for Advanced Studies in
Justice, February 1978.
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The Economy and Efficiency Commission is a group appointed by the
Board of Supervisors. It is charged by ordinance with studying any area of
County government and making recommendations to the Board to improve the
effectiveness, efficiency and economy of local goverment operations. The
commission has 21 members, all of whom serve without compensation of any
kino. I provide staff services to the commission in th-e conduct of its
studies, under provisions of a personal.services contract with the County.
Com!ll_i s s i o_n_Wor~_on_the Court Sys tern
In March, 1981, the Board asked the Economy and Efficiency Commission
to review issues of congestion and delay in the court system. In October,
we issued il report with fifteen recommendations for coordinated action by
Board, Judiciary and 1cgislature. This analysis and reconmendations provide
<l strategic basis for addressing conyestion in the system as a resources
problem-- which is, after all, what the word congestion means. Th(' report
contains an overview for planning, but the details of implementation are not
present. On November 10, 1981, after a hearing, the Board of Supervisors
adopted the recommendations for further joint development by county and
court agencies.
I have supplied your staff with a copy of the commission's report and
recommendations. I have also supplied a.list of past Economy and [fficiency
reconn1endations, since 1967, bearing on more narrowly defined court and
court system issues.

of the Trial Courts
In past reports, our commission
recommended full State funding of
trial court system,
marily
thi~ the context of a comprehensive
restructuring of local government systems. The Post commission made a
s~imilar recommendation in 1979.
The Board of Supervisc!h has consistently held
the same position, and has supported a·variety of bills offered in recent
years to implement State funding or revise revenue allocation formulas.
In our report in October, our
or recommend that
Board oppose,

comm~ssion
fu~l- State
~ '1

stated that it would not oppose,
funding of the court
tern.

However, we did not repeat or call "for increased emphasis on the·
State
recommendation for full State funding. in
Ange es County alone,
d
funding of the court system -- including all departments and overheads
require additional financing of at least $170 million. In the rerort, our
commission pointed out that the State is apparently as deficient in tax revenues
as
Coun
a that shifting cos ts~nnong a 1ternat ive tax bases wou1 d not
be adequate to resolve the system's r~·ources problems. It does not appear
realistic to hope for
1 State financing.
4
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Instead, we reconmended that the State subsidy formulas be revised to
prov de for a fixed proportion of total system costs, net of fines, fodcitun:s
and
s for service in each county. That would index the subsidy to costs;
equivdlently, vJe ltJould •favor indexing the subsidy to inflation. The com~1ission
furthur recormnended that the State fund~OO percent of any addi tionu1 court
system costs attributable to the impact of new 1egislation on system caseloads
or on case complexity.
ta

Your agenda
today's hearing contained three specific questions.
will
hese up assuming that the State .funds 100 percent of the court systen1.

\~hat costs? We would propose t!iat the State finance all direct and
indirec cos
the follo1ving: Superior Court, Municipal Courts, County Clerk,
Sheriff's Civil Division, Marshal, and Mandatory Courts' expense. In direct
irect costs we include all salar1es and employee benefits, all the costs
of space and the maintenance of space, all the ad!llinistrat·ive overhead. In our
, we provided an estimate of total annual system costs in Los Anqeles at
million (includinr~.costs now funded by State subvention or subs·idy).

D

·~tribution

of Fine<; and

Forf!~Hures.

·;ubjc-\X.in-diita·iY~irl

Our co111mission did not addre',s

the-1Ycfob-cr--r-cl)(wT. We suqqe';tcd that UH: t~l1ou ion
nnu a:;; be r·evised to take into account U1e proportionality amonq the vari(JUS

jur·i•;dictional costs they are intended to finance. At prr~·:;ent, cities coll•·ct
an average of 89 percent of fine and forfeiture revenue (exclusive of surcharqe).
In what sense can we justify a statement that the cities, in performing la1·1
enforcement and prosecutorial services bear 89 percent of the costs while the
crmrts bear 11 percent? That seems t6 u~ to be the question to ;wswel~,
rdless of whether the State assumes the funding responsibility and coJl,!cLs
t revenue. Were 100 percent of current fines, forfeitures and fees fnr
ice to be allocated to the court system, they would fund at most about nalf
total cost of the system in Los Angeles County.
State Authority. If the State assumes full financial responsibility for
costsof-fhe-CourT system, then we believe the State should eliminate a11
responsibility for the personnel and administrative functions. There is
po nt in duplicating such functions.

___£,J!JW oa c h
In considering congestion, our commission sought to identify means
ssing the lack of sufficient resources in three ways: 1) reducing costs,
ncreasing revenues, and 3) modifying the incentives and programs to whicl1
local legal community responds .
•

In addition to support of the programs established by the courts to
ieve congestion, we propose a comprehensive program to restructure the
system, based on the cost that each source of revenue is intended to
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In particular, we propose a rev1s1on of the fee
r service sy~;l.em
ies in the cow~ts. At present, the system of fi1inq fr~es, 111otion

o(

c1

use fees
r speci c services cannot be used to i11flu0nce
demand or to steer lit
nts and
ir at
lo lt";', costly ill Lcr·n.; iV(",
when appropriate. Con
ly, vJe see itt e incentive to promote 1c'>s
costly alternatives· we see potential i~quities; and we see a continuing
shift of costs from
demandi
services to the
1 taxpayer.
Our report proposes a fee-for-service system in tlw cou
\vhich would
1) index fees to costs so that
at least keep up with inflation, nd
2) promote a
1 cost recovery polic~ when less costly alternatives a
ava lable to li gants and lav1yers
~,
'

..

We identified three candidates
initial application of such a
policy in
civil system: fees for court reporters, fees for jury panels,
fees for process serving by public agencies. (
in, we did not s
y
details of how to i
ement any new fee.)
The fi1incJ fee ir(
or Com·t pn:::;ently inclw!l·', $L3 for unnl.
reporter. The fee has not changed for· at least ten ycMs -- so Luxpdyi·r:, "rc
paying a larger share now, due to infla on,
n vJhen the $13 lev<~l was ct.
We
tion the
i
incl i
is in
fi1i
fee --a lorger
po
tion of the cases
led settle, so some litigants are su
ing o
us
of court reporters.
st i
nt,
courts have tried in vain
r years
to obtain legislation enabling appropriate use of such less costly allernat ves
as electronic
ing or waiver when appropriate. More sensible pricing of
the
for service for the reporter
create su
c ent incentives to s
implementation
cost alterna ve~<;. We
e the same kind
a[~Lention
to jury
of a
to
-- and
the
consoli
pr ce
civil process serving -- a
Mars 1.
Conclusion
In its recent report,
and Efficiency Co11nni
upp ic(
program addressin9 court conqestion. Thf' commission' n:c
l.i(J!i 1m the
te funding question was that
State su
be inJcx£~J to cos (u!' Lu
in ation) ra
than to fi
dollar amounts for vari s sources of cos . We
did not repeat our past
11 State fincl!Kinq. Shou cl
te assume res
bili
the court system, we uqqe
tit pay 100
11 costs ~$1
11ion u1orc
now); pr'Ot'dt 1 ' to
County
territory whatever s re cities wo d receive,
sed on the
police
utorial servi s;
ieve
, salary a
wo k oad
sta
s.
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